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POSIDONIUS AND THE FLIGHT OF THE MIND THROUGH THE UNIVERSE

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Gregory of Nyssa, in *De anima et resurrectione* 48A, finds support for his theory that the soul remains in all the dispersed elements of the body after death in the fact that even in this life it is able in thought to view the heavens and reach the uttermost parts of the universe. In the occurrence of this idea Gronau sees a weighty argument for the Posidonian origin of this section of the work.

So preist Poseidonios die Erhabenheit der ratio und ihre Allgegenwart an vielen Stellen, indem er besonders die Fähigkeit der Seele betont, im Denken selbst Dinge, die himmelweit voneinander getrennt sind, vereinigen zu können, ohne dabei selbst irgendwie zerrissen zu werden.¹

In confirmation he cites Capelle's commentary on the first chapter of the *De mundo*,² repeats the parallels cited by the latter, and gives others of his own. Somewhat similarly, Norden assigns to Posidonius certain passages in the *Poemandres* which portray the flight of the mind through the universe.³

I have no desire to deny that Posidonius may have used this figure of the flight of the mind; in view of its frequent occurrence from the

¹ *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, p. 241. Gronau's other arguments rest on parallels between Gregory and Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* i. 70-71; but these latter sections are certainly not Posidonian.

² "Schrift von der Welt," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, VIII (1905), 534.

³ *Agnostos Theos*, pp. 26 ff.; 105 ff.

time of Pindar in writers of all kinds it would be strange if it were foreign to him. Nor have I any inclination to deny to him what so often is joined with this idea: the depreciation of earthly things, "*die schwärmerische Bewunderung der Caelestia*," the belief that in wonder at the starry heavens we find the roots of religion and philosophy. Such convictions he could hardly have escaped after the *Timaeus*, the *Epinomis*, the Aristotelian *περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. But to assume that Posidonius was the only channel through which the commonplaces of poets and philosophers flowed down to later antiquity is preposterous. Further, we find that those who have busied themselves with compiling lists of these commonplaces have frequently paid little attention to the immediate contexts in which they occur. Yet often in Philo, Maximus of Tyre, and the Church Fathers these ideas are imbedded in contexts which could hardly be assigned to Posidonius even by those who make the largest assumption of Platonic borrowings in his philosophy; and, indeed, the partisans of Posidonius frequently fail to indicate how much of these passages they claim for him.

It is my present purpose, first, to show by a hasty survey what scarcely requires proof, that the imaginative flight of the mind through the universe is an utter commonplace; then to examine more carefully a considerable number of later passages containing this idea, in which scholars have found traces of Posidonius, neglecting, however, in their desire to gather parallels, important peculiarities.

Although the swiftness of thought must have impressed itself on the human mind from most remote antiquity (cf. Homer's *ὅς πτερὸν ἡὲ νόημα*), the earliest passage we can cite for its flight through the universe is the fragment of Pindar which Plato works into *Theaetetus* 173. Boeckh's suggestion that Pindar is speaking of physical philosophers seems by no means improbable. A similar thought seems to be implied in Euripides' *Alcestis* 963-64: *ἔγώ καὶ διὰ μούσας καὶ μετάρσιος θύξα*. Perhaps we have parodies of it in Aristophanes' *Clouds* 225 ff. and 761 ff.¹ The first philosophical passage preserved to us is in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* i. 4. 17, where from the wide range of the mind of man is inferred God's care for the whole universe. We hardly need more evidence that the thought is a commonplace than its occur-

¹ Cf. Van Leeuwen's notes. With *ἀεροβατῶ* cf. *αἰθεροβατεῖ* in Philo *Spec. leg.* i. 37; *օιρανοβατεῖν* in Vettius Valens, p. 241, l. 14 (Kr.); and the "Mithraic" liturgy: *ὅπως ἔγώ μόνος αἰγῆρός (?) οιρανὸν βαίνω καὶ κατοπτρεῖν πάντα*.

rence here.¹ We have referred above to *Theaeletus* 173 ff. It may not be amiss here to mention *Republic* 486A, where the philosopher is said to be the spectator of all time and all existence, to whom the life of man is no great matter. Aristo of Chios in his attack upon physics says: "Not even if we could ascend higher than Perseus, 'above the sea's stream, beyond the Pleiades,' and with our very eyes behold the universe and the nature of things."² It is not my purpose here to list later parallels, many of which are to be discussed in the course of this paper. I call attention merely to Horace's *Odes*, i. 28. 4 ff.:

ne quicquam tibi prodest
aërias temptasse domos animoque rotundum
percurrisse polum morituro,

and Ovid's *Fasti*, i. 297.

But a little study makes it evident that the passages which portray the imaginative flight of the mind through the universe are not the only ones to be considered. Norden lays great stress upon resemblances between the *Poemandres* and the *Somnium Scipionis*, a dream-ascent. Maximus of Tyre believes that the space-transcending power of the mind is the true meaning of Aristeas' supernatural vision of the world.³ Vettius Valens combines a supernatural ascent of Nechepso with the figurative ascent granted by astrology.⁴ And in our study of Philo we shall see numerous points of contact between supernatural and eschatological ascents and figurative ascents.

Thus it may be well to glance hastily at the more important examples of these two types, which for our purpose we may group together, especially since often by a supernatural ascent the soul of a living man gains visions which belong to souls not yet incarnate and to souls freed from the stains of the body. Such fancies may be of considerable antiquity,⁵ but the earliest example preserved to us is found in the introduction to the poem of Parmenides.⁶ The chief literary sources for these thoughts and the chief models of the later

¹ Gronau omits this reference altogether, calling *Theaelet.* 173E "die älteste mir bekannte philosophische Stelle."

² *Apud Eusebium, Praepar. evang.* xv. 62. ³ x. 2 ff.

⁴ P. 241 (Kr.), quoted by Reitzenstein, *Poemandres*, pp. 5-6.

⁵ Cf. the cosmic visions of the Objibwas, R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion*, pp. 223-24.

⁶ The formal and literary character of Parmenides' treatment might seem to point to the antiquity and wide currency of such conceptions.

Greeks were the myths of Plato. In the *Phaedrus* the gods and blessed souls behold not only the sights within the heavens, but, when they rise above the rim of the world, ideal and supercelestial beauties as well. In the *Phaedo* we have the vision of the true earth and the heavens. In the *Republic* Er beholds the revolutions of the planets. Apparently many of Plato's pupils made use of these same fancies; we can point to *Epinomis* 986D, 992B, where we have a reminiscence of *Phaedo* 111A; to Aristotle, fragments 40-41; to Heraclides Ponticus, who has stories of Pythagoras, Empedotimus, the man fallen from the moon (perhaps in this last case the motif is used to introduce what was primarily an account of astronomy). Clearchus of Soli, Aristotle's pupil, imitated the myth of Er. In Eratosthenes, Hermes rises to heaven and views celestial sights; a similar motif is found in Alexander of Ephesus and in Varro Atacinus. The version of the story of Aristeas found in Maximus of Tyre, in which Aristeas, risen aloft, contemplates earth and heaven, presumably was borrowed from some earlier author.

We have already referred to the fragment of Nechepso in Vettius Valens. Reitzenstein, in his commentary upon this, is inclined to believe that the motif is Egyptian in origin and that Eratosthenes drew his *Hermes* from Egyptian material, and he points out that Thoth-Hermes was the god of astronomy. But the idea of ascent seems better established for Greece than for Egypt; and the myth of Hermes' invention of the lyre and the notion of the music of the spheres make the combination which we find in this poem very obvious, though it is conceivable that the fact that Thoth-Hermes was the god of astronomy may have been an added incentive to Eratosthenes. We mention here only a few later examples of the granting to the blessed the sights of heaven; Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* i. 44, where the probabilities, I believe, are against Posidonius' being the source; *Somnium Scipionis*, where he is surely not the source; Seneca *Consolatio ad Marciam*; Plutarch, *De facie in orbe lunae* 943E; and the myth in *De genio Socratis*. Lucian's *Icaromenippus* is a satirical treatment of the theme of supernatural ascent. It is highly probable, too, that anyone who assumed the continued existence of the soul in regions above the earth may have upon occasions portrayed its visions there, contrasting its blessedness with its evil state upon earth.

After this survey of the various types of ascent which were current let us turn to the consideration of portrayals of the imaginative ascent in Philo and Maximus of Tyre and other later authors, with a view to discovering the features which distinguish them from such commonplace statements of the notion as we find, for example, in *De mundo*, chapter i, or Horace's *Odes* i. 28. 4.

Perhaps the best example in Philo is the one referred to by Capelle and Gronau, *De opificio mundi* 69 ff. It runs as follows: Man is made in the image and the likeness of God, but it is man's reason, the guide of his soul, that is like God. What God is in the universe, that reason is in man. It is invisible, though it sees all things; it grasps the nature of all else, though its own nature is obscure. It traverses earth and sea and all that is therein. It mounts on wings through the air, it rises to the ether and the circles of the heavens; following its passion for wisdom, it joins the rhythmic dance of the stars. Rising above the sensible, striving after the intelligible, it views the Ideas, the patterns of this world, possessed by a wineless intoxication, a rapture as of the Corybantes. It is seized by a further longing; it fancies it may ascend to the very height of the intelligible, to the Great King himself. But as it strives to gaze on him, there pour forth from him pure beams of light, in such wise that it is dazzled by the effulgence.

Now it is to be observed that Capelle in his quotation does not follow the mind beyond the bounds of the stellar universe. Treated in this way the passage seems much closer to *De mundo*, chapter i.

In our examination let us look also at the sections immediately preceding. We find there the idea that in the creation there is no succession in time, certainly not a Stoic notion. The use of *φύσις* for the organizing principle of the embryo is Stoic. The independent origin, *θύραθεν*, of the reasoning soul, Philo's constant belief, is Platonic-Peripatetic. The passage on the parts of the soul seems impossible for Posidonius, if we are to believe the evidence of Galen; but this deserves, perhaps, a separate treatment. We observe the Platonic language of archetype and image. Continuing with 69, outlined above, we note that *νοῦς* as *ἡγεμόν* is Platonic and Stoic. The invisibility of the soul which sees all else is an old commonplace.¹ That its *οὐσία* is *ἄδηλος* is said elsewhere in Philo, but is not so much of a commonplace.

¹ Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* i. 4. 9.

Could we attribute it to any doctor of the Stoic school? In the description of the ascent of the mind we note the common motifs characteristic of the type. But the phrase *πτηνός ἀρθείς*, though possible for any one, reminds us of the *Phaedrus* myth, of *πτηνός γενόμενος* of *Phaedo* 109E, of *πέτεται* in *Theaetetus* 173E; *συμπεριποληθείς* recalls *Phaedrus* 252C: *καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν*; cf., also, Alcinoüs, chapter xxvii, in close dependence upon the *Phaedrus*: *συνεστίους θεῖς γινομένας καὶ συμπεριπολόσας*, where *συνεστίους* is probably from Empedocles, fragment 147: *ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι*. We note *ἔρως σοφίας*, found in many other passages of Philo, and in Maximus, which certainly suggests Plato. In the phrase *πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν οὐσίαν ὑπερκίνψας*, of frequent occurrence elsewhere in Philo and other authors, we detect *Phaedrus* 249C: *καὶ ἀνακίνψασα εἰς τὸ δύν ὄντως*. The substitution of *ὑπερκύπτειν* for *ἀνακύπτειν* is usual; cf. Proclus' commentary on the *Timaeus* iii. 349. 5, a paraphrase of the *Phaedrus* myth. The phrase *πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἀψίδα* is surely a reminiscence of *Phaedrus* 247B, *ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα*, though Philo's use of the phrase here is different from Plato's. The use of *χορεία* of the motions of the stars is a commonplace; cf. Sophocles' *Antigone* 1146; Euripides' *Ion* 1074; but we note its occurrence in *Epinomis* 982E. The dazzling of the eyes of the soul when it strives to look upon God, a favorite idea with Philo,¹ seems to have its expression colored by such passages as *Republic* 515C (cf. use of *μαρμαρυγαῖ*); *Laws* 892E:

μὴ δὴ σκοτοδινάντιλιγγόν τε ὑμῖν ἐμποιήσῃ;

and 897D:

μὴ τοίνυν ἔξι ἐναντιάς οἷον εἰς ἥλιον ἀποβλέποντες, νίκτα ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ ἐπαγόμενοι, ὡς τοῦν ποτε θυητοῖς ὄμμασι ὀψόμενοι τε καὶ γνωσόμενοι ἰκανῶς.

In sections 67–68 we have observed the presence of elements which cannot be Posidonian; in the description of the ascent we have a doctrine of Ideas as patterns, a doctrine of the transcendence of God, utterly incompatible with Posidonius' metaphysics even on the assumption of the truth of Schmekel's theory of the equation of *ἰδέαι* and *λόγοι* in our platonizing Stoic. What is there, then, in common between this passage of Philo and *De mundo*, chapter i? Only the notion that philosophy is the ascent of the soul above the things of earth!

¹ Cf. *Spec. leg.* i. 37–38; *De fuga* 165; *De Abrah.* 76; *De praemissis* 38.

But let us note another example of the influence of the *Phaedrus* upon similar passages of Philo. In *Alleg. leg.* iii. 84 we find the verb *μετεωροπολεῖν* used of the soul in wanderings aloft. This comes from *Phaedrus* 246C, where our manuscripts read *ἐπτερωμένη μετεωροπορεῖ*, though *μετεωροπολεῖ* was read by Syrianus, and, according to certain manuscripts, by Hermias. This occurs also in *Spec. leg.* i. 207, where the soul in the company of the host of heaven under the leadership of God is described after *Phaedrus* 246E.

Closely allied to the type of passages we have been considering is a group in which sight is praised as the source of philosophy. This notion goes back to Plato,¹ but is presumably a commonplace possible for Stoics as well as Platonists. There are present, however, certain particulars which deserve attention. In *De Abrahamo* 157, after the origin of philosophy has been traced back to the sense of sight, Philo gives some of the questions raised by philosophy. Is the universe *ἀγέννητον* or *γενητόν*, infinite or finite? Is there one world or a plurality of worlds? Are the four elements the elements of the whole universe or has the heaven a special nature? Who is the Creator, and what is he in *οὐσίᾳ* and *ποιήσῃ*? What is his purpose, what his present activity, what his *διαγωγή*? Very similar to this is *Spec. leg.* iii. 186, but in place of asking questions Philo says that the reason *λογισμὸν εἰκότα ἐλάμβανεν* that the world is not the work of chance but of the reason of God, the Father and Creator; that it is not infinite, but is one universe, surrounded as a city by the sphere of the fixed stars; that the Father cares for his creation, both the whole and the part. Then questions begin: What is the essence of the visible world? Is the essence of the heavens the same as of the rest of the universe? Are the causes that keep things together *σώματα* or *ἀσώματοι*? The truly philosophic disposition is revealed by its reflection concerning God and the world and the intelligible patterns. In still another passage, *De opificio mundi* 54, we have the same motifs: praise of the eyes, glorification of the universe, and questions raised by its contemplation.²

In these passages, which are plainly variant treatments of the same material, Philo cannot have been following Posidonius or any Stoic source. We observe the phrase in *Spec. leg.* iii. 186, *λογισμὸν εἰκότα*

¹ Cf. *Timaeus* 46E ff.

² Cf., also, *quod deterior* 88; *Alleg. leg.* iii. 84.

Ἐλάμβανεν, reminiscent of *Timaeus* 29C and inappropriate to a Stoic; the question concerning the essence of the heavens—would a Stoic have asked this question at all? The question concerning the materiality or immateriality of causes and the mention of intelligible patterns utterly preclude the possibility of Posidonius as a source.

One more passage deserves our special attention. In *Spec. leg.* i. 32 ff., after Philo has said that the Father and Leader of the universe is δυστόπαστος and δυσκατάληπτος,¹ he continues: The two chief questions concerning God are: Does he exist? What is he in essence? The first is of little difficulty, the second probably insoluble. The answer to the first is based on the argument from the order of the universe. Though we cannot discover the nature of God, we must continue the search for it, for the search itself gives joy, just as we investigate the nature of the stars without being able to gain the full truth about them, taking pleasure in plausible accounts (*τοὺς εἰκόσι λόγους*). When the soul mounts above the sensible universe, it is dazzled by the light that streams forth from God. When Moses asks God for a revelation of himself, God declares the impossibility of any knowledge of his essence or of the essence of the δυνάμεις (here identified with *ἰδέαι*) since they are *νοητά*. He then invites Moses to the study of what is comprehensible to him, the visible universe.

The two questions concerning God remind us of the Stoic theology as seen in Cicero's *De natura deorum* ii. 3. Philo's answer to the first is the conventional Aristotelian-Stoic answer. But there is not the least resemblance between his treatment of the essence of God and the Stoic discussion in Cicero. The declaration of the impossibility of knowledge of his essence together with the hyper-Platonism of God's speech makes the influence of Posidonius utterly impossible.² And it is of interest to observe that the ascent of the soul occurs in the answer to the second question.

¹ Cf. *Timaeus* 28C; δυστόπαστος, very frequent in Philo in this application, is from Euripides *Troades* 885.

² It is true that Seneca in *Quaest. nat.* vii. 30. 4 says: "God is accessible to the mind only, not the senses; we cannot know what he is, apart from whom nothing has its being. And we marvel at our own insufficient knowledge of fiery particles in the heavens, when the greatest part of the universe, God, is hidden from us." But such professions of ignorance are not usual in the Stoics; and we know that Seneca does not confine himself to Stoic thoughts. Further, the statement that we cognize God by the mind is very different from Philo's assertion that God and the δυνάμεις are *νοητά*.

In the passages of Philo which we have examined we have noted that the language is frequently colored by Platonic reminiscences, that the more important ideas are of the Platonic order, in many cases impossible for any Stoic; we have observed especially the sharp distinction between the sensible and the intelligible. In the many passages of similar content which we have not discussed the same traits appear. It is perfectly true that Stoic material is often found closely interwoven with Platonic or at least non-Stoic elements; but nothing is more characteristic of the great body of Philo's work than this method of composition. In the majority of these passages the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible is sharply drawn. In cases where at first sight it might seem to be absent, it occurs in the immediate context or elsewhere in the treatise. And perhaps the most impressive thing from our point of view in this paper is the fact that in passage after passage the ascent of the soul through the sensible to the intelligible is explicitly set forth. These accounts cannot, in their entirety, be borrowed from Posidonius; and I see no reason to suppose that Philo was compelled to resort to his works to find an ancient commonplace.¹

In their lists of parallels, together with their one passage of Philo, Capelle and Gronau cite two from Maximus of Tyre: xvi. 6 (Hobein) and xi. 9-10. The former bears considerable resemblance to *De mundo*, chapter i: The sights seen by travelers are as naught to the philosopher's vision of the whole earth and the heavens; he journeys with the stars and all but shares with Zeus the guidance of the universe.

¹ I append a list of relevant passages in Philo, including those discussed or referred to above: *De opif. mundi* 69; *Alleg. leg.* iii. 84; 97; 177 (*ἀπερχόμενοι* here used of transcending the *λόγος*); *Quod deterior* 87; 100 (note resemblance to *Phaedo* 109E; cf., also, the passages cited by Wyttensbach *ad loc.*, though Lucian *De sacrif.* i. 532 is borrowed rather from the *Phaedrus* myth); *De gigantibus* 61; *De plantatione* 20; *De ebrietate* 62; *De migratione* 64 (note *ἀναχθεῖσαι*, not *ἀπερχθεῖσαι*); 137; 168; *Quis heres* 68; 78; 88; 98; 126; 239; 301 (winged chariot of *Phaedrus* is the world); *De congressu* 48; 105; 134; *De fuga* 161; *De mutatione* 3; 45; 56; 72; 179; *De Abrah.* 57; 70; 157; *Spec. leg.* i. 32; 207; ii. 230; iii. 1; 186; *De praemissis* 25; 62; 84; fragment in VI (Richter), 210 (somewhat misinterpreted by Zeller, III, 2⁴, 464); *Quaest. in Gen.* i. 86; ii. 34; 46; iii. 3; 42; iv. 1; 46; 130; 234; *Quaest. in Ex.* ii. 29; 40; 51; *De providentia* ii. 47. For this last passage see Wendland, *Philos Schrift über die Vorsehung*, pp. 92-93, where he compares *De opif. mundi* 69, and adds: "Dieser bei Philo ins mystische Gebiet streifende Preis der Vernunft ist im Grund hellenisch, namentlich stoisch." But although the *De providentia* is based largely on Stoic material, this passage contains elements quite as impossible for Posidonius as *De opif. mundi* 69.

Whether or not Maximus had the *Phaedrus* in mind, whether or not he had a definite source here, the parallel is a fair one. But this is very far from being true in the case of xi. 9-10. Its substance is as follows: God may be discerned only by the fairest and purest part of the human soul, for this only is akin to him. How does this see God? By closing the avenues of the senses, forgetting this world, lending itself to the guidance of true reason and mighty love. As it leaves the earth behind, all about it grows brighter, foreshadowing the nature of God. But the end of the journey is not the heavens or the heavenly bodies. These are fair, indeed, since they are his offspring; but the soul must go beyond these and rise above the heavens into the true world and supernal calm.

Maximus' thought and language is colored by his memory of *Republic* vi¹ and the *Phaedrus*; note *τούτων ἐπέκεινα*; the heavenly bodies God's offspring; cf., also, the *Timaeus*; *ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*; *ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον*, i.e., the plain of truth; *τὴν ἐκεῖ γαλάνην* suggests *Axiochus* 370: *γαληνὸς δὲ τις . . . βίος*. The type of ascent is the same that we have in Philo; the motifs are the same: withdrawal from things of earth; guidance of Eros; ascent above heavens to the real world.²

There is still another passage of Maximus to be considered in this connection. In x. 2-3 we have the story of Aristeas, whose body lay sleeping, while his soul wandered through the air, seeing all things upon earth. "What is the real meaning of this?" Maximus asks. Is it not the freedom of the soul from the pleasures and affections of the body, when it turns to itself and encounters pure truth, not mere likenesses? Such a state is like the flight of the soul, not over mountains in the murky air, but above the air, in calm ether, borne aloft to the

¹ It may be observed that the conception of philosophy as an ascent is that of the allegory of the cave in *Rep.* vii, and that this passage was not without influence on our authors.

² The utter absurdity of putting this essay of Maximus in a list of Posidonian parallels is seen also from secs. 11-12, which follow the passage discussed above: How are we to explain the nature of God? God is the source of beauty; all beautiful things are beautiful in so far as they partake of him (cf. speech of Diotima in *Symposium*). Or you may gain an idea of him by abstracting all qualities, magnitude, color, form (cf., perhaps, *Phaedrus* 247C). We have here a close parallel to Alcinous, chap. x; Maximus' first way of knowing God is Alcinous' third; Maximus' second, Alcinous' first; cf., also, Clement Alex. *Strom.* v. 71.

truth, to the vision of reality. For the soul of man has by nature insight into truth, but the body sheds a heavy mist over it, and dims its light.

Here Maximus treats a supernatural ascent as an allegory of the ascent of reason.¹ The desired end is not the view of the visible universe, as in the *De mundo*, but the vision of truth—truth as distinguished from idols ($\tauῶν εἰδώλων$). There are reminiscences of Plato. Besides those we have noted elsewhere in similar passages, we find $\deltaρνιθος δίκην$, suggesting *Phaedrus* 249D; $\alphaχλύς$, taken from *Alcibiades* II 150D.² And in section 9 of this essay Maximus follows the *Phaedrus* myth even more closely, making use of the same phrases which Philo borrowed.³

There is one further point of resemblance between this essay of Maximus and a group of passages of Philo to which I should like to call attention. In *De Abrah.* 70, Philo speaks of the opening of the eye of the soul, as if the soul were awakening from a deep sleep ($\omegaσπερ ἐκ βαθέος ὅπνου$).⁴ Maximus, in section 1, has $τοῦ δένρο κάρου$, and in section 6, $ὅπνον βαθὺν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς νοημάτων$. Hobein gives but one parallel, Alcinous, chapter xiv, where God awakens the world-soul $\omegaσπερ ἐκ κάρου τινός$.

The figure is a very natural one to use,⁵ especially for Maximus in view of his account of the sleep of Epimenides and Aristeas. But its occurrence in an almost stereotyped form in Philo and other authors as well has a certain interest. Hippolytus, *Refut. haeres.* 144 (Schn.) refers to an interpretation of *Odyssey* xxiv. 1 ff., according to which the $\muηστῆρες$ whose souls are called by Hermes are not the suitors of Penelope, but *οι ἔξυπνισμένοι καὶ ἀνεμνησμένοι* from what glory and

¹ Mention of the flight of Aristeas occurs again in xxxviii. 3, and it is explained in a somewhat similar manner.

² Cf. Philo *De Abrah.* 79; Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* i. 45: "has terras incolentes circumfusi erant caligine." This expression, however, looks like a commonplace, and I should not take it in itself as an indication of source.

³ Maximus makes use of the same myth in an eschatological passage in ix. 6: the soul becomes a $\deltaάλων$, beholds $τὰ οἰκεῖα θέάματα$, neither hindered by a body nor confused by colors and shapes of things, but gaining a vision of $αὐτὸ κάλλος$.

⁴ Cf., also, *De somn.* i. 164; *Quod deus sit* 97; *Quaest. in Gen.* iv. 1; *Quaest. in Exod.* ii. 51.

⁵ Cf. Paul *Epist. ad Ephes.* v. 14; Marcus Aurel. vi. 31.

height of bliss they have fallen.¹ Very close to this is Proclus *In Rem Publicam* ii. 351 (Kr.), where in his commentary on 621B (έπειδη δὲ κοιμηθῆναι) the same passage of Homer is quoted, the path to birth is called "sleep," the return by reminiscence from the world of becoming to the world of pure being is called "awakening from τοῦ κάρου τούτου." Further, in his commentary on the *Timaeus* iii. 323, he puts ὑπνοι in the list of features of the myth of Er which are not found in *Timaeus* 43.² It would seem that Platonists were led to this symbolic use of sleep and awakening by the passage of the myth of Er, by the suggestion of *Republic* 476C that he who is unable to discern the Ideas lives in a dream-world, by the natural affinity between the λήθη of the *Phaedrus* and sleep, and by *Phaedo* 79C, where the soul in the body is said to be in a drunken state; for κάρος, the word used by Maximus, Proclus, and Olympiodorus, is the heavy stupor of drunkenness.³

I may perhaps be allowed a short digression at this point to discuss the parallel given by Hobein, Alcinous, chapter xiv, for which I cannot recall that a complete explanation has been offered. It runs as follows: God reduces the world-soul to order, ἐγείρων καὶ ἐπιστρέφων πρὸς ἔαντὸν τὸν τε νῦν αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἐκ κάρου τινός [βαθέος ὑπνου]. Waiving the difficulty of reconciling this with what Alcinous says elsewhere, let us look at Plutarch *De animae procreatione* 1026F: Following literally the myth of the *Politicus*, he speaks of a world-period when τὸ μὲν φρόνιμον ἀμβλύνεται καὶ καταδαρθάνει λήθης ἐμπιπλάμενον τοῦ οἰκείου. But if we examine the text of Plato we find that he says nothing of "sleep," but says: λήθης γιγνομένης ἐν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον. Obviously, in the case of the world-soul the concept of sleep has been added to that of λήθη, just as in the case of the human soul. There can be no doubt that Alcinous' conception, like Plutarch's, has been drawn from the *Politicus*.

The remaining parallels adduced by Capelle and Gronau differ considerably among themselves. Some may be thought not unreasonably to be derived from Posidonius; as, for example, Cicero *De*

¹ *Empedocles*, frg. 119.

² Cf. Clement Alex. *Strom.* v. 105; Olympiodorus in *Phaedon*. 158. 11 (Norvin). For an imitation of this feature of the myth of Er, cf. Plutarch *Amator*. 776B.

³ Cf. also *Timaeus* 52B.

natura deorum ii. 153–55, where human reason is said to penetrate to the heavens, discern the motions of the stars, and advance thereby to knowledge of the gods. In certain other passages the thought does not preclude the possibility of Posidonius as the source, though there seems to be no adequate reason for thinking of him as such; e.g., Plutarch *De facie in orbe lunae* 926 C, D; Nemesius *De nat. hom.* 26–27; *κόρη κόσμου apud* Stob. *Ecl.* i. 400W; Lactantius *De opif. dei* xvi. 9—the latter passage is a close parallel to *Memorabilia* i. 4. 17, and has nothing to indicate its immediate source, though to Gronau there seems to be speaking “*nicht der Christ, sondern der tiefreligiöse stoische Philosoph.*” But in Gregory of Nyssa (i. 1209A) the imagery of the *Phaedrus* recurs, and Posidonian influence is precluded by the assertion that the heavens are below *τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας*. In Chalcidius, chapter cclxvi, not only is there no good reason for thinking of Posidonian influence, but in chapter cclxiv, which belongs closely with chapter cclxvi, we have the division of theoretical philosophy into theology, physics, and mathematics. This is the division found in Alcinous, chapter vii, and attributed to Aristotle by later Peripatetics and Neoplatonists;¹ but we do not hear that Posidonius or any Stoic accepted it.²

The passages from Seneca which Capelle cites for Posidonius’ “schwärmerische Bewunderung der Caelestia” call for only a few remarks. Chapter viii of the *Consolatio ad Helviam*, which involves the kinship of the soul to the heavens, may conceivably be Posidonian, perhaps through Varro, who is quoted in the first part of the work; though it is to be observed that Seneca says that his assertions are true whether we accept a Platonic or a Stoic view of the universe. In *Epist. moral.* xciv. 56 there are only commonplaces; Capelle might better have cited xciii. 30–31, which has a distinct Stoic color.

Of more interest to us is a passage discussed by Reitzenstein: After quoting from Vettius Valens, he continues: “*Ganz ebenso*

¹ Cf. Zeller, II, 2³, 176–77.

² Posidonius’ adherence to the Stoic division of philosophy into logic, physics, ethics, is stated by Diog. Laërt. vii. 39, and Sextus Emp. *Adv. math.* vii. 19. Cleanthes’ division of philosophy into six branches does not correspond at all to what we have in Chalcidius, although he distinguishes theology from physics.

schildert die Wonnen der Seele vor der Geburt und nach dem Tode Posidonios in der Übersetzung bei Seneca 'Cons. ad Marciam' xviii. 2,"¹ and he gives special consideration to this in Beigabe I. Now I do not deny that Posidonius may have pictured the cosmic visions of souls before birth and after death, but it is certain that Seneca is not portraying in this passage such visions before birth, and almost equally certain that he is not attributing them to a life after death. The point that Seneca is making is this: Just as one must endure the tyranny of Dionysius if one is to view the marvels of Syracuse, so one must suffer the ills of life in order to behold the beauties of the universe. On the theory of the blessed pre-existence of the soul, birth in a mortal body is not necessary in order to obtain the vision of the starry heavens; for Posidonius must have put the pre-existent souls within the universe, since outside of it is only finite void, reserved for the vapors of the world-conflagration. Seneca here is assuming that the soul is born with the body. It is almost equally certain that the glories of the universe are to be seen from the earth in this present life, not from the heavens in the hereafter. Although one sentence, "Ut ad illa venias, per illa exeundum est," if taken out of its context, might seem to lend some plausibility to the latter view, there is nothing in Seneca's language in xviii. 1-4 to suggest it, and the parallel drawn between Syracuse and the universe is against it. What we have is an "enthusiastic" description of the world, and it seems idle to speculate whether Seneca owed any elements of it to Posidonius. In any case, it does not set forth what is currently believed, and with considerable plausibility, to have been the latter's theory of the origin of the soul.

Let us turn now to the ascent in *Poemandres* iv, which Norden infers from resemblances to the *Somnium Scipionis* to be of Posidonian origin. It reads as follows: Men who are ignorant of the end and of the source of life do not marvel at what is worthy of their admiration, but believe that life exists for the sake of bodily pleasures. But those who have received the gift of God, if we judge by their activities, are immortals rather than mortals, for by their reason they lay hold on all there is on earth, in heaven, and beyond the heaven. Rising to this

¹ *Poemandres*, pp. 6-7.

height, they behold the good, and having beheld it, they count the life on earth a disaster; and scorning all things, material and immaterial, they strive to reach the One and the Alone.

We note the same non-Posidonian traits that we discovered in Philo; perhaps the closest parallel is *De praemiis* 30: *πάντα μὲν σώματα πάντα δ' ἀσώματα ὑπεριδεῖν καὶ ὑπερκίψαι, μόνῳ δ' ἐπερέσσασθαι καὶ στηρίσσασθαι θεῷ*.¹ But letting go for the moment this decisive fact, we shall examine the parallels with the *Somnium Scipionis*. Scipio keeps looking toward the earth; in the *Poemandres* men are said to fail to marvel at what deserves admiration. But Scipio is struck by the insignificance of the earth; his heart is not set on the lusts of the flesh; he has already asked in § 15: "Why do I linger upon the earth? Why do I not make haste to come hither to you?" Africanus turns his thoughts from brooding on the vanity of empire to the great world about him. Again, Africanus teaches Scipio that he is a god, since he is soul, and soul is divine; in the *Poemandres* those who have received the gift of God are said to be immortal, if we compare their activities with those of other men. But the two assertions are not the same. Finally, Africanus exhorts Scipio to devote himself to the welfare of the state and to the highest intellectual activities, freeing himself from the body, so far as possible, for thus he will soonest return to his true home, the highest heavens; in the *Poemandres* the elect scorn all things material and immaterial, and press on to the Alone. Even if we make allowance for the rhetoric of the latter passage, the two points of view are very unlike. Summing the matter up, we may say: The ascent in the *Poemandres* contains elements which cannot come from Posidonius; the parallels of Norden are non-existent; what similarities there are between the *Somnium* and the *Poemandres* are too general to prove an identical source.²

Let us consider now the Epicurean passages which involve the

¹ Cf., also, Basil *Homil.* xv, quoted by Wyttensbach on *Phaedo* 109E: διάνοια ἡ δυνηθέσα τῶν τε ὑλικῶν καθαρεύσα παθῶν καὶ τὴν νοητὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν καταλιπεῖν, etc., if νοητὴν be the correct reading.

² For my reasons for refusing to believe that the *Somnium Scipionis* is derived from Posidonius, cf. my article, "Posidonius and *Tusculan Disputations* i," *Classical Philology*, July, 1923.

idea of the flight of the mind through and beyond our universe. The most familiar is Lucretius i. 66 ff.:

eo magis acrem
irritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta
naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret.
Ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra
processit longe flammatia moenia mundi
atque omne immensum peragrat mente animoque.

So, too, in Cicero *De natura deorum* i. 54 the mind ranges far and wide and sees no bound of space. Similarly, the critic of Epicurus in *De finibus* ii. 103 speaks of him who traversed in his thought innumerable worlds and limitless spaces. And Bishop Dionysius writes:

τὸν κόσμον προκύψας Ἐπίκουρος καὶ τὸν οὐράνιον ὑπερβάς περίβολον, ἦ διά τινων κρυφῶν ἀς μάνος οἶδεν ἔξελθων πυλῶν τοὺς ἐν τῷ κενῷ κατεῖδε θεούς.¹

W. A. Heidel, discussing Lucretius iii. 14 ff., together with i. 66 ff., writes:

. . . . There is here an allusion to the ecstatic *εποπτεία* of the mysteries evoked by the pronouncement of the *ἱερὸς λόγος* [*ratio . . . divina mente coorta*], coming as the climax of the rites of initiation, when the mystae catch a vision and seize the significance of the world.²

Then he quotes, after Reid, Seneca *Dial.* viii. 5. 6:

Cogitatio nostra caeli munimenta perrumpit nec contenta est id, quod ostenditur, scire: illud, inquit, scrutor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne profunda vastitas sit an hoc ipsum terminis suis cludatur, etc.

He continues:

I doubt, however, the correctness of his statement that Seneca was here imitating Lucretius. It seems to me more probable that both authors are reproducing with some freedom the thought of an earlier, perhaps Stoic, writer, who may have been Posidonius. Be that as it may, the thought common to Lucretius, Seneca . . . (and I may add, Bishop Dionysius) is that a great revelation has come, rending as it were the curtain or outer confines of the world and permitting a glimpse into the utmost secrets of nature.

But neither for the ascent of the reason through and beyond our universe, nor for the comparison of the revelations of philosophy to the

¹ *Apud Euseb. Praep. evang.* xiv. 27. 8.

² "On Certain Fragments of the Pre-Socratics: Critical Notes and Elucidations," *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, XLVIII, 682-83.

ἐποπτεία of the mysteries,¹ is it necessary to assume that the Epicureans employed a Stoic source. These ideas were current in the school from its earliest period. Metrodorus, the associate of Epicurus, writes:

μέμνησο, Μενέστρατε, διότι θνητὸς φύς καὶ λαβὼν βίον ὠρισμένον, ἀναβὰς τῇ ψυχῇ ἔως ἐπὶ τὸν αἰώνα καὶ τὴν ἀπειράν τῶν πραγμάτων κατεῖδες καὶ τὰ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἔοντα;²

and again:

καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίον εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὅργια.³

We have seen that the notion of the imaginative flight of the mind was so prevalent that it is absurd to infer from its presence in supposed Posidonian passages, such as *De mundo*, chapter 1, that it must have been taken by later authors directly or indirectly from Posidonus; that many passages which have been claimed for Posidonus contain elements which preclude our believing him to be the source; that in Philo, Maximus of Tyre, and other platonizing authors passages which contain this idea show strong Platonic coloring; that we have no need to assume the use of Posidonus or other Stoic as the source for similar passages in the Epicureans, since Metrodorus, perhaps in dependence upon Plato's *Phaedrus*, employed the same imagery.

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¹ I am not myself convinced that Lucretius in i. 66 ff. or Seneca or Dionysius were conscious of any allusion to the mysteries.

² Clement Alex. *Strom.* v. 732. There follow immediately the words: ὅτε σὸν εἴδαλοντι χορῷ, κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα, μακαρίαν δψιν τε καὶ θέαν ἐποπτεύσομεν (read ἐπωπτεύσαμεν, corresponding to Plato's εἴδον) . . . τελετὴν . . . μακαρωτάτην τελούμενοι. If we believe with Zeller, III, 1, 456, n. 1, as I think we may reasonably do, that Clement is still quoting Metrodorus, we have in one passage both the ascent of the soul and the comparison of philosophy to the revelations of the mysteries.

³ Plutarch *Adv. Coloten* 1117B.

CONVICIUM

BY G. L. HENDRICKSON

The technical legal word for abusive speech audibly uttered, as distinguished from compositions written and posted or circulated, was *convicium*. The praetorian edict which offered redress for this offense is given by Ulpian, and is referred to by Festus (drawing from Verrius Flaccus of the Augustan age). Essentially it amounts to this: *qui convicium fecerit, in eum iudicium dabo*. This edict is, it would seem certain, the civil counterpart of the old provision of the XII Tables which named capital punishment (whether death, or civic death?) as the penalty for *occantare*, the designation of an offense which has been much in dispute in recent years.

Concerning this latter word the view has come to prevail that in origin it denoted an act of malevolent or harmful incantation (which need be no more than a curse), and that as in form, so in meaning, it is parallel to *excantare* and *incantare*. But this is not to say that it did not at the same time connote the idea of verbal abuse. In primitive times a people neither could, nor cared to, distinguish between abusive utterance which was merely malevolent and that which was meant to inflict positive harm by invocation of supernatural powers. Personal abuse still today in less refined strata of society takes most often the form of cursing, and though in more clarified environment the curse no longer inspires terror as a supernatural weapon, yet its ancient vitality is far from exhausted among many peoples of the modern world.¹ The prohibition of *occantare* in the XII Tables was therefore at once a prohibition of words of malevolence and abuse, and of words calculated to effect harm by invocation of supernatural forces. The word itself must have been obsolete in Cicero's time. He only knows it from the XII Tables. It was the subject of glossographical attention a generation later: *occantare antiqui dicebant quod nunc "convicium fecerit" dicimus* (Festus from Verrius Flaccus). It must have been, if not obsolete, yet in process of disappearance or restriction when the praetor's edict defined the ancient provision of the XII Tables in the terms of his time. Too bad that we cannot name that

¹ Cf. the writer's paper in *Class. Phil.*, XX (1925), 293.

time, but it must I presume¹ be as early as the beginning of the second century B.C. A reason for the disappearance of the older term may be surmised in the growing consciousness that a distinction should be made between the abuse of mere petulance and hostility, and the invocation of harm by magic or curse. The word thus became differentiated: One part of its territory (and the largest and most common) was taken over in the legal language by *convicium facere*, the other yielded to a newer formation—*incantare*. An echo of the old undifferentiated meaning of the word—but prevailing in the thought of its abuse and billingsgate—still survives in the three examples in Plautus, *occantare ostium*, which he employs as the equivalent of the Greek *κωμάσειν ἐπὶ θύρας*. Wherever its related forms (*occinere*, *occensus*, *oscen* (?), *obcantare*) emerge in later times they convey some notion of ill-omened or magical utterance. But in general *incantare* took its place, and even the forms *obcantarent* and *obcantata* (found in Paulus and Apuleius) are, I suspect, to be looked upon as mere archaic fashions for *incantare*.

But to return to *convicium*. How extensive the term was at the time when it replaced *occantare* of the ancient code it is difficult to say: that is, whether *carmina famosa* or *libelli famosi* were embraced in it. The classical jurisconsults referred these latter to the edict *ne quid infamandi causa fiat* (*Dig.* xlvi. 10, 15, 12 and 27–28), and this difference of reference may point to the clause of the XII Tables which Cicero gives (following *si quis occentavisset*), *sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri*. If this be so, *convicium facere* was the offense of abuse or abusive epithet—presumably extemporized—uttered by word of mouth to another, face to face, or before the house of another, whether he be within or absent (*ibid.* 7).

It is apparently the prevailing view of modern students of the Roman law that Ulpian—and the jurists generally—conceived of *convicium* as denoting originally and properly a plurality of utterance or voices, in accordance with the ancient etymology, *quasi convocium*, which is interpreted, for example by Corssen (*Aussprache, etc.*, I, 481), as “Zusammenschreien.” From the same point of view Mommsen (*Strafrecht*, p. 794), under the general rubric of *iniuria*, defines *convicium*, “im ursprünglichen Sinn, die jemand mit öffentlicher Zusam-

¹ See Lenel, *Edictum Perpet.*² Tit. xxxv (p. 385, n. 1); the citations in Rudorff, *Edict. Perpet. Reliq.*, p. 178; and Karlowa, *Rechtsgeschichte*, II, 1330.

menrottung vor seinem Hause zugefügte Schmähung.” The French jurist Huvelin, who has treated the matter with greatest fulness (“La Notion de l’Inuria,” *Mélanges Appleton* [Lyon, 1903], p. 428), is still more specific: “*convicium facere* implique une idée de coopération, donc de pluralité. Il faut nécessairement que plusieurs personnes soient réunies pour qu'il y ait possibilité de *convicium*. Les auteurs juridiques sont catégoriques sur ce point.” Insisting upon this conception he continues (p. 430): “Ce n'est que tardivement que *convicium* a pris le sens d'insulte proférée par une personne isolée.”

The point of view illustrated by these citations rests in part upon the assumed etymology of the word, but more especially, as Huvelin notes, upon the definition of Ulpian. But here the modern jurists have failed of precise interpretation, a failure which I venture to note and correct. Whether the word itself, even if in origin *quasi convocium*, ever implied necessarily a plurality of speakers must be doubted. Certainly its early history shows no trace of it. As a legal term its earliest appearance is in the praetorian edict which Ulpian cites, *qui convicium cui fecisse dicetur* (or, *qui convicium fecerit*, as the gloss of Festus would suggest), and there the offense is conceived of as an individual utterance.¹ In none of the Plautine examples is there any implication of plurality of speakers or the presence of a throng or mob. To be sure the word is often used of noisy disturbance and abuse directed against an individual by a group or multitude, but such collective *convicia* are not the offense which the praetor's edict contemplates.

But in fact Ulpian has been conspicuously misinterpreted, though part of the blame may rest upon a slightly defective text, or upon misapprehension on the part of the Justinian compilers. The passage in question is found in *Digest* xlvi. 10, 15. 3-4 ff.: *convicium autem dicitur vel a concitatione vel a conventu, hoc est a collatione, vocum.*²

¹ Quite as much so as in the example from the Justinian Codex which Huvelin cites as evidence of the late emergence of *convicium* in the sense “d'insulte proférée par une personne isolée.” In the praetorian edict we have the indefinite *qui*, in the passage of the Codex the indefinite *tu*: *si non convicci consilio te aliquid iniuriosum dixisse probare potes*, etc. (ix. 35. 5).

² To one assuming the origin of *convicium* from *convocium* the conjecture of Canegieter, *concentu* for *conventu* (noted by Mommsen), might seem almost convincing. If both forms were attested by MS reading it would be difficult to decide between them. The etymology given by Ulpian might be thought to point to *concentu*, while *coetus*, used below, would point rather to *conventu*. That there was confusion of the two words may be surmised from the gloss (v. 182. 24) *concentus vocis est, conventus corporis*, and the words are confused in the gloss (iv. 321. 19) *concentus simul se colligentes (=conventus)*. Cf. also Paul. ex Fest., s.v. *concinnare*: *concinere enim convenire est*.

The language seems plain and unequivocal, and yet apparently modern jurists have overlooked the fact that not one, but two suggestions of interpretation are offered, exactly in the alternative manner of the ancient grammarians in presenting etymologies.¹ The first, *a concitatione*, gives the idea of concentration or intensity, that is of noise, or, as is said presently, *vociferatio*; the second, *a conventu*, of a plurality of speakers. *Vocum* has I presume been thought of as common to both *concitatione* and *conventu*, and so it may have been felt by the writer, though strictly speaking it belongs rather to the second. More logical would have been *vel a concitatione < vocis >*, *vel a conventu, hoc est a collatione, vocum*. For intensity, strain, or excitement of utterance—the characteristic marks of *convicium*—*concitatio* is quite the appropriate word. Cf. Quint. xi. 3. 175 (the words) *fortis et vehemens et latro erecta et concitata voce dicendum est*. Valerius Maximus ix. 3. 8 (*de ira aut odio*): *animi concitatione nimia atque immoderata vocis impetu*. Note also examples of association with words like *ira, furiae, pugna, offensa*, etc.

In what follows in this section it appears that Ulpian had in mind, and retained throughout, this twofold explanation, viz., that *convicium* might be defined either from the point of view of a loud and noisy utterance—*vociferatio*, or from that of a number of speakers or a crowd—*coetus*. In sections 11 and 12 there is an apparent blending of these two points of view, which has I suspect been the source of the error noted in the citations from the modern jurists at the beginning of this paper. It arises from the loss in our texts of the particle *vel*, the restoration of which is however, I believe, certain and demonstrable: *ex his apparel non omne maledictum convicium esse, sed id solum [a] quod cum vociferatione dictum est, . . .*² [b] <*vel*> *quod in coetu dictum est, convicium est*. That this sharp twofold division—obscured by the loss of *vel*—is intended, appears from the words following: *quod autem [b] non in coetu [a] nec vociferatione dicitur, convicium non proprie dicitur, sed infamandi causa dictum*.

¹ For example Paulus ex Festo, s.v.: "convicium a viciis . . . videtur dictum, vel immutata littera quasi convocium."

² The words here omitted, *sive unus sive plures dixerint*, are in their present position suspicious. As they stand they seem to be attached to *vociferatione*. It would be more natural for them to relate to both *vociferatio* and *coetus*, differentiating thus the *convicium* of an individual and that of a crowd. They look to me like a marginal explanation of *convicium* as here defined, that is the utterance of one (*vociferatio*) or of several (*coetus*). The logic of the argument would be preserved by transposing them to follow *convicium est*—but this is stylistically awkward.

To Ulpian therefore two conceptions of the meaning of *convicium* were present, the one defined by *concitatione (vocis), vociferatione*, the other by *conventu, collatione vocum, id quod in coetu dictum est*. It is to the latter of these that he attaches the etymological suggestion of *convicium*: *cum enim in unum complures voces conferuntur, convicium appellatur quasi convicum*. But this is an etymological explanation only for the second of his alternative interpretations, not for the first. Apparently he was divided in mind between a true feeling for the meaning of the word as a loud angry expression of abuse, *a concitatione vocis*, and the meaning which was yielded by a current etymology of the grammarians. It is, I venture to believe, out of this etymological doctrine that he has built up his twofold classification of *convicium*, a distinction which is in no way implied either in the praetorian edict, nor in the usage of the word. In the nature of things *convicia* spoken by a group small enough and well defined enough to be held to individual responsibility would be subject to the same legislation as the *convicium* of a single person. But the instances in which the miscellaneous outcries of a mob, though directed against an individual, could constitute an indictment for verbal injury would surely be few and exceptional. The offense was that of an individual against an individual, and this is contained in the edict of the praetor. But even if the idea of plurality of utterance was entertained as one characteristic aspect of *convicium*, it was not excluded by the explanation *a concitatione (vociferatione)*, as appears from the phrase (cited above) attached to this definition, *sive unus sive plures dixerint*.¹

The fact is of course that *con-* in *convicium* had entirely lost, if indeed in this compound it ever had, the notion of "with" or "together," and as in so many other words served merely to indicate the thoroughness or completeness of the action contained in the significant element of the word, as in *conficere, confringere, concludere, concedere, conticere, conticinium* ("the time of night of complete silence").² Whether indeed *convicium* is at all connected with the stem *vōc-* *vōc-* is certainly open to question. Not to dwell upon the alternative etymology of the ancient grammarians from *vicus*³ (which Usener favored,

¹ But cf. note 2 on p. 117 above.

² See the valuable discussion of *concludere* and *concedere* by Ulrich Leo in *Glotta*, X (1920), 173 ff., and Brugmann, *Kurze vgl. Gram.*, p. 564. The latter (*loc. cit.*, *Anm. 1*) notes that the frequency of such composita, especially with *con-*, is due to replacement of aoristic formations which had been lost in Italic. Thus *taere conticere* corresponds to *σιγᾶν σιγῆσαι*.

³ Which Horace may have entertained, *Epp. i. 17, 62: vicinia rauca reclamet.*

and connects with the theme of his *Italische Volksjustiz*), there is not a little reason for looking for some other explanation of the word. The long *i* in *-vīc-* has occasioned much perplexity and variety of opinion to comparative philologists, and no satisfactory explanation of it, starting from the stem *voc-*, has yet been found.¹ Most recently Professor F. Wood (in *Class. Phil.*, VII, 304) has connected the word with *vincō*, *pervicax*, and though I have no right to an opinion in a question purely linguistic, his explanation seems to me more satisfactory not only phonetically but also semasiologically. The Indo-Germanic base **ueig-* (in *vincō*) Walde renders by "energische, besonders feindselige Kraftäußerung," and it would not be difficult to reconcile all the usages of *convicium* with this fundamental idea.² The notion of insistent, obstinate, irrepressible (abuse, or attack) so characteristic of the word, is conveyed chiefly by the prepositional element *con-*, as it is conveyed analogously in *pervicax* by *per-*.

The belief that *convicium* implies the utterance, or requires the presence, of a crowd or mob, is clearly erroneous. It is spun out of an assumed etymology, which Ulpian does not in fact entirely indorse, but merely advances in explanation of one aspect of his twofold conception of *convicium*. But while not accepting it unreservedly, he yet rests one leg of his structure upon it. This is the starting-point of the modern doctrine, which, failing to note the alternatives, has accepted the idea of a plurality of voices or persons as the unqualified teaching of the jurists. *Convicium* has necessarily no more to do with a plurality of utterance than has *clamor*, or the ancient *pipulum* and *vagulatio*, both of which are defined by *convicium*. To be sure a mob might shout insults at an individual, and these were *convicia*, not however, because they were shouted by a crowd or in chorus—*quasi convocium*, but because they were vehement expressions of hostile feeling—a *concitatione*, and meant to overwhelm (*convincere*).

NEW HAVEN

¹ See Brugmann, *Grundriss*, I,² 1, p. 134 and esp. p. 505; Buck in *AJP*, XVII, 270; Solmsen in *KZ*, XXXIV, 15.

² *Convincere* shows little variation from the meaning "refute," "convict." But from such an example as *infamatis magis quam convictis* (Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 71) one may see how a related word like *convicium* should have become fixed in a meaning short of proof or conviction. The speaker of *convicia* utters epithets—*fūr latro parracida*: if pressed in trial, and proven, their object would be *convictus*. The Greek equivalent is *θλέγχειν*, which connotes not merely proof or conviction, but also at times abuse and insult: *conviciari* (Stephanus, citing Suidas), *θλέγχουσεν ἀντι τοῦ κακολογοῦμεν*, and Plutarch, *Mor.*, p. 1B, *τοὺς θλέγχειν καὶ λοιπορέσθαι βουλομένους*. A curiosity, scarcely significant, is the gloss *convicisse concitavisse*, which suggest Ulpian's *convicium a concitatione*.

THE "LOST" MS OF CICERO'S *DE AMICITIA*

BY C. H. BEESON

A MS in the hands of a private owner is the bane of the paleographer and philologist and the despair of the bibliographer. It is not always easy of access, the facilities for studying it are frequently insufficient, the restrictions placed upon its use are often annoying, and the privilege of using it sometimes expensive; it is always likely through a change of owners to disappear for an indefinite period. All who are interested in it breathe a sigh of relief when it has found a permanent home on the shelves of a great public collection, whose keepers realize that the possession of such treasures carries with it a responsibility and are eager to facilitate the research of scholars in every way.

The complications that may arise in the case of such a MS are well illustrated by the Codex Parisinus of Cicero's *De amicitia*. This MS was discovered by Mommsen in the library of Firmin Didot in Paris in 1863; Mommsen published the results of his examination in *Rheinisches Museum*¹ of that year, and his collation was later used by Müller in his preparation of the Teubner edition. After sixty years that represents the sum total of our knowledge of the best representative of the text of *De amicitia*! Reid examined the MS in 1883 in London where it was in the possession of Quaritch, but too late to use it for his edition of *Laelius* which appeared in that year.² He planned to publish the results of his examination but apparently never did so.

Other editors, except Price,³ appear to have had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the Parisinus, and the historians of Latin literature are equally uninformed. Schanz has no information on the subject, and Teuffel's only comment is "Wo jetzt?" The references to it have been of the most casual sort, and everyone seems to have accepted the situation with resignation except Bassi, the editor of *Laelius* in the new Italian series, who indulges in some speculations on the subject:

¹ XVIII, 593-601.

² *Addenda* to his edition (Cambridge University Press), p. 165.

³ American Book Co., 1902.

Sed posteaquam Mommsen has notitias de illo dedit, nescio quomodo, codex nusquam locorum amplius repertus est. Quo delatus est? Quis eum nostris possidet temporibus? Estne adhuc in Europa, an in Americam est transvectus, ubi homines docti ac divites omnia, quae praecipua atque optima videntur, empta in Museis conlocant, quibus iure meritoque gloriantur atque delectantur? Sed hoc, quod mirum, quasi non verisimile videtur, heu malum! verum appareat.¹

The state of affairs is not so desperate as Bassi's fancy paints it. The MS is not in America; it has been for nearly a quarter of a century in the capital of the stronghold of classical studies, in Germany, in the Royal Library at Berlin.

In a review of Teuffel's *Literaturgeschichte*, published in this *Journal*² four years ago, I made this statement on the authority of Professor Price, who had his information from Quaritch that the MS had been sold to Berlin, and of Holder, the kindly old librarian at Karlsruhe, who told me in 1910 that it was in the Royal Library at Berlin. It was with some distress at the possibility of having committed an error that I later read Simbeck's statement in the Preface of his new Teubner edition (1917), a copy of which had not been available at the time the review was published: "Nunc eum [i.e., Parisinum] possidet B. Quaritch bibliopola Britannus. Qui cum nullis precibus ut librum photographice depingendum curaret, moveri posset, Muellerum secutus lectiones varias, quae sunt magni momenti, notavi." This distress was changed to bewilderment when in the spring of 1923 an inquiry at Quaritch's met with the response that they did not possess the MS and never had possessed it! The comedy of errors was closed when a search in their records revealed the truth that they had in fact bought the MS at the sale of the Didot library and had sold it to Berlin in 1903. It now bears the signature Ms. Lat. qu. 404.

After all these years the MS deserves a re-examination, both because of its paleographical interest and its importance for the text. The following report is based on a study of photographs kindly furnished by the authorities of the Royal Library.

The MS has forty-three folios containing, folios 1-32, *De amicitia*, 32^v-43, a collection of *sententiae* attributed to Seneca, followed by the first two verses of the second *carmen* of Eugenius of Toledo. The last

¹ *Corpus scriptorum Latinorum Paravianum*, No. 27 (1917), p. v.

² XV, 98.

page, according to Mommsen, is illegible. The worn condition of the first and last pages shows that the forty-three folios have existed as a single MS for a long time, certainly since the thirteenth century, as a notation in Gothic script at the top of folio 1 proves, "Tulli' de amicitia pūbia qdam." The quaternion signatures also show that *De amicitia* formed the first part of the codex from the beginning. According to Mommsen, there is a library mark in a fifteenth-century hand which indicates that the codex once belonged to the cathedral library at Constance, "liber est ecclie Constan'." Mommsen naturally suggested that it therefore once belonged to one of the great collections formed by the Irish monks at St. Gall, the Reichenau, and elsewhere.

The pages are ruled with a dry point in long lines, twenty-one lines to the page, with two vertical lines to mark the outer margin of the script. The margins were originally unusually wide, but were much cut down in binding. This is indicated by the fact that the names of the interlocutors which stand far out in the margins have been partially trimmed off. Mommsen states that there is only one quire signature (f. 29^v), but the remains of a signature are plainly visible on 7^v, and still more so on 23^v; at the bottom of 15^v the letter *R* is written, with faint marks which may possibly be the remains of a signature. According to Mommsen, the first folio of the first quaternion and the second and seventh of the last quaternion have been lost. The latter point is important because it shows that the omissions in Parisinus (Simbeck, 74, l. 27-76, l. 3, and 80, l. 26-82, l. 6) were due to the loss of a double sheet and that the codex originally had the complete text. The second and third quaternions are regular, containing eight leaves each.

The script is a beautiful ninth-century minuscule, having all the earmarks of the Tours *scriptorium*. The first line (*QUINTUS MUCIUS*) is written in large rustic capitals and uncials. There are twenty-one lines to a page, except folio 1 which has twenty and folio 32 which has only six lines of text. The longer sentences begin with capital letters and are punctuated with a point followed by a mark resembling the figure "7"; the shorter members are punctuated by a point. The scribe does not always follow the rulings, and the lines therefore often have a wavy effect; the vertical rulings, too, are often disregarded, producing a ragged effect on the left-hand of the script-

margin. The script varies in compactness; some pages contain only seventeen Teubner lines, others twenty. The scribe wrote with extraordinary facility and with every evidence of haste. He repeatedly began a wrong letter and corrected himself at once after making one or two strokes: e.g., 47, 7 *familiaritate*] *il* was immediately corrected from *u*; 49, 5 *quidem*] *q* was corrected from *d*; 50, 27 *praecepis*] the second *p* apparently from a correction (*s?*); 52, 1 *laeli*] the second *l* was corrected from *b*; 54, 6 *p* is erased before *numeremus*; the scribe probably started to write *paulos*, the word following; 54, 25 *pluribus*] *l* corrected from *r*; 55, 25 *fabula*] *l* apparently from a correction (*r?*); 55, 26 *se*] the scribe started to write *esse*, the word following; 60, 28 *causam*] the second *a* was at once corrected from *e*; 61, 7 *profugit*] *g* was corrected from *i*; 67, 17 *usa*] the scribe started to write *s* for the first *a* (i.e., *usa*); 73, 11 *fabulis*] *a* was corrected from *l*; 77, 4 *anquirit*] *a* was corrected from *i*; 84, 27 *uergini*] *e* was corrected from *i* at once. The haste with which the scribe wrote is also evidenced by the frequent omission or repetition of single letters or small groups of letters and by errors involving single letters (see the lists below and cf. Müller ad 164, 29; 164, 31; 165, 6; 166, 31; 167, 22; 174, 14; and 181, 17). This matter is of great importance in estimating the trustworthiness of the text of Parisinus. Our scribe was not interested in "improving" the text; his sole concern was to accomplish the task of copying his MS as rapidly as possible.

The versatility of the scribe is shown by the astonishing variety of the forms of his letters and ligatures. Five forms of *a* occur, all of them perfect specimens of their kind: *uncial a*, *open a* (with sharp tops), *open a* of the double-*c* type, *closed a* of the *oc* type (regular in the ligature *ra*), and the *half-uncial* form with the flat top; four of the forms may be found in a single line. *Cursive c* occurs occasionally, also in corrections, and a beautiful *uncial d*; *cursive e* is found, especially where the ink has filled the eye of the letter; once or twice it has the form of the Visigothic *e*; *g* is of the open figure-3 type, but twice (once in a correction) it resembles the Visigothic form; *i-longa* occurs occasionally (*Iam*, *In*, *Inde*, *Iucundus*, etc.); *half-uncial m* and *n* occur frequently; *suprascript u* is found twice at the end of a line (*aliqua*, *numquam*) and *y* twice, with and without a dot.

Of the cursive ligatures, *&*, *st*, *rt*, *ra*, and *ti* are common; there are

a few cases of *re* and *ret*; *li* occurs occasionally, especially at the end of a line; *ei*, *ri*, and *nt* are found three or four times; *sc* occurs twice; *ct* and *rc* occur once each. Of the majuscule ligatures *nt* (occasionally within a word) and *ur* are common, especially at the end of a line or a sentence (possibly by the hand of the corrector at 55, 5, *uiuunt*; 59, 29, *perduxissent*; 65, 10, *repudientur*; 70, 27, *arbitrantur*; 71, 22, *pertinent*; 80, 26, *debent*); *or* is found occasionally, sometimes within a word and *us* a few times, once being formed of minuscule letters; *ae* occurs six times, four times at the end of a line, and *e-caudata* ten times.

These survivals of the old tradition in the form and variety of the letters and the prevalence of the cursive elements point to the early ninth century, certainly not to the tenth, as the date of the MS.

The range of abbreviation is limited. The old Roman system of suspension is employed, of course, for such proper names as *Decimus*, *Gaius*, *Publius*, *Quintus*, *Spurius*, etc.; once the abbreviation for *Quintus* has evidently been mistaken for *que* (82, 12); sometimes the letters are slightly larger than normal; they are set off by one or two points, occasionally with an added abbreviating stroke; *.ti.* and *.tib.* are found for *Tiberius*. The names are sometimes written out; e.g., *spurium* (57, 25), *tiberium* (60, 23; 62, 10; 84, 22), *marcum* instead of *manium* (61, 23), *quintum* (73, 1), *quinte* (84, 10), and *publum* (84, 22). *cos* is used for all cases of *consul* but the word is also written out (49, 28 and 74, 9); the abbreviation is set off by one or two points, by an abbreviating stroke, or by point(s) and stroke; *respublica* is abbreviated (*resp.*, *rep.*, etc.), the abbreviating devices being the same as for *consul*; the word is also written out (56, 13; 60, 23; 71, 2); *tr. pl.* occurs once for *tribunum plebis* (46, 18); *p.r.* for *populus Romanus* is found at 50, 15; it once stood at 62, 12, but *r* was already lost in the archetype of our MSS; the words are written in full at 82, 9; *pr.* for *praetor* had already been corrupted in the archetype to *p.r.* (82, 19). The most common abbreviation is *q.* (also *q.* and *q.*); the word is frequently written out (*quae* once); the abbreviation for *bus* is also common (*b.* occasionally *b.:*); *ē*, with or without point(s), for *est* is frequent; *ēē* for *esse* is found seven times, five times at the end of a line; *ēēt* for *esset* occurs once, at the end of a line. Other abbreviations occur as follows: *ñ=non*, five times, four at the end of a line; *qm̄* and *qm̄* for *quoniam*, four times and once respectively; *ur̄=uestrae*, once, at the

end of a line; \overline{nrm} and \overline{nra} once each; $qd=quod$, twice, at the end of a line; $\bar{s}=sunt$, once, at end of a line; $ul=uel$, once at the end of a line. Of the *p*-series, $p=per$ six times, $\bar{p}=prae$ three times, $\bar{p}=pro$ four times, all of these, with one or two exceptions, at the end of a line; as prepositions these words are not abbreviated. Of the syllable symbols the apostrophe symbol for *us* is used twice and for *ur* four times, once within a word; \bar{r} for *runt* and \bar{t} for *ter* are found once each. All of these cases occur at the end of a line. The usage in regard to abbreviations therefore supports the assignment of an early date to the MS. The use of the *m*-stroke varies; some pages have only three or four cases, others four or five times as many.

The orthography preserves to a great extent the old tradition. The practice in regard to assimilation and the inconsistent spelling of such words as *amicissimus*, *maximus*, *optimus*, *existimo*, *lubido*, etc., may be seen in the texts of Müller and Simbeck; they have followed Parisinus in matters of orthography, even to the extent of spelling *querella* (46, 21), but *querela* (60, 13), except at 74, 23 (*inprobi*), 84, 28 (*conparata*), 53, 8, where *optimam* has been corrected to *optumam*, and 51, 18; 53, 5; and 84, 2, where the MS reading is *optume*, *lubido*, and *lautissime*. *u*, not *o*, is the rule in *adulescens*, *iucundus*, etc., except *olescentis* (for *adolescentis*, 84, 27) and *iocundius* once (64, 15); at 65, 14 *absordum* has been corrected to *absurdum*. There is also inconsistency in the writing of the aspirates; e.g., *philus* (51, 3), but *pili* (56, 15) and *filo* (72, 28); always *graccus*, but *archita* (79, 18); similarly with *h*; *emiciclio* (46, 13), *ospitis* (55, 24), but *hutilitas* (80, 3, *utilitas* elsewhere); *his* is regular for *iis* (*eis* also occurs), but not *hisdem*; *hii* occurs four times (see Müller *ad* 177, 9), and *hi* six times, four times with an apex. Final *d* for *t* is found seven times, *ad* (60, 24), *inquit* (47, 2; 61, 2), *capud* (64, 2; 69, 25), *quod* (70, 5 and 6), but *haut* (66, 13). *ci* and *ti* are interchanged; *diuicias* (53, 26), *spacio* (62, 9), *inicio* (71, 24), but *conditionis* (59, 30, *condicio* elsewhere), *pernitosus* (77, 19; 82, 29, but *perniciem* 62, 19); *u* for *b* occurs once, *aceruius* (68, 9). The most notable spelling occurs in the following group of words: *coniucta* (51, 22), *coniunctionem* (55, 9), *coniungi* (57, 33), *adiucta* (58, 3), *disiuctum* (62, 22, later corrected), *coniunctionis* (73, 19), and *coniucti* (77, 12); *nati* occurs for *nacti* (57, 16) and *expetem* for *expectem* (62, 17). *laelii* is regular for the genitive (twice for the voca-

tive), also *uerginii* (84, 27), *pacuuii* (55, 25), *fabricii* (57, 22), but *curi* (57, 22), *pompei* (75, 26), *licini* (82, 13), *rutili* (84, 27); always *dii*, *diis*, *extitit*, *extitis* (Müller and Simbeck *ext-*), *extingui* (Müller and Simbeck *ext-*), *extirpo*, *exullantem* (for *exulanem*, 67, 2); *oportunitates* is found at 54, 10, not *opp-*, as Müller states; *reperio* occurs twice (68, 31 and 70, 20). Other irregularities are *loquutus* (47, 23), *inbecili* (55, 5), *ecferat* (55, 23), *cooperit* for *ceperit* (56, 20), *caeperunt* for *cooperunt* (59, 6), *pyrro* (57, 26), *suppellectilem* (67, 19), *poene* for *paene* (77, 5), *contempnunt* (78, 22), *magestas* (82, 8), *exflorescit* (84, 19).

Müller's list of cases where *ae=e* (*ad* 168, 15) lacks *haberae* (77, 6) and *praecari* (68, 8) and includes two cases of *e-caudata* and one of *Ȑ*; to his list of examples of *e* for *ae* should be added *maxime* (59, 9), *humane* (85, 4), *grecis* (55, 17), *greciam* (50, 25), *grecorum* (52, 14). *e-caudata* is relatively rare; *quarella* (46, 21, but *quaerela*, 60, 13), *grēcia* (48, 13, but *graecia* 63, 26), *naturę* (52, 19), *amplificandę* (68, 24), *reprehendendum* (69, 10, but *reprehenderę*, 68, 30), *adiuuandę* (69, 24), *preferre* (70, 21), *iudicandę* (74, 14), *ipse* (76, 28), *lēues* (84, 7, elsewhere *laeues*).

In the division of syllables the old Roman practice prevails, not the "learned" practice adopted by some scribes who followed the rules of the Latin grammarians; e.g., *doc-tus*, *scrip-tus*, *silves-tribus*, *gig-nuntur*, but *ne-glegenda* once; etymology is disregarded, *praes-to*, *cons-tantes*, *po-test*.

The apex is used a few times: over *a*, 47, 9 (for *ad*) and 59, 10; over *o*, 64, 12; and over *hi* (for *ii*), 66, 11; 73, 28; 78, 27 and 28.

The corrections are in a contemporary hand, almost certainly made direct from the archetype; they were made by erasure or by writing the new letters over the old or above the line; expunction is not employed except possibly in two places where the correction was later made by erasure (the use of expunction marks in Mommsen's collation and in Müller's apparatus is therefore misleading). There are no marginal or interlinear variants. An eleventh-century hand has written *dissipare . . . mortales* (55, 19) between the lines two lines above the correct position; over *omnino* (76, 9) the same hand has written *· omnimodo*. A late corrector has inserted paragraph marks before *uerum* (55, 2) and before *etiam* (66, 5). The names of the interlocutors, mutilated by the trimming of the margins, are written oppo-

site 52, 1 *< fanni > us* (overlooked by Mommsen), 52, 7 *scae < uola >* (overlooked by Mommsen), 52, 10 *lae < lius >*, 56, 9 *< fann > ius*, 59, 17 *scae < uola >*, 59, 18 *lael < ius >*. The name of Scaeula is written in rude majuscules, the others in the same minuscule as the text. Opposite 62, 3 is *lex amiti < tiae >*, *lex* in the ninth-century script, the rest in majuscules; at 63, 18 *< lex a > mititiae* in majuscules. All of these were undoubtedly in the archetype. Checkmarks, like the Greek rough breathing, and the monogram for *Nota* occur about a dozen times each. A passage from the Gospel of John, 16:21 (*usque modo non petistis quidquam*), has been partially erased at the top of folio 21; *probationes pennae* are found on folios 21^v and 29^v.

The archetype of Parisinus was a minuscule MS; *n* and *u*, *r* and *s*, are confused a few times; *quam* for *cum*, which occurs several times (50, 13; 52, 4; 54, 31; 60, 26), must have been in the archetype of the *x* family; it may be due to the confusion of *u* and *a* (i.e., *quum*), but I have a large number of examples of the same phenomenon from uncial MSS. There were probably few abbreviations in the original, if one may judge from the absence of errors due to their confusion; *prosolut* occurs for *persolut* (61, 9) and *quaquam* for *quaeque*, later corrected (77, 8); *tamquod* for *tamquam* (79, 24) may be due, as Müller suggests, to the preceding *aliquid*. The words in the archetype were not always clearly separated; cf. *scaeulae tu | ere* for *scaeula et uere* (48, 32), *magnificentiam etiam uiros* for *magnificentia metiamur uiros* (54, 5), and *occulta reserent. Iam* for *occultare sententiam* (71, 29).

The collation of P, published in *Rheinisches Museum*, which professed to give all the variants ("edere variam lectionem omnem"), justified Mommsen's verdict, "vincat, opinor, omnes Parisinus cum aetate tum bonitate," which has since been generally accepted.¹ Müller in his Teubner edition adopted over fifty of the new readings; he had at his disposal Mommsen's own collation and in his critical apparatus gives a complete report of it, sometimes indicating a doubt as to a reading. Simbeck in the new Teubner text has relied on Müller's apparatus for P and has noted only those readings "quae sunt magni momenti."

Mommsen's report gave us a picture of a ninth-century MS that

¹ Reid (*op. cit.*, p. 165) is not inclined to give P a preponderant influence in the constitution of the text though he admits it is of very high value.

was almost too good to be true; Müller's apparatus reveals errors that in character and number approach the norm of our best MSS of the period, but still falls far short of disclosing the full extent of these errors. The following notes, with one or two exceptions, correct or supplement the collation of Mommsen and the apparatus of Müller (and occasionally of Simbeck).

The first error removes P from the unique position of being the only MS to preserve the right reading; at 47, 8 (Simbeck) the editors read "ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi," omitting *fecī* after *Maiore*, against the evidence of all the MSS; Müller and Simbeck quote P as omitting *fecī*, but P, like the other MSS, has *fecī*; similarly Müller and Simbeck quote P in support of *suo loco* (72, 17), whereas P, like all the other MSS except G, has *loco suo*. The other errors in the reports on P are: 49, 20 *suis* *siuīs* or *suūs*; 50, 30 *excessiſſent*] *excessiſſent*; 51, 13 *interitus*] *intenſus*; 54, 7 *Paulos*] P, not *paullos* as by Müller; 55, 9 *coniunctionem*] *iunctionem* (KG'E have *iunctionem*); Müller and Simbeck have no note here, but Müller at 173, 9 implies *coniunctionem*; 59, 28 *ad*] omitted; 60, 3 *amicitiis*] *amicīis* not *amicīs*; 61, 19, *accedunt*] *accident*, like K and D; 61, 20 Mommsen reported *videmus aemilium luscino* for P, omitting *papum* after *videmus*, adding the remark, "P solus recte"; Müller, using Mommsen's collation, reports *papum* but adds "vocab. *papum* subscripta linea," which Simbeck misunderstood, for he credits *papum* to P²! The photograph shows *papum aemiliū luscino*, without any signs of correction; 61, 23 *M'*.] *marcum*, Mommsen; Müller incorrectly reports *marchum*; 61, 28 *imperaturum*] *imperaturūm*, not *impereturum*; 63, 8 *XX*] P has *viginti*, like the other MSS; 63, 17 *qualis* is incorrectly reported as *quales*; P's error occurs in the preceding line; 64, 6 *breviter*] *beruiter*; 64, 12 *calamitosi*] *calamitiosi*; 64, 24 *dolere*] *dolore*; 65, 4 Müller incorrectly reports *quandam* for *quandam*; 69, 20 *emendati*] *emundati*; 69, 28 *nec*] *ne*; 70, 8 *neglegentis*] P², not *negligentis*; here as elsewhere in Mommsen and Müller the indication as to the method of correction is misleading; *d* is not expunged, and *ti* are not written above the line; *i* remained undisturbed, the shaft of *d* was only partially erased; 71, 12 *divino*] *deuino*; 72, 1 *haudquaquam*] *haudquamquā*; 73, 21 *dolere*] *dolore*; 76, 7 Halm correctly reads *non is qui*, without noting any variant; Müller omits *is*

with no note *ad loc.*; Simbeck also omits it, citing MEE as having it; P also has *is*; 76, 19 *naturali*] this is the reading of the editors; Halm cites only one MS, *naturalia* S, *naturabili* S²; Mommsen and Müller, *ad loc.*, have nothing; Simbeck cites *naturabili* for MKS², P should also be added to this list; 77, 12 *coniuncti*] *coniucti*; 79, 11 *aliquis*] *aliqui*; MK as well as P have *aliqui*; 82, 7 *illa*], Mommsen has nothing, Müller reports *illi* for P, which Simbeck queries; P has *illi* along with BSVE; 83, 1 *delectatur*] *dilectatur* (*ta sscr.*); 83, 25 *litigare*] *ligata* not *litiga*, as in Mommsen, Müller, and Simbeck; 85, 18 *numquam*] *nunquam*, "ut videtur," Müller; P has *nūqua* (so); *nūquam* is found at 76, 25 where Müller says *nunquam*, "raro exemplo."

The following corrections have been overlooked in the reports on P: 48, 5 *Acilius*] *ci* above the line; 51, 3 *Manilius*] *nil* apparently corrected at once from *nus* or *ilus*; 52, 26 *interpretantur*] *interpretantur* P, but the stroke over *p* and the letters *tan* are by the corrector; the original reading was probably *interpretr*; 53, 8 *optimam*] corrected to *optumā*; 54, 10 *tantas*], Müller and Simbeck report that P has *tantes* but not that it was corrected to *tantas*; 54, 29 *splendidiores*] the second *i* is written above the line; 55, 17 *uaticinatum*] *ci* above the line; 57, 12 *earum*] *a* corrected from *o*; 57, 31 *maius*] *v* corrected from *e*; 58, 14 *in se*] from a correction; 58, 30 *suscipere*] P originally had *suscipere*, like KEM²; 60, 1 *labefactari*] the last *a* was corrected from *u*; 60, 19 *debeat*] *e* is on an erasure of two letters; 63, 12 *suppicio*] corrected from *subpicio*; 66, 13 *liberalissimi*] the third *i* was corrected to *u*; 66, 23 *ipse*] corrected from *ipso* without erasure; 68, 5 *adsentior*] *adsenior* corrected to *adsencior*; cf. 50, 19 where *adsenior* was corrected to *adsentior*; 72, 13 *modios*] *m* above the line; 74, 23 *improbi*] *inpbis*, *s* later erased; 76, 30 *adpetant*] *d* was corrected from *p*; 77, 2 *similitudine*] the last *i* was corrected from *e*; 77, 4 *ut efficiat*] written above the line; 77, 27 *optumus*] the first *u* was corrected from *i*; 78, 26 *unum idem*] *idem unum*, corrected by the usual marks of transposition; similarly *est omnis*, 85, 6; 79, 7 *fugial*] *i* inserted in the line; 79, 29 *monemur*] *r* was corrected from *s*; 80, 2 *illa*] corrected from *ulla*; 80, 22 *inimicos*] *mi* above the line; 84, 18 *indigentia*] the second *i* corrected from *e*; 84, 22 *nasicam*] *c* written above the line; 85, 19 *offendi*] apparently an erasure of one letter (*d*?) after *n*; 85, 21 *communis*] *i* corrected from *e*; 85, 22 *peregrinationes*] the last *e* corrected from *i*; 86, 5 *hortor*] corrected from *hortos*.

The evidence of a photograph, especially a rotograph, is not always trustworthy. In addition, the parchment of P is apparently so thin that in places it was not safe to write on both sides. The ink is likely to spread in such cases, producing the effect of having been written on a scraped surface, while the strokes showing through from the opposite side may resemble half-erased strokes. Differences in the color of the ink are not revealed nor can one tell whether one stroke of the letter is superimposed on another and therefore added later when the first ink had dried. Most of the changes listed here are fairly certain but others would require an examination of the MS in order to reach a positive decision. 48, 17 *sapientiam*] *e* apparently erased after the first *a*; 50, 22 *mortuis*] the second stroke of *u* and *i* are apparently by the corrector; 50, 31 *iustissimo*] Mommsen reports *iustissimoque* for P, but *q*; has apparently been erased; 51, 7, *se*] *e* by the corrector, with an erasure of one or two letters following? 53, 18 *hoc*] apparently on an erasure; 54, 28 *pauci*] *u* from a correction? 55, 3 *qui*] followed by an erasure (*in?*); the *i* of the next word (*intuetur*) is by P²; 55, 13 *potest*] *st* on an erasure? 55, 17 *virum*] apparently erased at the end of the folio; it now stands at the beginning of the next folio; 56, 23 *bona*] *a* from a correction? 57, 10 *animadverti*] a final *t* is apparently erased; 58, 25 *amicitiam*] *ti* apparently by the corrector; 59, 5 *ad-mouent*] *u* corrected from *n*? 60, 25 *Blossius*] *bissius* P; *us* by the corrector? 61, 18 *exempla*] followed by a gap of three or four letters, but there are no signs of an erasure; 61, 19 *proxume*] *ro* from a correction? 62, 2 *frater*] erasure after *f*? 62, 15 *quocumque*] P has *quoque*; erasure after *e*? 63, 3 *impietatis*] the second *i* from a correction? 64, 5 *in-humanius*] *ius* from a correction? 64, 14 *tollunt*] *o* apparently corrected from *u*; 64, 20 *fugienda*] seems certainly corrected from *facienda*; 65, 12 *animus*] apparently corrected from *amicus*; 65, 15 *aedificio*] erasure after *o*, which seems to be on an erasure; 65, 14 *absurdum*] the first *u* corrected from *o*; 69, 7 *putabit*] *u* apparently corrected from *o*; 69, 11 *factis*] is erased after *c*? 69, 12 *dolere*] apparently corrected from *dolore*; elsewhere P has *dolore* for *dolere* (64, 24 and 26 and 73, 21); 69, 13 *ualet*] apparently corrected from *uiolet*; 70, 2 *Sed*] seems to have been added later, at the end of the line; the next line begins with *Saepe*; 70, 25 *inbecilla*] followed by a space of three or four letters, but there are no signs of an erasure; 71, 17 *pertinent*] apparently *a* was

erased after the second *e*; 72, 10 *aliarum*] corrected from *alienarum*; 77, 3 *ipse* apparently corrected from *ipso*; 77, 18 *maxumum*] apparently corrected from *proxumum*; 79, 1 possibly *int* of *tradiderint* is from a correction; 82, 16 *forum*] *u* corrected from *a*?

Simbeck's apparatus is incomplete or incorrect in the following places: 50, 31 *iustissimo*] Mommsen and Müller report *iustissimoque* for P; Simbeck should credit *iustissimo* to P²; 54, 19 *colere*] credited to P² instead of P; 60, 14 *inveteratas*] Simbeck has adopted an emendation accepted by Orelli and others; Halm and Müller follow their MSS in reading *inveterata*; no note in Simbeck *ad loc.*; 70, 16 *ez*] an emendation by Müller, accepted by Simbeck; no note in his apparatus; 77, 4 *misceant* corrected to *misceat* (so Müller); 77, 8 *desiderant*] Simbeck, following Mommsen credits P with *desiderat*; Müller correctly reports *deriderat*; 83, 1 *adsentatoribus*] Simbeck credits P with *ad-senatoribus*, incorrectly, for it is not in Mommsen or Müller, nor in P; this mistake does occur in P at 83, 16; 84, 21 *galum*] no variants are cited in the apparatus; P has *gallum*.

The results of this examination do not shake the position of Parisinus as pre-eminent among the MSS of *De amicitia*. Our codex proves to be older than had been supposed. While the scribe in his haste has committed many errors, they are mostly of a minor sort; he does not appear to have tampered with the text. The activity of the corrector was confined to the removal of the errors of the scribe. We may assume, therefore, that the MS is a fairly faithful copy of its original.¹

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¹ Professor Rand after an examination of the photographs writes that in his opinion the MS was written at Tours or in some center under its influence.

ΜΗΔΕΝ ΑΓΑΝ IN GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE

BY ELIZA G. WILKINS

"Behold how many questions these inscriptions $\Gamma\nu\hat{\omega}\theta\iota\ \sigma\alpha\nu\tau\delta\nu$ and $\Mu\eta\delta\epsilon\nu\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\nu$ have set afoot amongst the philosophers, and what a multitude of discussions has sprung from each of them as from a seed," says Plutarch in his *E apud Delphos*,¹ and in another passage he says, regarding the same maxims, "If you consider what has been written or said about them by those who wish to understand what each means, not easily will you find longer discussions than these."² But, as a matter of fact, very few of the long discussions have come down to us. The *Alcibiades I*, ascribed to Plato, though of doubtful authenticity, and Stobaeus' collection of extracts from various writers under the title ΗΕΡΙ ΤΟΤ ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΤΤΟΝ,³ are the only discussions of $\gamma\nu\hat{\omega}\theta\iota\ \sigma\alpha\nu\tau\delta\nu$ which could be considered long in any sense, although we have a few extracts and titles of lost works which are concerned with that apophthegm. And there is no lengthy discussion of $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\nu\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\nu$ in extant Greek literature; for Aristotle's *Ethics*, while it may perhaps be conceived as having "sprung" from $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\nu\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\nu$ "as from a seed," makes no allusion to the maxim, and is probably more nearly related to $\mu\epsilon\tau\delta\nu\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\delta\nu$ in so far as it may be connected with any maxim at all. But allusions to both $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\nu\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\nu$ and $\gamma\nu\hat{\omega}\theta\iota\ \sigma\alpha\nu\tau\delta\nu$, sometimes together and sometimes separately, and often accompanied by more or less discussion, are scattered through the literature of the centuries since they appeared on Apollo's temple. The passages in which $\gamma\nu\hat{\omega}\theta\iota\ \sigma\alpha\nu\tau\delta\nu$ occurs in Greek and Latin literature prior to 500 A.D. have already been brought together in an attempt to discover the meaning of the maxim for the ancients in successive periods of their thought;⁴ but while there are a few essays by modern scholars which deal in part with $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\nu\ \ddot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\nu$,⁵ and while much has been written regard-

¹ *Op. cit.*, c. 2.

² *De Pyth. or.* c. 29.

³ *Flor.* 21.

⁴ *Know Thyself in Greek and Latin Literature* (Chicago dissertation, 1917).

⁵ Beroaldus, *Heptalogos Sept. Sap.*, pp. xciiii ff.; S. Karsten, "De Effatis Delphicis μηδέν ἀγαν et γνῶθι σαντόν," *Symb. Lit.*, II, 57 ff.; Paul Elmer More, *Delphi and Greek Literature*, "Shelburne Essays" (2d series, 1906).

ing the Greek sense of measure and harmony in general, no attempt has been made, apparently, to bring together all of the passages in which *μηδέν ἄγαν* in particular is definitely cited or evidently implied, with a view not so much to determining its meaning, for that is self-evident and constant, as to observing the various experiences and situations in life to which the Greeks and Romans gave it application in their literature.¹

The origin of *μηδέν ἄγαν*, like that of *γνῶθι σαυτόν*, is veiled in obscurity. It has been attributed to certain of the Seven Sages, usually to Solon or to Chilon, but as has already been shown in the Introduction to our discussion of *γνῶθι σαυτόν*, neither the distribution of the maxims among the various sages nor the canon of the Seven Wise Men itself was in any sense fixed. Plato was the first to attribute these apophthegms to the Seven Sages,² and the passage in which he does so is hardly to be taken seriously. The one point of which we are certain is that *μηδέν ἄγαν* was one of the maxims inscribed on the temple at Delphi which was built toward the close of the sixth, or early in the fifth, century B.C.³ The question of its exact position on the temple, as well as of its authorship, lies in dispute. Moreover, we cannot be certain whether it was placed on the temple because of its prominence in earlier Greek thought, or whether it became prominent in Greek thought largely because of its presence on the temple; but that it was already a current "proverb" when it was placed on the temple, and that its presence there served to give it a heightened importance, is a natural surmise.

Μηδέν ἄγαν, apparently, was but one of several proverbial sayings expressing the idea of the mean, for not only do the lists of apophthegms by late authors contain several maxims of similar connotation, but such sayings are scattered through the literature from Hesiod down.⁴ In Hesiod's *Works and Days* 40 we find *πλέον ἡμισυ παντός*,

¹ Karsten has done this to some extent, but his work is far from complete.

² *Protagoras* 343A-B.

³ Her. ii. 180 and v. 62; Paus. x. 5. 13.

⁴ The idea of the mean is suggested by Homer (*Od. xv. 69 ff.*), where Menelaus is saying that he will not detain Telemachus if he is eager to return home:

νεκέσουμαι δὲ καὶ δλλω
ἀνδρὶ ξενοδόκῳ, ὃς καὶ ἔξοχα μὲν φιλέστων,
ἔξοχα δὲ ἐκθαλρρών ἀμεινώ δὲ αἰσιμα πάντα.

The scholiast on this passage says *μέτρον γάρ πᾶν δριστον*. See also *Il. x. 249* discussed on p. 142.

which Plato discusses in *Republic* 466C,¹ and in verse 694 we read:

μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος.

καιρὸς evidently has here the force of "due measure" rather than its later and finally prevailing force of "due time";² and that *καιρὸς ἄριστος* was a gnomic expression is indicated by its occurrence later in the works of Theognis³ and Pindar,⁴ and by a suggestive passage in Aeschylus.⁵ *Μέτρον ἄριστον*, which was regularly attributed to Cleobulus in passages which distribute certain given maxims among the Seven Sages, appears first in a fragment of Evenus,⁶ who flourished during the latter half of the fifth century B.C., and it is closely approached by the *τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον* of Aristotle's *Politics* iv. 11. 1295b. There were a number of other ways of saying "the mean is best" in Greek, however, and it is probable that *μέτρον ἄριστον* did not become stereotyped until relatively late. We find *μέσον . . . ἄριστον* in Aristotle's *Ethics*,⁷ for instance, and *βέλτιστον* is often used instead of *ἄριστον*, as in the <*μέτρον*>*τὸ βέλτιστον* of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 378.⁸ In view of this variety of expression, it is possible that *μηδὲν*

¹ See also Dio Chrys. xvii. 467R; Diog. Laert. i. 75; Seneca *Ep.* xc. 36 ff.; Ovid *Fasti* v. 718.

² For a discussion of this passage, see Hays, *Notes on the "Works and Days" of Hesiod* (Chicago dissertation, 1918), p. 180. He tells us that *καιρὸς* does not occur in Homer at all. *μέτρον*, which occurs here in its figurative sense of "due measure," is used in Homer chiefly in its literal sense of a liquid or dry measure, or the measure of distance, although it occurs figuratively in the sense of "full measure or end" in two phrases—*μέτρον ἥβης*—*Il.* xi. 225, *Od.* iv. 668, and elsewhere; and *δρυμον μέτρον*, *Od.* xiii. 101. The word *άγαν* occurs in Homer only in the compound *άγάννιφος*—*Il.* i. 420 and xviii. 186. Hesiod refers to the mean again in *Works and Days* 740:

πλείστη δὲ χάρις κατὰ μέτρον λοιπη.

³ See p. 135.

⁴ *Ol.* xiii. 47–48:

Ἐπειτα δ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ
μέτρον νοῆσαι δὲ καιρὸς ἄριστος.

⁵ *Supp.* 1061–62. Cf. epigram of Sodamus inscribed at Tegea (schol. ad Eur. *Hipp.* 264):

ταῦτα Θεγέν Σώδαμος· Ἐπιπράτον, δι' μ' ἀνίθηκεν
μηδὲν ἄγαν. καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστον καλά.

⁶ βάκχου μέτρον ἄριστον—*Frag.* ii (ed. Bergk). See also Pseudo-Phocyl. 70:
πάντων μέτρον δριστον, ὑπερβασια δ' ἀλεγενα!

Longinus *Frag.* iii. 6; *Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans*, vs. 38.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, ii. 6. 1106 b 11.

⁸ See also Arist. *Pol.* iv. 11. 1295b—ἡ μίση βελτίστη—and the fragment of Phocylides there quoted. Note also the late phrase, *Μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον*, *Pal. Anth.* xiii. 193 and xvi. 224; schol. on Plato's *Philebus* 45D (cf. ὑπὲρ μέτρον *Theog.* 502) and *μέτρῳ χρῶ*, assigned to Thales by Demetrius (*Frag. Phil. Gr.*, i [ed. Mullach] 213). The Latin phrase is usually *optimus modus*—Plaut. *Poen.* 238; Cic. *De Off.* i. 39 (141); Seneca *De Tranq. An.* viii. 9; Pliny *Ep.* i. 20. 20; but *mediocritas* occurs frequently in place of *modus*—Cic. *De Off.* i. 36 (130); ii. 171 (59).

ἄγαν did not attain much prominence until its presence on the temple of Apollo gave it a prestige above the other closely related aphorisms; and if so, its choice for that high position may well have been due to its metrical adaptability, inasmuch as the maxims on the temple together form a hexameter verse, if we take the *v* and *a* of ἔγγιβα in ἔγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτη, as a case of synecesis.¹ Μηδὲν ἄγαν makes its first appearance in literature in Theognis, where it occurs in four passages:

Μηδὲν ἄγαν ἀσχαλλε ταρασσομένων πολιητέων
Κύρνε, μέσην δ' ἵρχευ τὴν ὁδὸν, ὥσπερ ἐγώ [vss. 219-20].

Μηδὲν ἄγαν σπειδειν· πάντων μέσ' ἀριστα καὶ οὐτως
ἔξει, Κύρν', ἀρετὴν, ἦντε λαβεῖν χαλεπόν [vss. 335-36].

Μηδὲν ἄγαν σπειδειν· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πάσιν ἀριστος
ἔργωσιν ἀνθρώπων . . . [vss. 401-2].

Μηδὲν ἄγαν χαλεποῖσιν διστο φρένα μηδ' ἀγαθοῖσιν
χαῖρ' ἐπεὶ ἔστ' ἀνδρὸς πάντα φίειν ἄγαθοῦ [vss. 657-58].

These passages indicate that as early as Theognis at least the maxim was applied to mental attitudes rather than to physical habits, although the poet uses the word *μέσην* repeatedly of moderation in the use of wine. Living in a period of political revolution, the exiled nobleman would have his young friend Cyrnus keep his poise in the midst of the turmoil and not be over-exercised at the course of events. He should not be too downcast when affairs went wrong, nor overjoyful in the hour of success, but follow the middle course with quiet dignity. The influence of such precepts, conned as they were by every schoolboy, may well be traced in all the later thought and life of Greece.

The next occurrence of the apophthegm is in a fragment of Pindar:²

σοφοὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν ἔπος αἰνησαν περισσῶς.

This verse, quoted by the scholiast on Euripides' *Hippolytus* 264, discussed below, suggests the currency of the maxim in Pindar's time and the high esteem in which it was generally held. The scholiast apparently thinks that the term *σοφοί* refers to philosophers, and not, as is often the case in Pindar, to poets; but in either case, the humor

¹ See Goettling, *Abhandlungen*, I, 228.

² No. 216 (ed. Christ).

of the charge is apparent, and the verse might well serve as a text for many a later critic who questions the value of mediocrity versus excellence.¹

As we come to the tragic poets, we find that while Sophocles is generally regarded as the poet par excellence of moderation and calm and the harmonious life,² it is Aeschylus who seems to have the *μηδὲν ἄγαν* most frequently in mind.³ Toward the end of the *Suppliants*, when the pursuing cousins are close at hand, a semi-chorus suggests that they offer a *μέτριον* prayer. The other semi-chorus asks:

τίνα καιρόν με διδάσκεις;

And the first semi-chorus replies:

τὰ θεῶν μηδὲν ἄγάζειν.

If we agree with Paley that *ἄγάζειν* is formed from *ἄγαν* as *λιέζειν* is formed from the Homeric *λιάν*, the maxim would seem unmistakably implied,⁴ while the thought that even in their distress they must not importune the Gods overmuch is characteristically Greek as well as Aeschylean. There are two passages in the *Prometheus Bound* which strongly suggest the maxim. In verse 72 Hephaestos says to Kratos, who is urging him to hasten the work of impaling Prometheus to the cliff:

δρᾶν ταῦτ' ἀνάγκη. μηδὲν ἐγκελευ' ἄγαν.

And in verse 327 Oceanus says to Prometheus:

οὐδὲ δ' ἡσύχαζε, μηδέ ἄγαν λαβροστόμει.

In the *Septem* also, Eteocles repeatedly exhorts the chorus of women to keep quiet and calm in language suggestive of the apophthegm:

μηδέ ἐπηλύσων
ταρβεῖτ' ἄγαν ὄμιλον [vss. 34-35].
ἔκηλος ἵσθι μηδέ ἄγαν ὑπερφοβοῦ [vs. 238].
μὴ νῦν ἀκούσοντος ἐμφανῶς ἀκούντες ἄγαν [vs. 244].

¹ See Speroni, *Disc. sop. le Sent. Ne quid nimis e Nosce te ipsum*; More, *Delphi and Greek Lit.*, p. 217. That Pindar himself advocated the observance of the mean is evident from several passages, e.g., *Ol.* xiii. 47-48; *Pyth.* xi. 52; *Nem.* xi. 47; *Isth.* vi. 71.

² See Reginald Robbins, "Sophocles," *Poems of Personality* (2d series). He makes Sophocles the very embodiment of *μηδὲν ἄγαν*.

³ Aeschylus uses the word *ἄγαν* more frequently than either Sophocles or Euripides. It occurs at least thirty times in his plays as against twenty-six in Sophocles', and thirty-seven in all of Euripides' plays and fragments.

⁴ See Tucker's note on *Supp.* 1062. Also note by Harry, and by Sikes and Wilson on *Prom.* 72. They all recognize the allusion to the maxim in the given passages, and also in *Sept.* 35 and 244, and in *Frag.* 155. With *Sept.* 244 cf. *Thucyd.* vii. 77. 4—*μὴ κατὰ πέπληχθε ἄγαν*. . . .

In the *Eumenides* Athena exhorts the chorus:

μηδ' ὑπερθυμῶς ἄγαν
θεαὶ βροτῶν στήσητε δύσχηλον χθόνα. [vss. 824-25].

And in a fragment of the *Niobe* the poet expresses a Greek commonplace when he says:

γίγνωσκε τάνθρωπεια μὴ σέβειν ἄγαν.¹

There are two passages in Sophocles' plays which may be reminiscent of the precept. One of these occurs in the *Antigone* at the close of Haemon's long speech to his father:

ἀλλ' ἄνδρα, καὶ τις γὰρ σοφός, τὸ μανθάνειν
πολλά' αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲν καὶ τὸ μὴ τάνειν ἄγαν [vss. 710-11].

The other passage, which needs only Dindorf's usually accepted emendation of *μηδὲν* for the manuscript *μηδ'* to express the maxim beyond question, is found near the close of the *Oedipus at Colonus*. Antigone and Ismene are mourning the death of their father Oedipus, and the chorus urges them to avoid excessive lamentation:

ὦ διδύμα τέκνων ἀρίστα,
τὸ φέρον ἐκ θεοῦ καλῶς.
μηδὲν ἄγαν φλέγεσθον οὐ τοι καταμέμπτ' ἐβήτην [vss. 1693-95].

Euripides cites the maxim definitely in his *Hippolytus*, but does not allude to it elsewhere. In the *Hippolytus* the nurse is speaking of her anxiety for Phaedra and of the grief which her exceeding devotion to her mistress entails. "It were better that people should be moderate in their friendships," she says. "Men say that the too-absorbing devotions of life bring more of disappointment than of joy and wage war against health." And then she adds:

οὐτο τὸ λιὰν ἡσσον ἐπαινῶ
τοῦ μηδὲν ἄγαν.
καὶ ἔνυφήσοντι σοφοί μοι [vss. 264-66].

The maxim is quoted five times in the works of Plato—three times in connection with *γνῶθι σαντὸν* and twice by itself. In his *Protagoras*² he tells us that *γνῶθι σαντὸν* and *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, inscribed on the temple at Delphi by the Seven Wise Men as the first-fruits of wisdom, are on everybody's tongue, and that they are examples of Laconian brevity of speech. In the *Charmides*³ he suggests fancifully that *γνῶθι σαντὸν*

¹ No. 154 (ed. Nauck).

² *Op. cit.* 343A-B.

³ *Op. cit.* 165A.

was placed on the temple first, as a salutation of the God to his worshipers, but that men mistook the salutation for an admonition and, that they might inscribe no less useful advice, they added later the *μηδὲν ἄγαν* and *έγγινα*, *πάρα δ' ἄτη*. And in the pseudo-platonic *Hipparchus*¹ it is said that the tyrant set up Herms in every deme, inscribed with epigrams of his own, in order that people might not wonder at the wise inscriptions at Delphi. Mention of *μηδὲν ἄγαν* by itself alone is found in the *Philebus* and in the *Menexenus*. In the *Philebus*,² Plato is discussing mixed pleasures—bodily pleasures as distinguished from pure pleasure, such as the pleasure of beauty, of knowledge, and the like—and he asks Protarchus whether these mixed, or bodily, pleasures are greater in sickness or in health. Protarchus answers that while the aphorism—the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*—restrains those who have *σωφροσύνη* from excessive indulgence, the excesses of those who lack *σωφροσύνη* make them fairly cry aloud to the point of madness. This connection of *σωφροσύνη* with *μηδὲν ἄγαν* is all the more interesting because of the connection of the virtue with *γνῶθι σαντὸν* in the *Charmides* and in the *Timaeus*.³ It is evidently related to *γνῶθι σαντὸν* in its sense of “knowing one’s place,” and also to some extent in its etymological sense of sound-mindedness, whereas it is here obviously related to *μηδὲν ἄγαν* in its sense of controlling one’s physical appetites. In the passage in the *Menexenus*,⁴ Aspasia represents those who have died as speaking before they went out to battle of what they would wish said to their children and parents in case they should not return. They urge their parents to bear their loss as lightly as possible. Their parents have prayed that their children might be famous and brave, and their prayer has been answered. “The ancient saying *μηδὲν ἄγαν* seems to be, and really is, well spoken,” they say.

He who depends upon himself for his happiness and does not cling to others and so become obliged to suffer their vicissitudes of fortune, he is well balanced, brave, and wise. When his money or his children come to him or perish, he will always obey the maxim, for he will appear neither to rejoice nor to grieve in excess, on account of relying upon himself. Such we deem it right our parents should be, and wish to declare that they are; and such we now render ourselves—not distressed nor fearful overmuch if we must die at once.

Other passages in Plato in which the doctrine of the mean is sug-

¹ *Op. cit.* 228E.

² *Op. cit.* 45D.

³ *Op. cit.* 72A. See *Know Thyself in Greek Lit.*, chap. iv.

⁴ *Op. cit.* 247E.

gested or discussed apart from any reference to *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, however much they may be related in thought, must needs lie beyond the compass of this paper, for we are concerned with those passages alone in which the maxim definitely occurs or is specifically implied. And we must pass over, likewise, that work so pregnant with influence upon later literature, the *Ethics* of Aristotle, for, as has been said, *μηδὲν ἄγαν* is nowhere even suggested by the phraseology of the *Ethics*. It is to the *Rhetoric*, rather, that we must turn for *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. There Aristotle first cites the apophthegm in describing the characteristics of youth. He says:

They err on the side of excess and violence in everything, contrary to that maxim of Chilon's. For they do everything too much. They love too much and they hate too much, and everything else in like manner. And they imagine that they know everything and they affirm everything with emphatic confidence. For this [strong confidence] is the cause of their going too far in everything.

But the aged, on the other hand, err the other way.

Because they have lived more years, and have been deceived, and have made more mistakes, and have become disillusioned, everything is stressed less than it ought to be (*γιττόν τε ἄγαν ἀπαρτά η δεῖ*). In a discussion, they suppose a thing is so, but they *know* nothing; and they always add a "perhaps" or a "possibly"—and say nothing with certainty. They neither love too much nor hate too much, but according to the precept of Bias, they love as if they were going to hate, and hate as if they were going to love.¹

These characterizations of youth and of old age are followed by a discussion of middle age as the mean period of life. Hence in the *Rhetoric* if not in the *Ethics*, Aristotle connects his doctrine of the mean very definitely with *μηδὲν ἄγαν*.

A little farther on in the *Rhetoric*, *μηδὲν ἄγαν* is again brought into connection with the foregoing precept of Bias.² In the chapter on the use of maxims for rhetorical effect, Aristotle says:

Maxims may be cited in contradiction of sayings that have become public property (by public property I mean, for instance, the *γνῶθι σαυτὸν* and the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*), whenever one's character (*ἥθος*) is going to appear in a more favorable light thereby, or whenever they are uttered under stress of emotion (*παθητικῶς*).

¹ *Op. cit.* ii. 12. 13—13. 1. See Cope's note for the possible interpretations of *γιττόν ἄγαν*. Surely there is a reference to the maxim here, and the meaning given above seems the preferable one.

² *Ibid.* 21. 13—14. The *locus classicus* for this precept of bias is Soph. *Ajax* 678—83. See Jebb's Appendix, pp. 231 f.

He then goes on to illustrate the use of *γνῶθι σαυτὸν* in expressing strong emotion, and of *μηδὲν ἄγαν* in revealing *ἡθος*. He continues:

Our character is put in a better light by saying that "one ought not," as the saying goes, to love people (with reservation) as if we were going to hate them, but we should rather hate as if we were going to love (them thereafter). We must show our moral purpose by our diction, or if we do not do that, we should add the reason for our attitude, as if one should say, "One ought not to love as the Saying goes, but as if one would love always. For the alternative would be acting falsely." Or we might express it in this way, "The Saying does not please me, for the true friend must love as if he were going to love forever. And the *μηδὲν ἄγαν* does not please me, either. For one should hate the wicked at least exceedingly."

Citations of *μηδὲν ἄγαν* in Greek literature after Aristotle and in Latin literature are relatively few as compared with the interest in its companion *γνῶθι σαυτὸν*, on the one hand, and the influence of Aristotle's *Ethics*, on the other. Several of the later notices merely attribute the maxim to some one of the Seven Sages,¹ or refer to it as one of the inscriptions on the temple,² or mention it as a rhetorical device.³ We are indebted to Diodorus Siculus for an unusual story, however, and to Plutarch for some interesting comments, while Diogenes Laertius makes two statements worthy of notice, and Hierocles introduces the maxim in his commentary upon the *Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans*. There are pertinent epigrams in the *Palatine Anthology* also, and the passages in Latin literature which refer to the precept, while few, are none the less important. Diodorus Siculus says⁴ that *μηδὲν ἄγαν* means to be moderate in all things, and not be entirely divided in any human contention; and then he tells this strange story of the people of Epidamnus. He says:

When at variance with one another they let down masses of hot iron into the sea, and took oath that they would not lay aside their mutual enmity

¹ Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. 14. 61; Diog. Laert. i. 1. 14 (41); ii. 16 (63); Pal. *Anth.* ix. 366; schol. on Lucian *Phal.* 7 and on *Dio Chrys.* (see *Philol.*, Vol. XXIV, p. 203, n. 2). Greg. Cyp. *Leid.* ii. 79; Sidonius xv. 47; Luxorius *De Sent. sept. phil.* See also Mullach, *Frag. Phil. Graec.*, I, 212 ff.

² Paus. x. 24. 1; Pliny *N.H.* vii. 32 (119).

³ Aristides *Art of Rhetoric* A¹ 483; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 8. 45.

⁴ ix. 9. 3. The story probably has reference to the period of strife between the nobility and the people which led to the intervention of Corinth and Corcyra and helped to bring on the Peloponnesian War. The tale is apparently a literary echo of Her. i. 165. Cf. Hor. *Epod.* xvi. 17 ff.

until these masses were recovered hot. But although they swore so harshly and did not exert themselves to obey the *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, they later became reconciled perforce, and left the hot iron cold in the depths of the sea.

Plutarch, as we have seen, speaks of the importance of the Delphic maxims in the minds of the ancients, and he admires them as examples of concise and meaningful expression.¹ He discusses *μηδὲν ἄγαν* with specific significance in two of his works. In his *Consolation to Apollonius*² he has much to say against excessive grief and joy, and at length he refers to *γνῶθι σαντὸν* and *μηδὲν ἄγαν* as very necessary for life, and says that they are in harmony with each other, and that each is included in the other—that he who has these maxims impressed upon his mind can easily adapt himself to all the experiences of life, “considering his nature so that he is not lifted up to arrogance by a prosperous event, nor cast into complaint when adversity comes.” It is clear from the context that Plutarch is thinking here of *γνῶθι σαντὸν* in its sense of “know you are human and mortal, and so subject to human limitations,”³ and it is at this point that the maxims may be said each to involve the other. In his *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men* stories of the preservation of Arion, and other dolphin tales, are told by different members of the company, and Pittacus at length declares that these stories are not past belief. Then, turning to Solon, he says:

To be brief and speak all in a few words, if one should know how to distinguish between the impossible and the unusual, and what is beyond reason from what is beyond one's expectation, especially if he chances to be neither too credulous nor too incredulous, he would keep the *μηδὲν ἄγαν* which you have enjoined.⁴

Presently Chersias tells other tales of the miraculous preservation of people, and especially of Cypselus, who consecrated a shrine at Delphi in gratitude for his preservation in the chest when a babe. Pittacus, reminded of Delphi, asks Periander why all those frogs were carved on the palm tree before the temple door, and Periander passes the question over to Chersias, who refuses to reply unless they tell him the meaning of the maxims on the temple.⁵ Aesop remarks that Chersias likes jestingly to make Homer responsible for such sentences,

¹ *De Pyth. or.*, c. 29; *de Garrul.*, c. 17.

² *Op. cit.*, c. 28.

³ See *Know Thyself in Greek Lit.*, chap. vii.

⁴ *Ibid.* c. 19.

⁵ *Ibid.* c. 21.

and he proceeds to connect each of the three with a Homeric passage. He connects *μηδὲν ἄγαν* with the remark of Odysseus to Diomed in *Iliad* x. 249, where Diomed has just made a complimentary little speech in choosing Odysseus from among those who volunteered to join him in spying on the Trojans:

Τυδεοδὴ, μήτ' ἄρ' με μάλ' αἰνεῖ μήτε τε νείκει.

This last passage in the *Banquet of the Seven Wise Men*, half-playful though it is, affords a conspicuous instance of the tendency of late Greek writers to refer the Delphic maxims back to Homer,¹ even as men of a later day came to look for some statement of every truth in the Hebrew Bible.

One of the statements by Diogenes Laertius referred to above is that when Socrates was once asked in what the virtue of youth consists, he replied, *το μηδὲν ἄγαν*,² and the other statement, which occurs in his chapter on Pyrrho, is to the effect that some men regard the sayings of the Seven Sages, such as the *μηδὲν ἄγαν* and *ἔγγιγα*, *πάρα δ' ἄτα* as *σκεπτικά*.³ Hierocles quotes *μηδὲν ἄγαν* in commenting upon the portion of the *Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans*⁴ which includes the phrase *μέτρον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστον*, and he says that "we would avoid the ill-will which grows up toward those who excel, if with the help of *μηδὲν ἄγαν*, we do not arouse our fellow-citizens against us so that they find fault with us for living too delicately or blame us for being too crude."

One of the epigrams in the *Anthology* which has the precept for its theme is by Alpheius of Mitylene, who probably flourished in the time of Augustus. It reminds us somewhat of the fragment of Pindar

¹ The scholiast on this passage says ἐντεῖθεν τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν δηλοῦται. For γνῶθι σαντὸν see schol. on *Il.* iii. 53. Cf. Sheewan, "Homer and Recent Discoveries," *Classical Weekly*, XV (Dec. 12, 1921), 71. He is speaking of the restraint of Homer, and he says, "It is summed up in Homer's own precept, that . . . moderation is best in all things, and that is just the famous, the golden *μηδὲν ἄγαν*."

² ii. 6. 16 (33).

³ viii. 11. 17 (8). Cf. Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh.* i. 25—φαμὲν δὲ ἄχρονὸν τέλος εἶναι, τὸν σκεπτικὸν τὴν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ δόξαν ἀταραξίαν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατηναγκασμένοις μεριστάθεαν. Ritter, *Hist. of Anc. Phil.*, III, 396, translated by Morrison, says that moderation was a skeptic principle. Zeller, however, says that it cannot be proved "that Pyrrho's school so far accommodated itself to life as to make moderation rather than indifference the regulating principle for unavoidable actions and desires" (*Sloits, Ep. and Scept.*, pp. 497-98). Neither Ritter nor Zeller refer definitely to this statement of Diogenes Laertius.

⁴ Commentary on vss. 35-38.

cited above, for Alpheius apparently implies the possibility of his being too contented with his moderate circumstances:

No deep-soiled fields I crave to own,
Nor wealth of Gyges rich in gold:
Enough to meet the needs of life
Is all I wish, Macrinus mine.
Μηδέν ἄγαν o'er-pleases me!¹

A second epigram in the *Anthology*,² by Palladas of Alexandria, who seems to have flourished early in the fifth century A.D., applies the maxim to a certain Gessius, whose identity is unknown, but whose ambition for power evidently brought him to his death. The first six verses read:

Μηδέν ἄγαν the wisest said, of Seven Sages known of old;
But thou didst heed it not, O Gessius, so this thine end!
Though learned in wisdom's lore, thou hadst to face reproach
for lack of sense,
Since thou didst dare desire to make ascent to Heaven above.
So Pegasus, the steed, Bellerophon did slay,
Who wished to learn the laws by which the stars do move.

In further epigrams referring to Gessius, Palladas tells us that he consulted the oracle of Ammon and two astrologers regarding his future, and that they promised him high office. The allusion to Bellerophon marks the earliest attempt to illustrate the maxim by a mythological story—a practice which became somewhat common in Renaissance literature, where Icarus and Phaëthon figure as the stock characters.³ A third epigram,⁴ by Agathius Scholasticus, of the sixth century A.D., applies the maxim to a lover's arrogant treatment of his sweetheart:

Μηδέν ἄγαν, said the Sage of old,
But I, as one comely and fair,
Was puffed up with pride, and the fancy held
That a maiden's heart lay all in my hands—
A maiden full crafty, forsooth.
Now she holds uplifted her haughty brow,
As of one who deplores she's been kind;
And I, the brazen and fierce of mien,

¹ Pal. *Anth.* ix. 110.

² *Ibid.* vii. 683.

³ The story of Bellerophon is alluded to in a passage suggestive of the mean in Pindar (*Isth.* vi. 44). For the Icarus and Phaëthon stories in Renaissance literature, see Gracian, *El Criticon*, I, 5, and Gomberville, *Le Doctrine des Mœurs*, No. 9.

⁴ Pal. *Anth.* v. 299.

So slow to persuade, and winging so high,
 On a sudden have fallen, alas!
 And all is other than once it was;
 I fall on my knees, and I cry to the maid,
 "Thy pardon: my Youth was in error."

With the possible exception of a passage in Plautus' *Poenulus*,¹ the earliest instance of the occurrence of the maxim in Latin literature is in Terence's *Andria*—a passage which became the *locus classicus* for *ne quid nimis*, much as did the

e caelo descendit γρῦθοι στεντόν

of Juvenal's *Satire* xi. 27 for its companion maxim. In the *Andria*, the old man Simo is speaking of his son to his slave Sosia, and he says that he is pleased because his son engages in the pursuits common to the young men of his day—the training of horses, or of dogs for hunting, and attending upon the philosophers—in a moderate degree, and does not give more heed to any one pursuit than to the others. Sosia in reply assures his master that he has reason to be pleased, and adds:

nam id arbitror

Adprime in vita esse utile, ut nequid nimis [vss. 60–61].

The next citation of the precept is in Varro's *Satura Menippaea*,² where he asks in one of the fragments under the title *Modius*: "Quid aliud est? Quod Delphice canit columna litteris suis "Αγαν Μηθέν, quam nos facere ad mortalem modum 'medioxime,' ut quandam patres nostri loquebantur?" *Medioxime* is apparently synonymous with *ad mortalem modum*, and Varro thus appears to apply the maxim with the meaning suggested in Aeschylus' fragment, and in Plutarch's *Consolation to Apollonius*—that we should not aspire to what is beyond the nature of man.

While the poems of Horace and the philosophical essays of Cicero and Seneca are full of the doctrine of the mean, *ne quid nimis* is not cited at all by Horace, and it is given less prominence than *optimus*

¹ "Modus omnibus rebus, soror, optumus habitu:

Nimia omnia nimium exhibent negoti(um) hominibus ex se" (vss. 238–39).

Cf. Afranius frag. *Emancip.* vi. 1. 78:

"Cur nimium adpetimus? Nemini nimium bene est."

² *Op. cit.* v (6) (ed. Riese). See note by Oehler, p. 164.

modus in the works of the other two. Cicero lists it in his *De Finibus*¹ among the old precepts of the Wise Men which he says "would have little force (and they have a very great deal) without natural philosophy"; and in his *Tusculan Disputations*² he quotes from the passage in Plato's *Menexenus* in which *μηδὲν ἄγαν* occurs. Seneca mentions the maxim in one of his *Moral Epistles*³ in which he discusses the value of precepts. He says that good precepts, if often with us, will benefit us like good examples, and he quotes a statement of Pythagoras to the effect that those who enter a temple and see the statues near at hand are differently affected from those who merely attend the voice of some oracle at the door. Then he asks:

Who could deny that even the crudest people are struck by certain precepts effectively, as by those very brief and weighty sayings *Nihil nimis, Avarus animus multo satiatur lucro*. . . . These fall upon our ears with a certain blow, nor do they allow any one to doubt or to ask why—so far does the truth itself affect us.

There is a glance at *ne quid nimis* in Seneca's *De Tranquilitate Animi*⁴ also, although the real text of the passage is *optimus modus*.⁵ Seneca is recommending contentment with fewer servants and simpler appointments, and he asks to what end men own innumerable books, of which the owner scarcely reads through the indexes in his entire life. It is much more valuable to apply one's self to a few authors, he says, than to wander aimlessly through many. "You say you spend money in this way more properly than to waste it on Corinthian brass, paintings, and tablets," he continues, but "*Vitiosum est ubique quod nimium est.*"

Among the contemporaries of Seneca, Pliny is the only one who cites the maxim, and he merely mentions it as one of the three consecrated at Delphi in letters of gold.⁶ And the maxim is rare in the writings of the church Fathers. Hieronymus, however, quotes it in

¹ *Op. cit.* iii. 22.

² *Op. cit.* v. 12 (36).

³ *Op. cit.* xv. 2 (94). 43.

⁴ *Op. cit.* ix. 6.

⁵ *Op. cit.* viii. 9: "*Optimus pecuniae modus est.*"

⁶ *N. H.* vii. 32 (119). There is a possible allusion to the maxim in Martial i. 57:

"Qualem, Flacco, velim quaeris nolimve pueram?
Nolo nimis facilem difficilemque nimis.
Illiud quod medium est atque inter utrumque probamus,
Nec volo quod cruciat, nec volo quod satiat."

three of his *Epistles*. In the first,¹ which is an epitaphium for a certain Nepotianus, he beseeches one Heliodorus to employ moderation in his grief, *memor illius sententiae: ne quid nimis*. In the second,² an *epitaphium of Saint Paula*, he says that it is difficult to hold to the mean in all things, and according to the sentiment of the philosopher, the phrase *μεσότητες ἀρεταῖ, ὑπερβολαι κακιῶν*³ is of high repute, which we can express in one little phrase, *ne quid nimis*. The sainted Paula, he goes on to tell us, could scorn food, but she was crushed by the death of her children—a fact which may be to her discredit, but which must be included in a true account of her character. In the third letter,⁴ addressed to Demetriades, “a Christian virgin first in rank and wealth in the Roman world,” he counsels her against immoderate fasting, “by which delicate frames are straightway broken in health,” and again he quotes the statement that mean states are virtues and excesses vices. Then he adds:

Whence also one of the Seven Wise Men said *Ne quid nimis*, a saying which became so celebrated that it is even expressed in the verse of Comedy. You ought not to fast so that you tremble and find yourself scarcely able to breathe, so that you have to be carried or dragged in the arms of your companions; but you should fast only to such an extent that, with the bodily appetite curbed, you can do no less than is your wont in the reading, and in (the singing of) psalms, and in watching.

The only other discussion of the maxim of any consequence⁵ in the classical period occurs in Ausonius' *Masque of the Seven Sages*, where it appears synonymously with *μέτρον ἀριστον*. Cleobulus the Lindian is introduced, and he says as he enters the stage:

I am Cleobulus—whom they think said *ἀριστον μέτρον*. You translate it who sit within the fourteen rows next the orchestra. Tell us whether *ἀριστον μέτρον* is *optimus modulus*. . . . Your poet Afer has already said from this stage *ne quid nimis*, and one of our poets, *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. Both phrases, Italian and Greek, are to this effect: It means moderation in speaking, in keeping silent, in sleeping, in waking, in benefits, in favors, in study, in labors. Whatever there is in all our life demands this measure of timely cessation.

¹ *Ep. ix. 7.*

² *Ibid. cviii. 21.*

³ See *Eud. Eth. ii. 5. 1222b; iii. 1. 1228a; 7. 1234a.*

⁴ *Ep. cxxx. 11.*

⁵ There is a probable echo of the precept in a distich by Dionysius Cato (ii. 6):

“Quod nimium est fugito, parvo gaudere memento:
Tuta mage est puppis, modice quae flumine fertur.”

As we look back over these passages in Greek and Latin literature in which *μηδὲν ἄγαν* is either definitely quoted or apparently implied, we are impressed by the fact that it is more frequently applied to mental states than to conduct, especially in Greek literature prior to the Roman period. The only instance of its application to physical desires is the passage in the *Philebus* where it is made synonymous with that dignified virtue *σωφροσύνη* in its meaning of control over one's physical appetites. In no one of the numerous passages which recommend moderation in the use of wine, for example, does the maxim appear at all. In two of the four passages in *Theognis*, where it first appears, it is used to caution against distress of mind, and it is probable that the *μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν* of the other two passages is primarily a warning against over-excitement rather than against rash behavior. With the possible exception of this phrase, the only other applications of the maxim to conduct in Greek literature prior to the Roman period are the exhortation against importuning the gods in the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus, and the passage in the *Prometheus Bound* in which Hephaestos bids Kratos not to urge him overmuch, although Terence may be following his Greek model in applying the apophthegm to horse-training and the like. For the most part, the precept is directed against excessive emotion and excessive pride and ambition. The emotional experience to which it is most often applied from *Theognis* down is that of grief, whether for the death of a friend or over reverses in fortune; but it is also applied, as we have seen, to emotions of joy, of fear, of anger, of love, and of hatred.¹ We may class with warnings against excessive pride or ambition the advice to Prometheus not to be too violent of tongue, and to Creon against maintaining a stubborn spirit, as well as the passages which bid men bear in mind their human limitations, and the epigram which shows the folly of ambition on the part of Gessius. Plutarch, as we have seen, applies the maxim to credulity in one passage. It is applied to property or to one's manner of living by one of the epigrams in the

¹ Cf. Karsten in *Sym. Lit.*, II, 61: "Graeca enim natio juvenili animi impetu et ardore exultans, facile immoderatioribus studiis motibusque abripietatur, ira, gratia, amore, odio, gaudio, luctu, contentione, libidine. In hoc autem animorum aestu aderat iis sanae mentis ratio, quae quasi habens tenens modo premeret impetum, modo incitaret, et tamquam certam normam sequeretur illud, *ne quid nimis.*"

Anthology and by Hierocles, to fasting by Hieronymous, and, in close union with $\muέτρον$ $\alphaριστον$, to a number of human experiences taken together by Ausonius; but this tendency so to apply it was obviously late. The idea that one may appraise the maxim and the philosophy of life for which it stands too highly is as old as Pindar, and is again implied by Aristotle; but, take it all in all, the ancients spoke of $\muηδὲν$ $\alphaγαν$ with dignified admiration, and reverenced it as a command sent from Heaven.

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LE FRAGMENT DU *DE AMICITIA* CONTENU DANS LE *SELESTADIENSIS*

PAR L. LAURAND

La Bibliothèque Municipale de Schlestadt¹ contient un manuscrit où, après la *quatrième catilinaire* et les prétendues invectives de Cicéron et de Salluste, on lit un fragment important du *De Amicitia*. L'écriture est du XII^e ou du XIII^e siècle. Le texte présente diverses variantes intéressantes. Nous en publions ci-dessous la collation, faite sur l'édition Reid (Cambridge, 1921).

Le fragment commence au chapitre 12, § 40, *Haec igitur lex*. Mais l'*H* majuscule a été laissée au soin du rubricateur; et celui-ci ne l'a jamais tracée; on sait combien cet accident est fréquent dans les manuscrits. L'*H* a donc été ajoutée au crayon par une main récente.

Si l'on compare le leçons ci-dessous avec les éditions critiques, on s'apercevra vite que le *Selestadiensis* est de la même famille que les manuscrits BDV, mais qu'il présente aussi des leçons communes avec d'autres classes de manuscrits; il en est, d'ailleurs, presque toujours ainsi pour le *De Amicitia*: les diverses traditions ont réagi l'une sur l'autre. Nous ne signalons pas les variantes purement orthographiques, comme: *karitatis* (46), *benivolentiae* (49), *iocundius* (49), *vulgi* (50), *haut* (51), *habundantia* (52), *terciam* (56), *paciuntur* (57), *impuri* (59), *negligenda* (61), *blandicisis* (61), *inbecilla* (63), *contempnendam* (63), *repperiuntur* (64), *eligi* (65), *hautquaquam* (66), *ingenii* (70), les accusatifs pluriel comme *fideles* (54), *très* (56); mais nous devons signaler qu'au § 69, l'abréviation *oī̄s* ne permet pas de savoir si l'on doit lire *omnes* ou *omnis*; des abréviations de ce genre expliquent la présence de certaines variantes.

Notons aussi qu'aux §§ 50 et 51, *atque* est remplacé par le signe &, qui, normalement, est censé représenter *et*.

La division des mots est généralement claire; parfois les prépositions sont réunies au substantif qui les suit (*ingrecia*, 45), usage qui remonte à l'antiquité.

¹ Ville appelée successivement Selestat, Schelestat, Schlestadt, Schlettstatt, Sélestat, etc., en latin, *Scaldistadium*, *Scaldistadium*, etc. Mais le nom latin le plus usité a été *Selestadium*, d'où l'adjectif *Selestadiensis*; le manuscrit porte le cachet: *Biblioteca urbis Selestadiensis*.

La diphthongue *ae* est souvent représentée par *e* mais aussi par un signe spécial: *e* accompagné d'une cédille.

COLLATION

	SELESTADIENSIS	REID
12. 40	Tiberius	Ti.
41	P. nasicam scipionem quoque quem modo posuimus	P. Scipione quocumque modo potiumus
42	Precipiendum igitur est in magnam aliquam rem	Praecipiendum est igitur in magna aliqua re publica
	Graeciam liberavisset (1 ^e <i>main</i>) graeciam servitute liberavisset (2 ^e <i>main</i>) missus esset uterque sibi mortem conscivit	Graeciam liberavisset
13. 44	gaudeamus aperta	expulsus esset mortem sibi
46	minimum virium maxime appetere hi qui putantur	uterque conscivit audeamus aperte
47	hi qui re ipsa neque est	minimumque virium appetere maxime ei qui putentur
48	inter pecudem (1 ^e <i>main</i>) non dico inter pecudem (2 ^e <i>main</i>) neque sunt (1 ^e <i>main</i>) neque enim sunt (2 ^e <i>main</i>) quandam esse volunt diffundantur contrahantur	ei qui reapce neque enim est non dico inter pecudem neque enim sunt
14. 50	concedatur boni bonos hoc Fanni constat fons amicitiae	quandam volunt diffundatur contrahatur concedetur bonos boni
51	figunt profectum est hi qui	hoc quidem Fanni constet amicitiae fons figunt est profectum
15. 52	erunt audiendi amicitiae locus	ei qui audiendi locus amicitiae

	SELESTADIENSIS	REID
53	ceciderit 1 ^e <i>main</i>) ceciderint (2 ^e <i>main</i>) se (1 ^e <i>main</i>) tum se (2 ^e <i>main</i>) neutri	ceciderint tum se neutris
54	superbia (1 ^e <i>main</i>) superbia et importunitate (2 ^e <i>main</i>) uideri sperni ab his	superbia et importunitate videre sperni ab eis
55	supellectilem uitae ut ita dicam (1 ^e <i>main</i>) uitae ut ita dicam supellectilem (2 ^e <i>main</i>) cum parantur cui parentur illa permaneant	vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem cum parant cui parent illa permaneant
16. 56	deligendi se (1 ^e <i>main</i>) se ipsum (2 ^e <i>main</i>) faciat	diligendi se ipse facit
57	quisque sit sic nostru causa inuehi in aliquem his	quisque, sic nostra causa in aliquem inuehi eis
58	diffinit vera amicitia restricte (1 ^e <i>main</i>) stricte (2 ^e <i>main</i>)	definit amicitia vera stricte
59	se faciat solitus sit Scipio inimicitiorem amicitia ei (1 ^e <i>main</i>) eius (2 ^e <i>main</i>)	se ipse faciat Scipio solitus sit inimicitiorem amicitiae eius
60	cuiuscumque (1 ^e <i>main</i>) cuiuscumque (2 ^e <i>main</i>) id potius Scipio	cuiuscumque
17. 61	accideri <i>et grattage</i> (<i>La 1^e main avait probablement écrit: acciderint</i>) acciderit (2 ^e <i>main</i>)) de capite agatur de uia est	id Scipio potius acciderit caput agatur de via sit

	SELESTADIENSIS	REID
62	posset diligendis magna penuria est experiendum amicitia praecurrit experiundi	posse diligendis est magna penuria experiendum praecurrit amicitia experiendi
63	temperatis aliqua parte quam leues sint erunt aliqui (1 ^e main) erunt aliqui reperti (2 ^e main) existimant altera parte preposita ex altera parte	temptatis ex aliqua parte quam sint leves erunt aliqui reperti existiment ex altera parte proposita ex altera
64	in honoribus r. p. calamitum (1 ^e main) calamitatum (2 ^e main)	in honoribus reque publica calamitatum
18. 65	quam in amicitia (répété deux fois par ditto graphie) stabile est hisdem multiplex et tortuosum ingenium dicere licet odisse est précédé d'un grattage: la 1 ^e main avait dû écrire: uel odisse; la 2 ^e a supprimé: uel. ingenuum suspiciosum esse	quem in amicitia stabile eisdem multiplex iganum et tortuosum licet dicere vel odisse
19. 67	debet . . . societas uerumque est (1 ^e main) uerumque illud est (2 ^e main)	ingenui esse suspiciosum debent . . . satiates uerumque illud est
68	Quin ipso equo (1 ^e main) Quin in ipso equo (2 ^e main) nemo est qui non his qui in locis (1 ^e main) quin in locis (2 ^e main) etiam siluestribus	Ipso equo nemo est quin eis cum locis etiam et silvestribus

	SELESTADIENSIS	REID
69	ut ita dicam in nostra grege	in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege
	rutilio	Rupilio
	nummio	Nummio
	(<i>A partir d'ici, le dernier folio ayant été mouillé, on ne peut pas toujours distinguer la 2^e main de la 1^e.</i>)	
70	consecuti sint	consecuti sunt
	inbecilliores	imbecilliore
	in famulatu fuerint	in famulatu fuerunt
	cogniti sunt (<i>peut-être</i>)	cogniti sunt
	<i>corrigé par la 2^e main</i>	
	<i>en cogniti sint</i>	
	dixerunt	duxerunt
	Fructus ... confertur, omis dans <i>le texte est rajouté en</i>	Fructus ... confertur
	marge	
20. 71	hi	ei
	dicere queant	queant dicere
72	hi	ei
	Sunt etiam qui (amicitias) faciunt <i>omis</i> <i>dans le texte est rajouté</i> <i>au dessus de la ligne</i>	Sunt enim quidam qui amicitias faciunt
	contigit	contingit
	his	eis
	opere	opera
	rutilum	Rupilium
73	·L·	Lucium
74	fuerint	fuerunt
	negligendi non sunt	neglegendi quidem
	est	aestimandi
	secuntur, eoreum quorum (?)	sequuntur, quorum

Les mots *disparia studia* sont les derniers qui soient bien lisibles et ils sont donnés comme les derniers par le *Catalogue général des manuscrits*; mais les mots *secuntur eorum*, qui suivent, peuvent encore être déchiffrés avec certitude; il semble, de plus, qu'il y a ensuite trace la leçon *quorum*, qui, dans d'autres manuscrits, remplace *eorum*.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *EPISTOLA DE INDICIS GENTIBUS ET DE BRAGMANIBUS*

BY P. R. COLEMAN-NORTON

To Palladius Helenopolitanus (ca. 363-ca. 425) are ascribed three works: the *Historia Lausiaca*, the *Dialogus de Vita S. Joannis Chrysostomi*, and the *Epistola de Indicis Gentibus et de Bragmanibus*. The Palladian authorship of each work has been contested: that of the *Historia* has been vindicated completely by the learned Benedictine, Dom Butler,¹ whose proof of the authenticity also of the *Dialogus* has won almost universal acceptance,² while the case for the *Epistola* has been neglected in modern times.

The *Epistola* was edited first by Joachim Kammermeister (Camerarius) at Leipzig in 1569.³ But it remained for Edward Bysshe (Bissaeus), the second editor of the *Epistola* a century later,⁴ to imply that the author of the *Historia* wrote the *Epistola*.⁵

¹ Dom Butler presents his conclusions in his monumental edition of the *Historia Lausiaca* (Cambridge, 1898 and 1904), I, 1-6, 138, 178-96; II, ix-xiv, 182-84, and in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (Oxford; Jan., 1921), Vol. XXII, No. 86, pp. 138, 144-46, 148, 149.

² His arguments are found in a brochure entitled *Authorship of the "Dialogus de Vita Chrysostomi"* (Rome, 1908) and in *JTS*, loc. cit., pp. 138-55. Rev. Herbert Moore has adduced further evidence in his English translation of the *Dialogus* published as *The Dialogue of Palladius concerning the Life of Chrysostom* (London, 1921), pp. xiv-xxiv, 201-3. And I have additional data, still *in manuscripto*, which supplement the work of Dom Butler and Mr. Moore.

³ "Epistola Palladii de Indicis Gentib. et de Bragmanib. (sic)," *Libellus Gnomologicus* (Leipzig), pp. 110-49. Since the *Libellus* appeared *sine temporis nota*, we may accept the date fixed by Kollar, who, in his *Supplementum ad Petri Lambecii Commentarios de Bibliotheca Caesarea Vindobonensi*, I, 599, recorded the following note by Joannes Sambucus in the MS from which Kammermeister printed the text: *Camerarius imprimi curavit 1569. mense Maii. Remisit 26. Junii.*

According to Kollar (*ibid.*) Kammermeister made the Latin translation of the *Epistola* appearing in pp. 253-94 of the *Libellus*.

⁴ *Palladius de Gentibus Indiae et Bragmanibus* (London, 1665). This edition was reprinted in 1668. Bysshe's translation into Latin is printed à côté on each page.

⁵ This imputation Bysshe advanced, not by any contribution of his own, but by notices from Baronius, Voss, and Labbe, with which he introduced his text. Since these accounts, while silent as to the *Epistola*, discuss the Palladius of the *Historia* and the *Dialogus* (of which latter all three historians either doubted or denied the Palladian authorship), the inference is that Bysshe attributed the *Epistola* to the Palladius who wrote the *Historia*.

The *Epistola*, which is not a lengthy composition, falls naturally into two parts: (1) an introductory letter¹ and (2) a commentary on Arrian's *Anabasis*.

From the introductory letter, which, unfortunately, does not contain the name of the person to whom the commentary was sent, it appears that the author is a Christian who journeyed to India (the starting-point, date and route are not mentioned) in the company of one Moses, Bishop of Adulis (an Abyssinian town on the Red Sea), for the purpose of inquiring into the life of the Brahmins—a subject of interest to the recipient of the *Epistola*. In extremely hot weather the two men traveled as far as the borders of India, where the author, already *caloris impatiens*, turned back upon seeing water boil in jars placed to receive the flow from fountains. What happened to Moses and whither the author returned we are not told. His promise to describe the life of the Brahmins the author contrives to fulfil by recording the impressions thereon of a certain Theban, Scholasticus by name, who had sailed from Adulis to Taprobane (Ceylon). After a description of this isle, it is discovered that Scholasticus was arrested in Taprobane as an undesirable alien and enslaved there for six years, toward the end of which period an Indian king, on the pretext of rescuing a noble Roman (Scholasticus) from servitude, waged war upon the king of Taprobane, who thereupon investigated the case of Scholasticus and set him at liberty. In the midst of hostilities (the cessation of which by the removal of the pretext does not appear), Scholasticus turns to a discourse upon the physical features, the flora and fauna, and the inhabitants of India—a recital abruptly terminated by the author, who states that he has sent a copy of Arrian's *Anabasis* to his friend (the recipient of the *Epistola*) and that what follows is his own commentary on Arrian.

The commentary on Arrian's *Anabasis* pertains only to the second and third chapters of the seventh book, in which is related the meeting of Alexander the Great with Dandamis, the celebrated Brahman.

¹ This introductory letter led Kammermeister to intrude into the title of his edition the word *Epistola*, which is wanting in the MS used by him.

A word may be said here about the MSS of the *Epistola*. I have found twelve MSS which contain the text of the *Epistola* either in whole or in part, and none of which calls the treatise an *Epistola*. The MSS, while they bear the name of Palladius, do not state whether Palladius was Bishop of Helenopolis or Aspona, as do the MSS of the *Historia* and the *Dialogus*.

sophist. The commentary assumes the form of a complete report of the disputation, in which the Brahmanical system of thought is elucidated.

Before the nineteenth century the *Epistola* received attention from few historians of patristic literature;¹ but of those who referred to it, its Palladian authorship was defended by some, doubted by others, and denied by most. The history of the criticism concerning its authenticity shows a series of affirmations based on stylistic similarities to the *Historia* and the *Dialogus* and a series of objections grounded on chronological considerations. During the last century the controversial aspect of the criticism about the *Epistola* waned, due, perhaps, to the absence of any special study on the question of authorship and to the fact that the work contains nothing not accessible elsewhere; and attention was directed to its sources² and to its appearance as a source for later writers.³ The present practice is to notice the ascription of the *Epistola* to Palladius Helenopolitanus.⁴

The most valuable research was performed by Karl Mueller, who discovered that the entire *Epistola* is contained in the work of Pseudo-Callisthenes, one of the *Scriptores Rerum Alexandri Magni*. The *Epistola* Mueller regarded as an interpolation⁵ and accepted its Palladian origin,⁶ in which he has been followed by Zacher⁷ and Kroll.⁸

¹ In our own day it is not even mentioned by Dom Butler in his writings on Palaiania or by Mr. Clarke, the English translator of the *Historia*, or by Mr. Moore, the English translator of the *Dialogus*.

² Schneider entered the field with the statement that Palladius (for he believed him to be the author) borrowed much of his material from Ctesias (*Commentarii in Aristotelis de Animalibus Historiam* [viii. 27.3], IV, 475-78).

³ Bernhardy found that Cedrenus quoted about a third of the introductory letter of the *Epistola* (*Analecta in Geographos Graecorum Minores*, p. 35). The reference to Cedrenus, who listed the matter *ex silentio*, is to his *Historiarum Compendium*, cap. 268, 269 (edited by Migne in *Patrologia Graeca* cxxi. 304, 305).

⁴ Here may be noticed Zoeckler in Herzog's *Real-Encyklopädie* (3d ed.), XIV, 612, s.v. "Palladius"; Christ, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur* (5th ed.), Vol. II, Part 2, p. 647; Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur* (2d ed.), pp. 849-52.

⁵ *Pseudo-Callisthenes* (Paris, 1846), III, 7-16. In his analysis of the writings of Pseudo-Callisthenes (pp. x-xv) Mueller thus characterized the intrusion of the *Epistola*: *Interponitur Palladii libellus de situ gentibusque Indiae et Brachmanibus* (p. xiv).

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 102, n. 3.

⁷ *Pseudocallisthenes, Forschungen zur Kritik und Geschichte der ältesten Aufzeichnung der Alexandersage*, p. 146.

⁸ In Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, Vol. X, Part 2, cols. 1720-21, s.v. "Kallisthenes (2)." .

The chief counts upon which the Palladian authorship of the *Epistola* has been denied rest upon the assumption that Moses, Bishop of Adulis (who is unknown outside the *Epistola*), and Moses, first Bishop of the Saracens, are one and the same person, and upon the lack of evidence, either in the other writings of Palladius or in the *testimonia* about him, that Palladius ever went to India.¹

The first objection is readily dissipated. Passing by the statements that the *floruit* of Moses, Bishop of the Saracens, is 370 (so Cave, Oudin, and Martini)² or 377 (so Tillemont),³ and that the *floruit* of Moses, Bishop of Adulis, is 400 (so Gams),⁴ let us turn to the testimony of Theodoret, who tells us that Moses, Bishop of the Saracens, dwelt in the desert between Egypt and Palestine⁵—a distance of 1,150 English miles from Adulis. Second, as is well known, the name Saraceni was applied by the Greeks and the Romans to the nomad Arabs of the Syro-Arabian desert who harassed the frontier of the Roman Empire, while there is no evidence that the inhabitants of Adulis and vicinity were ever called Saraceni. Third, Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret,⁶ in their accounts of Moses, Bishop of the Saracens, offer not the slightest suggestion that his ecclesiastical jurisdiction extended into Upper Egypt or that Adulis, more than a thousand miles distant from Moses' abode and situate in the patriarchate of Alexandria, was under his episcopal care. Thus the proposed identification of Moses, Bishop of the Saracens, with Moses, Bishop of Adulis, appears to be at best an untenable conjecture.⁷

¹ The first argument was advanced tentatively by Cave (*Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Historia Literaria*, I, 288) and accepted as proved by Oudin (*Commentarius de Scriptoribus Ecclesiae Antiquis*, I, 911) and Martini (*Dissertatio de Vita Fatisque Palladii Helenopolitani*, pp. 20, 21). The second objection was raised by Oudin (*loc. cit.*) and confirmed by Martini (*loc. cit.*).

² The loci in these historians are the same as in the preceding note.

³ *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles* (2d ed.), VII, 595.

⁴ *Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae*, p. 462.

⁵ *Historia Ecclesiastica* iv. 23.

⁶ The references are Socrates *Historia Ecclesiastica* iv. 36; Sozomen *Historia Ecclesiastica* vi. 38; Theodoret, *loc. cit.*

⁷ There is nothing in the ancient sources or in Tillemont (*op. cit.*, VI, 591; VII, 593-97, 788, 789; X, 62) to warrant the supposition that Moses, Bishop of Adulis, is identical with Moses, Bishop of the Saracens. Tillemont did not even discuss the probability of this identification, which has been the only one advanced.

The second objection to the acceptance of the Palladian authorship of the *Epistola* is a difficulty that is real but not insurmountable. It is true that there is nothing in either the *Historia* or the *Dialogus* to support the hypothesis that Palladius undertook a journey to India, and that the ancient sources are silent about such an event in the career of Palladius. Dom Butler has shown that the last ascertainable date in Palladius' life is 420, when the *Historia* was composed, and that Palladius' death probably occurred before 431, at which time the see of Aspona (whither Palladius was translated from Helenopolis)¹ was represented by its incumbent, Eusebius, at the Council of Ephesus.² Now there is no real difficulty in supposing that Palladius may have gone to India any time between 420 and the date of his death—a theory which explains the omission of references to his journey in his other writings. Oudin and Martini have argued that, even if Palladius did go to India, Palladius would, of necessity, have spent many years there to accumulate the information about India contained in the *Epistola*, and that there is no period vacant in the life of Palladius into which this time can be fitted.³ But this objection to the authorship carries little weight, because the author of the *Epistola* explicitly states that he traveled only as far as the borders of India and then straightway returned,⁴ and because his information about India the author derives from Scholasticus who had lived there (in Ceylon, at least) for six years.⁵

Thus the objections to the Palladian authorship of the *Epistola* disappear. But it may be properly asked whether there are any positive reasons for attributing the *Epistola* to the Palladius who wrote the *Dialogus* and the *Historia*.

Lambeck instituted a comparison between the dedicatory epistle to Lausus in the *Historia* and the epistolary part of the *Epistola*, by which he found *indicia quaedam satis luculenta* pointing to the supposition that the latter was sent to Lausus in fulfilment of a promise by Palladius to write to Lausus about the life of the Brahmans.⁶ This was also the opinion of Mueller.⁷ Lambeck's surmise seems quite prob-

¹ Socrates *op. cit.* vii. 36.

⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 7, 8.

² *Historia Lausiacæ* II, 245, 246.

⁷ Kollar, *op. cit.*, I, 602, 603.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 157, n. 1.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 156, n. 6.

⁴ In *Pseudo-Callisthenes*, III, 7.

able, in view of the theory that Palladius went to India after 420 and wrote the *Epistola* as a supplement to the *Historia*.

Cave discovered a close verbal similarity between the *Dialogus* and the *Epistola*, which induced him to suggest a common authorship for both.¹ In the *Dialogus* (Migne, PG, XLVII, 17) we read ἀδικεῖ γὰρ ἀληθῶς δὲ ψευδόμενος δὸν πείθει· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ δὲ πειθόμενος τὸν ψευδόμενον, ἥδιως πιστεύων and in the *Epistola* (Mueller, *Pseudo-Callisthenes*, III, 12) ἀδικεῖ γὰρ δὲ ψευδόμενος δὸς (al. δὸν) πείθει, ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ δὲ πειθόμενος ψευδόμενως προσέχων πρὸν ἢ τάληθες μάθῃ. Here it is clear that the author of the *Epistola*, if he was not Palladius, certainly intended that he should be considered to be Palladius.

Although the *Epistola* seems to be Palladian in diction and style, there do not appear enough (owing, perhaps, to its brevity) resemblances to his other works for a convincing argument that on these grounds the *Epistola* is by Palladius. Dom Butler has found seventeen combinations in which ὑπερβολὴ is used in the *Historia*.² Five appear both in the *Dialogus* and in the *Epistola*.³ In the *Historia* Palladius employs the phrase ὡς αὐτὸς ἡμῖν διηγήσατο (with variants, chiefly in the tense of the verb) eight times, while in the *Dialogus* it appears once and in the *Epistola* thrice.⁴

The *Epistola* also bears affinity to the *Historia* and the *Dialogus* in other ways. Mr. Moore has remarked that in both the *Historia* and the *Dialogus* "proverbs and sententious observations are frequent, and in both an inordinate amount of space is devoted to food and drink—or abstinence from them."⁵ This feature is likewise true of the *Epistola*.⁶ Again, the introduction of Moses and Scholasticus appears to be quite in accordance with Palladius' methods in the *Dialogus* and in the *Historia*.⁷ And it seems that the author of the *Epistola* was

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 135.

² In *JTS*, Vol. XXII, No. 87, p. 225.

³ In the former: cols. 24, 27, 31, 60, 80. In the latter: cap. 7 (*ter*), 8, 10.

⁴ In the *Historia* II, 19, 22; 49, 10; 85, 5; 117, 9; 121, 3; 121, 7; 133, 1; 153, 9. In the *Dialogus*, col. 59. In the *Epistola*, cap. 7, 8 (*bis*).

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. xxii.

⁶ Cf. δεῖ . . . φρονέν μὲν . . . λαλεῖν δὲ ἀ φρονέῖ, ποιεῖν δὲ ἀ λαλεῖ (*Hist.* II, 140, 24-26) with ἀ μὴ δεῖ ποιεῖν, μηδὲ ὑπονοοῦν ποιεῖν (*Dial.*, col. 53) and with ὑμεῖς δὲ λέγετε ἀ δεῖ μὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ποιεῖτε ἀ μὴ δεῖ λέγειν (*Epist.*, cap. 12).

⁷ In the *Dialogus*, col. 72; in the *Historia* II, 167, 5-169, 11.

familiar (as was Palladius) with Christian monachism, for he compares the monks with the Indian ascetics.¹

But these resemblances may be explained as accidental coincidences, with the exception of the striking similarity found by Cave. And concerning the question of literary style, is it not a matter of appreciation whereon each one may form one's own opinion after reading the three works? There are those among the critics who confidently identify the authors of books by similarity of style, notwithstanding that the thesis of one writing differs from that of another. In this case the difference, if any, of style is not a sufficient ground—since it cannot be proved that Palladius is not the author—for questioning the claim of Palladius to the authorship of the *Epistola*.

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¹ Cap. 9 and 10.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

THE MEDIAEVAL ACADEMY OF AMERICA

The Mediaeval Academy of America has recently been incorporated with the purpose of conducting and promoting research, publication, and instruction in all departments of the letters, arts, science, and life of the Middle Ages. The president is Professor E. K. Rand, of Harvard; the vice-presidents are Professors Manly (Chicago), Haskins (Harvard), and Willard (Colorado); the treasurer is Mr. John Nicholas Brown; the clerk, Dr. Ralph Adams Cram. The council consists of Mr. G. A. Plimpton, of New York, and Professors P. S. Allen (Chicago), C. H. Beeson (Chicago), G. R. Coffman (Boston), G. H. Gerould (Princeton), L. J. Paetow (California), A. K. Porter (Harvard), W. W. Rockwell (Union Theological Seminary), J. H. Ryan (Catholic University), J. S. P. Tatlock (Harvard), J. W. Thompson (Chicago), and Karl Young (Yale). The officers include business men and artists as well as students of ancient and modern languages and literatures, mediaeval religion, philosophy, history, art, and education; and an equally broad membership is intended. A considerable number of Fellows, and of Corresponding Fellows in foreign countries, will be elected later.

The Academy maintains a quarterly journal, *Speculum*, of which the managing editor is Dr. F. P. Magoun, Jr., Harvard University, and in which it means to publish not only the results of research but also articles of broader character. The Academy proposes many other functions. One of the chief is that of serving as a clearing-house for information and a help to co-operation among those concerned in all the various sides of mediaeval study. Hitherto many a student of mediaeval literature, for example, has been more aware of researches in nineteenth-century literature than of those on mediaeval history of philosophy. No studies have been pursued in a more hole-and-corner fashion. In this movement toward co-operation many hundreds of persons all over the world have already signified their interest. Enthusiastic response has been found in Britain and Germany; in France, especially through the Association Guillaume Budé; and in Belgium through Professor Maurice de Wulf of Louvain, who during his stay at Harvard aided the inception of the Academy. Persons in any part of the world who are pursuing original research on any aspect of the Middle Ages are invited to send their names and information as to their subjects of study to the Clerk of the Academy, who acts as its secretary. The Academy will maintain relations with religious organizations, such as the Benedictine order, concerned with mediaeval studies. Large co-operative enterprises are particularly needed in the mediaeval field, and already members of the Academy are taking a hand in several such projects. Later it hopes to grant much-needed financial aid to investigations on the

Middle Ages and to publish their results, but it has no funds for such purposes at present. Its usefulness will obviously be increased when it is able to establish a suitable local habitation, with a library, accessible records and archives, and meeting-quarters.

The Middle Ages on their literary and artistic, their historical, religious, and intellectual sides appeal to many persons of cultivation as well as to special students. The Academy has been greatly encouraged already by the large generosity of individuals, but it desires equally the support of a large number of smaller contributors. There are various forms of membership in the Academy. Any person anywhere in the world interested in becoming a member may obtain further information from the office of the Academy, Room 312, 248 Boylston Street, Boston, Massachusetts.

A VARIANT OF HOMER'S STORY OF ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS

Professor T. M. Parrott has called attention to a variant version in George Chapman's *Widow's Tears* of the means employed by Ulysses to escape the danger of the sirens.¹ As this incident is reported in the *Odyssey* xii. 39, 169, Ulysses stopped the ears of his comrades with wax, bidding them bind him to the mast so that he could hear the songs of the sirens without danger. In the variant version, as it is found in Chapman's play, and elsewhere, Ulysses stops his own ears with wax. The passage in *Widow's Tears*, which makes no mention of Ulysses' stopping his companions' ears with wax, or of having himself bound to the mast of the ship, is as follows: "But by your leave, Lycus, Penelope is not so wise as her husband Ulysses, for he, fearing the jaws of the Syren, stopped his ears with wax against her voice."²

In connection with this passage, Professor Parrott notes that this version was "current in Chapman's day, as it appears in Ascham's *Scholemaster*,"³ and that its origin is unknown.⁴ Further evidence of its currency is found in John Lyly's *Love's Metamorphosis*, IV. ii. 80-83, in which the Ghost of Ulysses "who continually hovers about these places where this Syren haunteth," counsels Petulius to "stop thine ears, as I did mine."⁵ An example is

¹ See *The Comedies of George Chapman*, edited by Thomas Marc Parrott, p. 808, for Professor Parrott's note on this passage.

² *Ibid.* p. 372 (I. ii. 13-15).

³ Roger Ascham, *The Scholemaster*, edited by Edward Arber, 1870, p. 74; "except they will haue them run headlong, into ouermany ioperdies as Vlysses had done many tymes, if Pallas had not alwayes gouerned him: if he had not vset to stop his eares with waze; to bind him selfe to the mast of his shyp: to feed dayly, vpon that swete herbe Moly. . . ."

⁴ See note 1.

⁵ *The Complete Works of John Lyly*, edited by R. Warwick Bond, 1902. *Loues Metamorphosis*, III, 323 (IV. ii. 80-83): "I am the Ghost of Vlisses, who continually houer about these places, where this Syren haunteth, to sauе those which otherwise should be spoyle: stop thine eares, as I did mine, and succour the faire, but, by thy folly, the most unfortunate Protea."

found, also, in *Eastward Hoe*, V. iv. 1-16, where Touchstone says that "like the wise Ulysses," he has "stopt [his] eares with shoomakers waxe."

Another example, forming a part of a simile in Stephen Guazzo's *La Civil Conversatione*, 1574, throws light on the origin of this variant version by reason of its resemblance to a simile in Erasmus' *Parabolae sive Similia*, 1514.¹ The passage in Guazzo, as translated by George Pettie, in 1581, is as follows:

But returning to the solatariness of the mind, I woulde have a wise man enter into it when he is in the company of the evil: *from hearing whose talke he ought to stop his eares as Ulisses did against the song of the Marmaides* and walke amongst them (as the saying is) shood amongst the thornes.²

The italicized words in this passage point directly to the simile contained in the following words of one of Erasmus' *Similia*:

Quemadmodum Vlysses auribus cera obturatis, Sirenum periculum praeter-navigavit: Ita nos si quid incidit blande foedum in auctoribus, praetervehi opporebit.³

Erasmus' simile is included among those indicated by him as "ex Plutarchi Moralibus,"⁴ without specific indication being given as to the particular work in the *Moralia* from which it is taken. I have identified Erasmus' source in this instance as the following passage from Plutarch's *How a Young Man Ought to Hear Poems*:

It deserves therefore our consideration, whether we shall put young men into Epicurus's boat,—wherein, *having their ears stopped with wax, as those of the men of Ithaca were, they shall be obliged to sail by and not so much as touch at poetry*,—or rather keep a guard on them, so as to oblige their judgments by principles of right reason to use it aright, and preserve them from being seduced to their hurt by that which affords them so much delight.⁵

The correctness of this passage as the source of the Erasmus simile is confirmed by the fact that immediately before and immediately after the words quoted from Plutarch are found the sources of the two similes that occupy the same positions relative to Erasmus' Ulysses simile.⁶ With

¹ The first part of De Vocht's *De Invloed van Erasmus op de Engelsche Tooneel-literatuur der XVI en XVII*, Gent, 1908, which deals with "Shakespeare Jest-Books" and with "Lyly," does not refer to the incident discussed in this note, although there are numerous instances given in which Lyly is indebted to Erasmus' *Similia*.

² *The Civile Conversatione of M. Steeven Guazzo*, edited by Sir Edward Sullivan, in *The Tudor Translations*, second series, 1925, I, 51-52. In the 1579 edition of Stefano Guazzo's *La Civil Conversatione*, page 15, the original text is as follows: "Ma tornando alla solitudine dell'animo, io voglio, che in questa si ritiri l'huomo di sana mente, nō conuersando fra i cattiu, a quali dee chiuder l'orecchie, come Vlisse al canto delle Sirene, & andarsene, come si suol dire, calzato fra le spine."

³ Erasmus, *Opera Omnia*, 1703, Vol. I, 580 C, *Similia*. ⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 561 A.

⁵ The translations of *Plutarch's Essays and Miscellanies*, as corrected and revised by William W. Goodwin, II (1906), 44.

⁶ (1) The simile immediately preceding and (2) the simile immediately following the Ulysses simile (Erasmus, *Opera Omnia*, *Similia*, Vol. I, 580 C), together with their sources from Plutarch (the translations of *Plutarch's Essays and Miscellanies*, as corrected and revised by William W. Goodwin, II [1906], 44) are as follows: (1) *Ut Simon-*

the source established, it becomes apparent by a comparison of Erasmus' simile with its source that the variant version, examples of which I have not met with prior to the second half of the sixteenth century, does not go back to Plutarch, but originates in Erasmus' imperfect recollection of the incident to which Plutarch referred in speaking of "the men of Ithaca" who had "their ears stopped with wax."¹

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ASTERIS

In connection with my paper on this subject, pp. 297 ff. of *Classical Philology* for 1924, attention may be directed to the letter of W. R. T. Gunther, of Magdalen College, Oxford, in the *Times* of October 23. It is headed "The Mediterranean Coasts: Changes since Classical Times," and it was written with reference to the communication from Sir Arthur Evans, published in the issue of the same paper of 16th idem, on his "Further Discoveries in Crete: I. Southern Port Found." Sir Arthur states that he has identified "beyond doubt" the " $\lambda\sigmaσ\eta\piέρη$ " of γ 293, and adds that "the Homeric geography" of this particular locality in Crete is "singularly precise." That is encouraging, and deserves to be noted. All I desire to add is this, that, if it be the case, as these two authorities assert, that it is known for the shores of Crete, of Alexandria, and of Italy, that there has been since Mesioan times a subsidence of more than twelve feet, there can be no difficulty in accepting the same for Daskalio, especially as there is, as stated in my paper on the authority of the *Mediterranean Pilot*, shallow water at both ends of the islet.

A. SHEWAN

ST. ANDREWS

ideas dixit, stupidiores esse Thessalos, quam ut a se decipi possent: Ita qui felicie sunt ingenio, citius a Poetis corrumpuntur (Erasmus); "And indeed such only are endangered thereby [i.e., by poetry] for the charms of that art ordinarily affect not those that are downright sots and naturally incapable of learning. Wherefore, when Simonides was asked why of all men we could not deceive the Thessalians, his answer was, 'Because they are not so well bred as to be capable of being cajoled by me'" (Plutarch). (2) *Si multi inebriantur vino, non ob id incidentae vites, ita fecit Lycurgus, sed proprius admovendi fontes: Ita si multi abutuntur Poetica, non protinus abicienda, sed adhibenda cautio, ut fiat salutaris* (Erasmus); "For neither did Lycurgus, the valiant son of Dryas (as Homer calls him) act like a man of sound reason in the course which he took to reform his people that were much inclined to drunkenness, by travelling up and down to destroy all the vines in the country; whereas he should have ordered that every vine should have a well of water near it, that (as Plato saith) the drunken deity might be reduced to temperance by a sober one," etc.

¹ Even if examples of this variant, prior to 1514, the date of the publication of Erasmus' *Similia*, should turn up, the *Similia* would still have to be reckoned with as one of the most likely means of bringing the variant version to the attention of writers of the sixteenth century.

NOTES ON THE SCHOLIA OF DEMOSTHENES
AND AESCHINES

Oratores Attici Didot, II, 536: *παραδέξου οὐσης τῆς φύσεως . . . τὴν θεραπείαν αὐτῆς ἐξ θεοῦ ἐποιήσατο*. Read *θέσεως*. If the error is not a mere misprint, it arose from misunderstanding of *θεραπείαν* as a rhetorical term.

Scholia on Aeschines, *ibid.*, page 492: *καὶ εὑρίσκεσθαι φύει ἀντινομίαν ὅπερ οὐχ οἶον τε*. Read *φήσεις* of supposed objection. There is perhaps a similar case on page 493: *ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλεῖ φῆσιν* where the entire context requires *φήσεις* of an objection answered in the following sentence.

PAUL SHOREY

AESCHYLUS' CHOEPHORI 412

καὶ τότε μὲν δύστελπις

Should we not read *τοτέ*? In that case *ὅταν δ' αὖτ'* in 415 would be irregular responson for *τοτὲ δέ*. Cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 237D and other examples in Kühner-Gerth, § 527, Anmerk. 2, where however *Philebus* 32D is misunderstood. Editors apparently refer *τότε* to the preceding *κλύνοντας* felt as past. But *τοτὲ μέν . . . ὅταν δ' αὖτ'* (= *τοτὲ δέ*) explain the alternations of feeling signified by *πέπαλται*—while hearing (and seeing). Liddell and Scott seem to refer *τοτέ* to this passage and Boissonade (Paris, 1825) reads *τοτέ*. But modern editors so far as I have observed ignore the point.

PAUL SHOREY

BOOK REVIEWS

Tacite, "Annales," texte établi et traduit. Par H. GOELZER. Paris: Guillaume Budé, 1923-25. Three volumes.

It was no small task to provide the readers of the *Collection Guillaume Budé* with a text and translation of all that remains of the work of Tacitus, and M. Goelzer is to be congratulated on the fidelity and skill, no less than the industry, with which he has accomplished it.

Prefixed to the first of the three volumes of the *Annals* is a well-written Introduction, which deals with "la matière des *Annales*"; "Date"; "Étendue de l'ouvrage" (M. Goelzer accepts the eighteen-book theory); "Valeur historique et littéraire des *Annales*" (M. Goelzer adopts *in toto* the views of Fabia, and concludes that the method which Tacitus followed in the employment of his materials is no less imperfect than his method of investigation, but that happily the writer is superior to the historian); "les Manuscrits"; "le Titre de l'ouvrage"; "le plan de cette édition." Before each book is printed a full analysis of its contents, and the third volume contains an Index of Names.

The Latin text presents the editor's own recension, but does not differ markedly from the Halm-Andresen Teubner text. It is numbered according to Gruter's sections, the pagination of the Medicean MSS is indicated in the margin, and there is an apparatus wherein are reported all the important departures from the MSS (and many unimportant ones).

The English reader will like to compare the work of M. Goelzer with that of the late Professor Ramsay, whose version of the *Annals* is one of the best of our recent translations of classical authors. For conciseness the palm must be awarded to Ramsay, but in accuracy the advantage is by no means certainly his. Take this passage for an instance:

Sed Partho ad exequendas obsidiones nulla comminus audacia: raris sagittis neque clausos exterret et semet frustratur. Adiabeni cum promovere scalas et machinamenta inciperent, facile detrusi, mox erumpentibus nostris caeduntur [xv. 4, 5, 6].

Ramsay translates:

But the Parthians had no stomach to press home the siege. An occasional discharge of arrows failed to terrify the garrison, and produced no effect. And when the Adiabeni proceeded to bring up scaling-ladders and engines, they were easily driven off, and lost heavily by a sally from within.

There are two little slips here: (1) the plural *obsidiones* shows that Tacitus is making a general observation on the Parthian conduct of sieges and that *exterret* and *frustratur* are therefore not historical; (2) *semet frustratur* is not

merely another way of saying *nec clausos exterret*; the meaning is that they "deceive themselves" into supposing that they have frightened off the defenders. M. Goelzer gives us the passage thus:

D'autre part, le soldat Parthe ne vaut rien pour mener les sièges; n'ayant pas assez d'audace pour l'assaut, il se contente de lancer quelques flèches, sans effrayer les assiégés tout en se faisant illusion. Les Adiabéniens approchèrent des échelles et se mirent à faire usage de machines, mais on n'eut pas de peine à les culbuter, et une brusque sortie des nôtres les taille en pièces.

This is a more correct version than Ramsay's, but the first sentence is more Tacitean in the English translation than in the French.

M. Goelzer appears very rarely to have missed his author's meaning. At iv. 41. 1, *fanumque quae praesenti Herculi Arcas E�ander sacraverat*, the legend, as Livy has presented it (i. 7. 12), shows that *praesenti Herculi* does not mean "à Hercule Secourable," but "to the Present Hercules" (Ramsay). And at xv. 44. 8, *Nero . . . habitu aurigae permixtus plebi vel curriculo insistens*, the last words probably do not mean "prenait part à la course," but "took his stand upon a chariot" (Ramsay).

Misprints and editorial oversights are few and such as for the most part will occasion the reader no annoyance. On page xvii of the Introduction it is not true that "il cite deux fois Cluvius Rufus la première pour opposer à son récit ceux de Fabius Rusticus et de Pline, la seconde pour dire qu'il lui paraît avoir raison contre Fabius Rusticus," for at xiii. 20. 2 Cluvius and Pliny are set over against Fabius. At xv. 51. 4, M. Goelzer has printed *senatus*, but translated *sancti*.

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Italische Gräberkunde. Von FRIEDRICH VON DUHN. Erster Teil. Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1924. (Band II of *Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften*, herausgegeben von J. GEFFCKEN.)

This work, by reason of the importance and range of its subject matter and the undisputed authority of its author, will at once take rank among the small group of volumes, such as the epigraphical collections of Dittenberger and Dessau, Nissen's handbook of Italy, and Hülsen's volume in Jordan's treatise on Roman topography, which form the indispensable paraphernalia of the historical student. It represents in fact a more remarkable achievement than any of those mentioned, and will be recognized as more necessary, if possible, than they, owing to the exceptionally varied and minute character of its material and the masterly skill with which it has been marshaled and appraised.

The dedication to Luigi Pigorini is peculiarly fitting, since without the well-organized activities of the Italian government, for which he has been

primarily responsible, the study of this field would have been sorely handicapped.

On the title-page appears the quotation from Mommsen's address on admission to the Prussian Academy: "Es ist die Grundlegung der historischen Wissenschaften, dass die Archive der Vergangenheit geordnet werden"—a program vast enough for any book, but one which is exceeded in this instance, for the cemetery archives are not merely set in order but interpreted. We are given not only an inventory but an exposition as well.

Heinrich Nissen, in the year 1902, began the second volume of his *Italische Landeskunde* with the words: "Die politische Beschreibung Alt Italiens geht von der Zeit des Augustus aus"; and this point of view, based partly on considerations of ecumenical history and partly on the practical convenience of using the literary and epigraphical documents and following the administrative system of late Republican and Imperial Rome, determined the structure and the perspective of Nissen's work. If we add the circumstances, first, that Nissen was writing at a time when the picture presented by prehistoric remains was less full than it is today, and second, that in any case the early graves evidently did not interest him, we understand how it came about that his great work, extraordinarily valuable for the later period, leaves the reader almost entirely in the dark with regard to early and local conditions.

It is obvious that the history of ancient Italy, down to the Roman domination, is the history of the peoples inhabiting its various districts. But if it was the merit of Rome to impose the peace of law on the surrounding nations, this result was in general attained, so far as the West was concerned, at the cost of obliterating local traditions. Where written documents fail us, and where—as is almost invariably the case—the remains of temples and dwellings are fragmentary, we must be receptive to the language of the tombs; and owing to the simple and conservative ways of primitive man this language in general can be made to yield an intelligible message.

The present volume deals first with the tombs of the "original" inhabitants who buried their dead without burning them, and who are found in many parts of Italy in the paleolithic and neolithic periods (paleolithic burials in Italy are very rare), and then with the "Italici," the "cremating" branch of whom entered the Po Valley from the north early in the Bronze Age, then slowly spreading southward, whereas the "inhuming" branch followed them at a later period and finding the nearer stretches of desirable land already occupied were forced at once to penetrate farther south in search of homes. The second volume is to cover the various races such as Etruscans, Greeks, Gauls, who intruded into Italy during the Age of Iron. The chronological limits of the two volumes naturally overlap: for example, Campania exhibits Samnite graves at Pompeii as late as the second century B.C., whereas the Greek burials at Cumae begin some five centuries earlier.

Within the broad divisions of time, the material is arranged geographically

according to the regions of Augustus: an interesting testimony to the administrative achievement of that prince. The plates at the end make slight pretense to artistic merit, but are adequate for their purpose of elucidating the text. The full indexes are invaluable.

In the case of a volume which should be made accessible at once to every classical scholar and every student of prehistoric archaeology, there is no need for a summary of its contents; nor would it be feasible to summarize them, for they have already reached the limit of condensation. The work has busied its author during the space of some fifty years: for it was in 1873, while studying the pre-Roman graves of Pompeii, that he realized the need of such a publication and began to collect material. The bibliographical labor, enormous in itself, has been at every point supplemented and controlled by direct study of the monuments; and the deductions from the material show a soundness of method and a sure common-sense which inspire confidence. This vast field of knowledge need no longer be unknown territory to those willing to devote time and effort to its cultivation.

Some of the author's reasoned judgments deserve special mention: Page 4, the literary tradition with regard to early conditions and events in Italy is far better than the excessive skepticism of modern scholarship has been willing to admit. Pages 7, 16, there are no certain instances in Italy of the practice of preliminary burial, followed by the artificial removal of flesh from bones: the disturbed or incomplete state of remains which occasionally has been observed is to be attributed to the predatory action of beasts. Page 54, the discovery near Locri of graves of Orsi's third and fourth Sikel periods, while in part confirming the traditions of the Greek historians, seems to show that the direction of the original current of migration was from Sicily to the mainland and not vice versa; it is probable that the early population of Sicily and Sardinia had closer relations with Northern Africa than with the European regions of the Mediterranean. Page 70, the early developments of culture in Sicily, though at times influenced from outside, exhibit no sharp lines of cleavage; the distinction drawn by the ancients between Sikans and Sikels cannot be accepted in an ethnological sense; it is not possible to give it more than a chronological interpretation. Page 154, the biconical form of the typical "Villanova ossuary" is not due to the combining of two receptacles; it arose through the adaptation to metal technique of an early ceramic type, the metal shape being in its turn reproduced in earthenware. Pages 310-12, the much-vexed question of the exact position of the town of Tarquinii receives a very attractive solution: there were several pre-Etruscan settlements, on the series of ridges or plateaus in the vicinity of the early graves; then in the period of Etruscan domination the inhabitants for military purposes fortified the strong site which later was occupied by Corneto, still however, maintaining their smaller settlements; the Romans, here as in other instances, forced the people to migrate to a less defensible position. Pages 355-57, the human-headed ossuaries of the Etruscans, were a local product,

free from Egyptian or other external influence—a development from the masks which were originally attached to the jars.

On the first page, we are warned that the purpose of the book is not only to tell what is known but also to show what, and how much, we as yet do not know. Many gaps in our knowledge will doubtless be filled in due time. In particular, when our author is treating of the lower stretches of the Po Valley, he is forced to admit our ignorance of the site of that early seaport, Spina, whose treasury at Delphi was still pointed out in Strabo's day, although the geographer states that the place itself had dwindled from a noteworthy city to a mere village. It seems as if the sands of the Po Delta were ready to yield up their secret: for since this book was printed there has appeared (*Not. d. Scavi*, 1924, pp. 279–322) the account of a newly-excavated necropolis of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., in the Valle Trebbia, near Comacchio, which may well have formed part of the cemetery of the vanished town.

The recent lamented deaths of Giacomo Boni, Charles Densmore Curtis, and Luigi Pigorini, three men who according to their several opportunities had labored well in this field, remind us of the inevitable passing away of the older generations: *οἴη περ φύλλων γενεύη, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν*. Von Duhn's publication will help greatly to turn over to fresh workers a knowledge of the contents of Italic tombs, with a tradition of sound method in their interpretation.

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Traité de grammaire comparée des langues classiques. By A. MEILLET AND J. VENDRYES. Paris: Champion, 1924. Pp. xiv+684.

Since the last edition of V. Henry's *Précis* in 1908 there has been no new manual in which the Greek and Latin languages are treated together from the historical-comparative point of view. Yet, in spite of the number of historical grammars of Latin and a few of Greek, a book of just this type is always needed. As the authors remark, from the standpoint of linguistic relationship there is no more propriety in a comparative grammar of Greek and Latin than in one of Greek and German, and what they offer is the union of two comparative grammars in a single work. But, since owing to the cultural relations the two languages concern the same body of students, there is a practical advantage and saving of much repetition in handling them side by side. At the same time there are some none too easy questions of arrangement to be settled, of which the present reviewer should be well aware, having for many years given a course of lectures along these lines and drafted a portion for possible publication. The method chosen by the authors is to handle the two languages together when discussing the forms and uses of the noun and in various other sections, but separately in the history of the verb and in the phonology. I have been accustomed to carry the two languages along together

in the phonology also, formulating the statements to cover both when feasible, or in separate paragraphs for each language, according to the situation. For example, the evolution of intervocalic *s* may be covered by a single statement, bringing out the contrast between Greek and Latin and also saving the repetition of comparisons like G. *γίνεσθαι* = L. *generis* = Skt. *janaśas*. This need not prevent one from also pointing out the relation within Greek between the loss (through *'*) and the change of initial antevocalic *s* to *'*. In other cases the attempt to formulate statements covering both languages would only result in confusion, and they must be made for each separately.

The names of the joint authors are a guaranty that the treatment is both competent and lucid. It is by far the best book that we have ever had on the subject, and is recommended to all classical students—always with the warning that no such book is to be looked on as “authoritative” in all details. In certain matters that are vital, yet controversial, like the Latin accent, the authors express their own conviction in the form of positive statements, with scarcely a hint of opposing views. As is well known, the French scholars have led a crusade against the view that the historical Latin accent was one of stress, and they have made some full or partial converts. This is not the place to review the whole controversy, in which American scholars (Abbott, Frank, Kent, Sturtevant) have taken an active part. But, except in France, it is still I think the prevailing opinion (and so the evidence appears to me) that, while both pitch and stress were present, and pitch may have had considerable stylistic importance, the stress element was the more dominant characteristic in ordinary speech and the more effective factor in the phonetic development. There are many forms the explanation of which is easy under the theory of stress accent but is left in the air by those who deny it, e.g. *farina* from **farrīna* (*far*, *farris*), *canālis* from **cannālis* (*canna*), of which the authors say (p. 91): “Il s’agirait donc d’une particularité de prononciation d’ordre plus général, mais dont la formule précise est inconnue.” The statements of Cicero and the grammarians I appraise in the same way as does Frank, *Class. Quart.*, IV, 36 ff.

And now the authors (likewise Juret, *Manuel de phonétique latine*, pp. 298 ff.) go further and discard the theory, formerly held by Havet and by Vendryes himself, of an older accentual system with initial stress accent. The widespread syncope and weakening of short vowels in medial syllables are said to have nothing to do with accent, and merely to indicate “un caractère spécial” of initial syllables, such as shows itself in alliteration. But this “caractère spécial” seems only a vague substitute for what must have been a phonetic reality of some sort, and one the absence of which in other syllables produced a result similar to what is seen in unstressed syllables of languages with a stress accent, but wholly unknown in ancient Greek.

Forms quoted from Greek dialect inscriptions are given without marks of accent, and Meillet has elsewhere taken frequent occasion to condemn the usual practice of supplying them. But with due warning of our ignorance, the

practice is fully justified, like any other matter of editing, as a convenient aid to recognition.

Sanskrit forms with original final *s*, e.g. *jánas* (=G. *γένος*, L. *genus*) are quoted with the visarga, e.g. *janah*, and this is the practice now followed by most other comparative philologists, on the principle of consistently quoting the pause form. It has always seemed to me better to sacrifice consistency in this case and to quote that one of the sentence variants which preserves the original final, as is the usual practice in Sanskrit grammars, instead of one that makes the comparison with Greek and Latin forms a degree less obvious by involving a secondary and not universal Sanskrit change.

Apart from these last-mentioned and other like questions of practical procedure, there are various matters in which one may differ with the authors as to the most probable explanation. But no detailed review is intended here. The strong personal touch is welcome, and the superior excellence of the work cannot be too strongly stated.

One is curious to know why, in the Bibliography, German translations are cited in preference to their English originals (e.g. Moulton's *Prolegomena*, Lindsay's *Latin Language*, and my *Oscan-Umbrian Grammar*).

C. D. BUCK

What Is Rhythm? By E. A. SONNENSCHEIN. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925.

I cordially agree with the major and to me the most interesting part of Dr. Sonnenschein's book, the concrete treatment of rhythm in English verse. He is obviously well acquainted with the recent literature on metric even in America, and knowing my views or prejudices he will not expect from me the open-mindedness toward the experimental study of metric in the psychological laboratory which leads him not only to treat respectfully the work of others in that kind, but to experiment himself in collaboration with laboratory directors and research students. "The cymograph cannot lie," he says, and it reports the times in one reading of Tennyson's

The long light shakes across the lakes.
12: 31: 27: 45: 7: 34: 9: 55

That may trouble those, if any such there be, who still think that a "long" syllable must take just twice the time of a "short" syllable. But my withers are unwrung. For I have always taught and in 1908 printed in *Choriambic Dimeter* (p. 63):

Because quantities in English verse are largely influenced by word and logical stress, and "irregularities" may be rhythmized by compensation in adjoining feet, it is inferred that English verse has no quantity. Because the broad distinction of long and short is fixed in Greek syllables, it is inferred that the limit of their variation is either - and -, or at the most for rhythmic purposes the precisely

measured L and LJ etc. But as a matter of fact, even apart from rhythmical plasma, the natural length of Greek syllables admitted not two but at least five or six degrees variously modified not only by vowel quantity and consonant framework but by word, or logical accent pauses, rough breathings and the entire speech context. This obvious fact is stated with perfect clearness by Aristides Quintilianus and by Dionysius and is the element of truth in the otherwise absurd speculations of the scholiast on Hephaestion about the effect of neighboring accents and breathings on quantity.¹

Cf. also *ibid.*, pages 62 and 73. There needs no cymograph to tell me this. Would I reject the aid of science then? I would. Unless the "scientist" can "scan" *ad aperturam libri* at least Greek, Latin, English, French, and German verse. There can be no science of a matter which the investigator himself does not understand. And the majority even of authors of textbooks on metric and professors of Greek and Latin cannot meet the simple test proposed, and a good many of them cannot distinguish Swinburnian anapaests from dactyls. Who is to decide then in case of doubt? The *φρόνιμος*. He who knows the facts and possesses an ear. And if the *φρόνιμοι* the doctors disagree? Why then a conference of such and an argument to the finish texts in hand, with *viva voce* illustrations of the meaning of every point made? That, in Plato's eternally applicable phrase, would be the affair of unfortunate men with superfluous leisure on their hands. But there is no other way than this or its equivalent. Meanwhile I shall continue to dogmatize the opinions that are the outcome of an unusual experience—forty years of *viva voce* reading and drilling others to read every kind of Greek meter. That experience determines my interest in the subject which is "pragmatic." I am interested in theory only as it directly influences *viva voce* practice and facilitates teaching.

Professor Sonnenschein's short chapter on rhythm in Greek verse is, on the contrary, concerned mainly with its theoretic verification of his introductory chapters on rhythm in general. The definition of rhythm which he would substitute for all definitions hitherto proposed is: "Rhythm is that property of a sequence of events in time which produces on the mind of the observer the impression of proportion between the durations of the several events or groups of events of which the sequence is composed." I should not myself attempt to define rhythm in general as opposed to the rhythm of verse, but Professor Sonnenschein's generalization seems to me as plausible as any, and he makes good use of it as a touchstone throughout his volume. I would not define, but might provisionally describe, verse rhythm as an orderly symmetrical or regular sequence of relatively long and short syllables and quantities marked for consciousness by a corresponding succession of stresses by voice, hand, or foot or incipient nervous tensions. In this I would seem to conflict with Professor Sonnenschein's conclusion in the chapter on Greek verse (p. 56): "My definition of rhythm agrees with that of the Greek

¹ *TAPA*, Vol. XXXVIII.

theorists in not demanding an *ictus* as a necessary element in the structure of Greek verse." The conflict is more apparent than real, for he adds (p. 58):

How far we moderns may be justified in employing an *ictus* (verse stress) in order to make the Greek rhythm intelligible to our ears . . . is . . . a question with which I am not here concerned. . . . The use of an *ictus* . . . may therefore be inevitable in modern practice.

Professor Sonnenschein may be personally interested in the scansion and teaching of the scansion of Greek verse. But he has no space for the topic in this volume and I pass on.

The short chapter on rhythm in Latin verse is rather a theory and a generalized history of the subject from the Saturnian to the rhymed verse of the Middle Ages than a practical method. And I have nothing to contribute here. I will again pass on, merely noting that Professor Sonnenschein recurs to his rejection of the so-called *brevis brevians* law¹ and in the Appendix (pp. 214, 215) discusses the failure of answers to his argument and the tardy acceptance of his views by the late Professor Havet and others.

This brings us to the ninety pages on English verse where I find myself in substantial agreement with nearly all of Dr. Sonnenschein's scensions, and if tempted to carp at all could only deprecate the ardor of his protest against the verse measurers who demand "that all the feet of a line of English verse should be constructed on the same model and that the lines should all be equal in duration"—and indulge myself in the harmless vanity of pointing out that I had said much the same thing in *Choriambic Dimeter* and other papers. For example, Professor Sonnenschein says (p. 183):

Quantity is nothing less than a structural element in the best kind of English verse side by side with accent. I do not claim that even the best English verse attains to the perfection of quantitative structure . . . of Greek or Latin verse. But regard for quantity admits of degrees.

With this compare "Word Accent in Greek and Latin Verse," *Classical Journal*, II, 219:

It is not necessary to discuss the much exaggerated differences between Latin and English. The statement that it is not the case in English that two consonants lengthen or give weight to a syllable would amaze a Shelley or a Swinburne—the truth being that it is not so much or so exactly the case—not the case in colloquial discourse or in bad verse.

Again on page 119 Dr. Sonnenschein writes: "The substitution of two short syllables for one long is rooted in the rhythmic sense of man." With this I may be permitted to compare *Choriambic Dimeter* (p. 61):

What we call freedom of substitution or irregularity of responson is not only the license of popular verse before art but the rational liberty of the maturest art. The rhythmic sense does not demand precise syllabic responson. It is content with any quantitative equivalence of dissyllables and trisyllables which the poet

¹ *Classical Philology*, VI, 10.

can find or arrange without violently violating the normal quantities and stresses of the language in which he writes. It is merely a question whether the substitute can be easily uttered in the normal time of the bars among which it occurs. The substitution in descending rhythm of tribrachs for dactyls, of short dactyls or tribrachs for trochees, or its retardation by spondees: the interchange in ascending rhythm not only of spondees, anapaests, and apparent dactyls, but of heavy iambs, tribrachs slightly retarded, or light anapaests; the occasional use even of procelesmatics and apparent pyrrhics—these “licenses” which we meet in the best verse of Milton, Shelley, Tennyson, and Swinburne—are a priori and independently of all historical considerations to be expected in any developed metrical art. The thing which requires historical explanation is their restriction by the *rules* or convention of any particular verse form. The restriction may be due to a temperamental preference for “regular,” smooth, and dignified rhythm, or to the inability of a defective rhythmical sense to dissociate rhythmical from syllabic equivalence. And on the other side, as in modern music, it may not be easy to decide in extreme cases whether an apparent license is a discord or a subtler harmony. But this is no reason for confounding the freedom of the great artist either with the roughness of the primitive or the carelessness of the incompetent. Metrical schemes may be constructed to exhibit identical irregularities in the verse of Byron and Swinburne. But the one remains (metrically) bad and the other good. A rapid dactyl (or tribrach) is independently of all historical considerations a possible substitute in a trochaic series.

This leads to what Professor Sonnenschien calls “the dissyllabic rise in English verse,” that is, $\text{--}\text{--}$ where -- is expected. I have always taught this, especially in relation to English anapaests, French Alexandrians, and the apparent dactyl in Greek. It is glanced at in *Choriambic Dimeter* (p. 66), in the scansion, e.g.,

Es ritten | drei Reiter | zum Thore | hinaus

and is treated more explicitly in “The Issue in Greek Metric,” *Classical Philology*, XIX, 170–71. In short the whole method of explaining the alleged “irregularities” in English blank verse which Professor Sonnenschein practices so successfully is, I think, indicated in *Choriambic Dimeter* (p. 73):

“Irregularities” in English five-foot iambs can always be explained by holds, pauses, tribrachs, anapaests, and syncopated, truncated, or monosyllabic feet. But as an alternative explanation it is sometimes better to recognize the principle of compensation in adjoining feet, or the virtual substitution of quadrisyllabic and other groups for two regular feet. Such groups usually take the form (so far as we may define the less precise English quantities) of a choriamb $\text{---}\text{--}$ or a retarded choriamb $\text{--}\text{--}\text{>}$:

“Ask me no more the moon may draw the sea.”
 “Tears from the depths of some divine despair.”
 “Fills the faint eyes with falling tears which dim.”

To conclude with a few particulars. Professor Sonnenschein, like all rational metrists, admits that some English lines may be plausibly read in different ways, but rightly denies that this invalidates the general principle

of his scansion. In most of his readings I concur. For example, I prefer with him (p. 112):

In cata|ract aft|ter cata|ract to | the sea

to Professor Saintsbury's

In cat|aract af|ter cat|aract to | the sea,¹

and I would read with him

I said | to the lily | there is | but one

and again

And the last | wheel echoes | away.

I would scan with him

Myriads | of rivulets hurry|ing thro | the lawn

but cannot understand why he elsewhere says that the line has only four accents. The accent on "thro" though slight is sufficient to count. And I would definitely join issue with his classification of Tennyson's *Vastness* as trochaeo-dactylic. I think he is misled by what, for lack of a better name, I call the monosyllabic and dissyllabic anacrases in such lines as (approximately)

Many | a planet | by many | a sun | may roll |
with the dust | of a vanished race

(or for that matter:

of a vanished race)

and

Vows | that will last | to the last | death ruckle |
and vows | that are snapped | in a moment | of fire.

If he will re-read the whole poem, taking account of anacrusis and his own principle of the "dissyllabic rise" I believe he will agree that the natural movements of the phrasing is ascending, and that some lines must be scanned as anapaests. This is of course quite certain in the *Channel Passage* of Swinburne who would have melodiously cursed the dactylic scansion of what should be read

Gleamed | and whispered | in wind | and sea | and heaven |
 was fair | as a field | in flower.

Again one should read the whole poem and note the prevailingly ascending movement of the phrasing. Similarly in Shelley's *Night*, which is sometimes cited as an example of English logaædics, attention to the monosyllabic and dissyllabic base restores everywhere the anapaestic scansion which in some of the lines is indispensable.

Swiftly | walk over | the western wave
Wrap | thy form | in a man|tle gray.

¹ Cf. Watson's

"Bright o'er the ridge of darkness falls
the cata|ract of thy hair."

There is much more useful matter in Professor Sonnenschein's book, but I have tried to give a fair account of its general purport and content. I must admit that I have also used this review, as I have used reviews of other books on metric, as a vehicle for the presentation of my own opinions. I have buried so much work in fugitive reviews that I may hope that Professor Sonnenschein and the readers of *Classical Philology* will pardon me for trying to resuscitate some of it in this way.

PAUL SHOREY

Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. Von WOLF ALY. Bielefeld und Leipzig, 1925. Pp. 418.

Wolf Aly, as he prefers to be called, since he began to publish in 1913, has been peculiarly interested in every form of *Volkserzählung*, and in this book is more careful than writers usually are to differentiate, as precisely as may be, *Märchen*, fable, tale (*Novelle*), legend, saga, and myth. With the *Märchen*, the oldest of all these forms, that with which man first rebuilt his world nearer to the heart's desire, literature begins, i.e., with the prose narrative, not, as some have thought, with verse: the prose *Märchen* is pre-eminently the raw material of the epic poet. Thus, for Aly, Greek literature began, and in his survey of its course during about one thousand years, in fact down to the beginning of the fourth Christian century, there constantly recurs this endeavor to relate when it is possible the mind of the poet or prose writer to the popular tradition. So he closes his work appropriately with the Alexander roman as a boundary-mark into which the motifs of both *Märchen* and saga are built. Here, once again, as in the case of the earliest saga stories of Achilles or Agamemnon, we see the saga of Alexander arising in the popular imagination, a flood of narrative that has not so far, however, inspired an epic poet of any account.

This interest in folk-tradition makes Aly especially readable for the remains of the lyric poets. Always he dwells on the content rather than the form, the poem rather than the man, for, as he says in his Preface, he does not want to add to the histories of Greek writers, but to produce a history of the literature itself. He thinks he will be the first to do this. Those who know his fascinating book on Herodotus (1921) will find much the same method here, though necessarily condensed. Aly there, for instance, devoted eight pages to a detailed discussion of the influence of the tragic style, and especially of Sophocles, on Herodotus. In the present work he is thinking rather of the influence of Herodotus on the poet. Certainly it is not easy to decide always which of these two friends inspired the other. In his championship of Herodotus against all critics, Aly who studied him in the trenches during the war, outdoes even Mr. Glover, and actually gives the very months in which Herodotus visited Cyrene, Elephantine, and Babylon. It is a pity that two such enthusiasts seem not to have read each other's books. But Aly, to judge from his bibliographical notes (he has no footnotes, a great merit), reads only German

authorities and when on his first page he gives a paragraph to Crete and the significance of its vanished power, for the story as revealed by excavation he refers only to the work of Fimmen. But I ought to add that he regrets that Germany possesses nothing of the type of the *Loeb Classical Library* (p. 407). In spite of his Bibliography he cannot be narrow-minded if he admits that there are Phil-Hellenes who are worthy to be provided with a short cut to the classics.

In spite of his limited space he analyzes every tragedy of the Three, and this without being commonplace, a very difficult achievement. In his discussion of the origin of Tragedy one is at first soothed by his intense orthodoxy—if to be orthodox is to follow Aristotle—but soon we arrive at the fertility ritual and the vegetation daemon which are perhaps now to be considered orthodox. I meet here again a theory that was started by Gressmann in his *Mose und seine Zeit* (1913) and is now a favorite quotation with those who write (and who does not?) on the masked dances of primitive peoples. I mean the statement (p. 76) that when Moses read the tables of the law he wore the mask of Jahve, that he was playing the part of Jahve, and that this is a parallel of the tragic mask. Unfortunately, whenever I consult an Orientalist he refuses to change the veil of Moses into the mask of Jahve.

Without questioning the value of the book as a whole, one may quarrel here and there with a statement, or with the distribution of space—for instance, I do not like to see Origen receive the same space as Theocritus, nor has Aly in fact much feeling for the pastoral. Nor do I believe, without evidence, that there was once an Odyssey without Penelope, in which Melanthius, not the wooers, had to be suppressed by Odysseus, still less that Odysseus was originally a Cretan. Aly claims in his Preface that anyone who encounters a work written in Greek, provided it has any importance whatever, may find in this history "*wie er ihm nahe kommen kann.*" That sounds as though it were addressed to the general reader. But to my mind it would be wiser to read one's authors first, and then see how near one can come to this very erudite and confident Wolf Aly.

WILMER CAVE WRIGHT

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Platonism and Its Influence. By ALFRED EDWARD TAYLOR. No. 19 in "Our Debt to Greece and Rome Series." Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1924. Pp. ix+153.

The choice of Professor Taylor to write the volume on Platonism in this series meant, among other things, that Plato would be treated primarily as the founder of philosophic theism, that is to say, of the doctrine that God is the ultimate ground of things and an adequate object of unqualified adoration. From this point of view, Aristotelianism, which forms an essential part in the history of Platonism, becomes a weakened form of the latter, a form

rendered "arid" through its conception of God as a purely intellectual being, devoid alike of moral attributes and of interest in the rest of the universe.

The reader must expect to find, also, that Plato the literary artist and original thinker will be subordinated to Plato the transmitter of natural theology and mathematical science, since to Professor Taylor, as to his colleague Professor Burnet, Plato is more a biographer than a dramatist of the intellect. Platonism, taking its name from the man who first reduced it to writing, is regarded as a substantially accurate account of the doctrines of Pythagoras and Socrates. A belief in number as the basis of the universe, the theory of ideas, and an ethical monotheism are the key positions of the system and provide the chief criteria by which Professor Taylor judges the Platonic character of later movements. Thus Platonic influence is seen especially in those scientific developments in which emphasis is placed on mathematics and in those philosophic systems which involve one ever present righteous deity.

To the task of describing Platonism in its relation to religious and ethical thought Professor Taylor brings a wide acquaintance with other systems and, in particular, with the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. His analysis of St. Thomas' skilful adaptation of Aristotelianism to Christianity deserves the attention of every student of Platonism.

The first chapter, on "The Platonic Tradition," indicates the principal channels by which Platonic thought passed into mediaeval and modern life. On the way, the author pauses to argue a number of propositions of considerable interest to the historian of philosophy. He brings support, for example, to Philo the Academic in the latter's contention that the Old and the New Academy were at one in their doctrine, or at least in their epistemology. Calling attention to the widely diffused popular Platonism outside the Academy, Professor Taylor briefly reviews its history up to the point where it found its complete prophet in Plotinus. He passes in a few sentences over the period in which Platonism struggled valiantly but hopelessly against the *τι μνθῶδες καὶ δειδὲς σκότος* of Antoninus, the son of Eustathius, until, overborne by the rising tide of the new religion, Greek philosophy reappeared robbed of its militant logic and made to join in the task of *τὸ τυραννῶν τὰ κάλλατα ἐπὶ γῆς*. This temper of the late Platonists, apparent in the tone of Antoninus' notable prophecy, the author is inclined to pass over as a "fad." A history of Platonism written more in the spirit of Professor Bury or George Santayana, who would be less inclined to see the triumph of Christianity as a step in the march of progress, would doubtless have mentioned Pletho's daring revival of this anti-Christian struggle in the fifteenth century. At this point, too, belongs some account of the curious semi-Platonic literature of Hermes Trismegistus, just now made accessible to the modern world through the laborious research of Professor Walter Scott. Platonism within Christianity, however, has had the larger history, which Professor Taylor describes with just perspective in the influence of Augustine, Boethius, and Dionysius the Areopagite.

Professor Taylor rightly insists that the domination of the European mind by Aristotle was really an episode in the fortunes of Platonism. On the other hand, he points out that the extent of this domination is greatly exaggerated. His argument concludes, however, with one of those arbitrary assumptions regarding the procedure of literary artists which have become familiar to students of Professor Taylor's writings. That is to say, he adduces Rabelais' contemptuous satire on Aristotelianism as evidence that Aristotelianism was really contemptible and had spent its force (p. 28). Yet satirists from Aristophanes to Leacock have not been conspicuously noted for aiming their shafts at moribund movements.

On the scientific side, Platonism, or at least the Platonic spirit, is shown to have been the impetus of Alexandrian medicine, astronomy, and mathematics; of Descartes' mathematical methods; of the calculus of Leibnitz, Newton, and Weierstrass; and, more recently, of Alfred N. Whitehouse's attempt to construct a philosophy of nature on a mathematical basis. "It certainly looks," Professor Taylor writes, "as if the *Timaeus* may once again come to be the standing background for the educated man's vision of nature" (p. 27).

Having completed his lucid account of the Platonic tradition, Professor Taylor devotes the remaining three chapters of the volume to the epistemology, the ethics, and the theology of Platonism. In each case, he states briefly the Platonic position and then discourses on its rôle in later thought. In doing so, he introduces many discussions which will meet with wide interest among educated people.—One of these is his comparison of Christian ethics with Platonic ethics (pp. 73-81). Having demonstrated the importance, in the Platonic rule of life, of the so-called Christian virtues of self-denial, humility, and hope, he finds a point of superiority for Christianity in its "transfiguring of all the virtues by the connection with the person of Christ."

It is not entirely clear what is meant by the transfiguring of a virtue, but if Professor Taylor's meaning, stripped of its pious associations, is that a virtuous action when so transfigured is felt to be more significant because of the example or the mystically apprehended presence of an approving human deity, plainly Christianity provided the social mechanism the necessity of which was clearly stated by Plato in the *Republic* 414 C ff. To obtain cohesion in the state, Plato proposed that the dogma of the brotherhood of man should be inculcated by persuading the rulers or, if that was impossible, then the other citizens, to believe in one sublime myth (*γενναῖον τι ἐν ψεύδομένος*). Regarded as a social agency and as a psychological factor, Christianity is calculated to perform precisely this function.

It should be noted that Christianity thus supplies an effective motive for virtuous action but has nothing to say about what makes an action virtuous, that is, about the purpose and ends of social organization, to which all virtue is relative. Platonism, on the other hand, indicates the necessity and purpose of the motive but does not itself provide that motive. Its part in life is that

of the engineer, who points out the relation and the adequacy of means to ends, rather than that of the entrepreneur, who provides the inducements for carrying out the recommendations of the engineer.

Here emerges the chief distinction between the Christian and the Platonic ethics and one which Professor Taylor, with his theistic convictions, allows to pass unnoticed. Platonic ethics are based on a scientific concept of society, whereas Christian ethics are essentially individualistic. The latter discipline has not shaken itself free from the theocratic prepossessions of the early Hebrews and, despite the utmost efforts of the neo-Christian exegesis, cannot be shown to have considered seriously the relation of virtue to the interests of society.

Professor Taylor is clearly wrong in seeking to minimize the intellectualism of Plato (p. 81). It is precisely this quality which distinguishes the Platonic morality from the Christian, affording, as it does, an intellectually apprehended standard by which the reality of a virtue may be tested. Christianity, on the other hand, provides an emotional dynamic which, in the sad history of Christian society, has frequently brought virtue to dwell in the house of the seven deadly sins.

Not but what an overconfident intellectualism may lead to results similarly disastrous. Professor Taylor is one of the few admirers of Plato who does not flinch from stating the fact that Plato would establish in his ideal polity an inquisition for the extirpation of heresy as remorseless as that of Spain (p. 109). He fails to note carefully, however, one important distinction, namely, that, with Plato, heresy is harmful because it leads to the deterioration of individual character and hence to the ruin of the state, whereas, with the church, heresy is primarily an offense against God.

It is not the writer's intention to minimize the part which Platonism has had in the work of the Christian moralists. Yet to gloss over the essential differences between these two sources of *Tugendlehre* does not make for clarity in the understanding of either Platonism or Christianity.

A few statements in Professor Taylor's work would appear to demand modification in the light of certain passages of Plato and Aristotle.

In studying the intellectual background of a man like Aristotle, who aims at being rigidly objective, "chance" phrases which he lets fall are frequently of great significance. For instance, when Professor Taylor states that Aristotle has no sense of the vast stretches of human life lying behind all our recorded history (p. 72), he has certainly given insufficient weight to Aristotle's significant self-correction in the *Politics* 1329 b 25-27: *σχέδον μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπειράκις.*

Professor Taylor appears to have gone too far in stating (p. 90) that Plato would expect only the dull-witted to think he was, in the *Republic*, prophesying the detailed appointments of a utopia. Yet this is certainly the obvious interpretation of *Republic* 503 A-C, where Socrates is made to say in effect that surely among all men throughout all time someone will be found

with the requisite knowledge and power to give substance to his utopian arrangements. It is, on the contrary, precisely those details which Socrates has not described specifically that he will leave to the discretion of others, yet those others must be educated in the manner on which he insists.¹

The volume is completed by a representative Bibliography and an Index of Proper Names. The material in the text is rich enough to have made an *index rerum* valuable. A misprint occurs on page 131, where, in the ninth line, "much" should read "must."

The style throughout is fresh and clear, and the author has succeeded admirably in the avoidance of technical terms with little loss of precision. To the lay student of philosophy, the book should prove an excellent exposition of Platonism as well as an enlightening account of the relation of Platonism to many movements not commonly thought of as Platonic.

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Quotations from Classical Authors in Medieval Latin Glossaries. Collected and annotated by JAMES FREDERICK MOUNTFORD. Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XXI. Longmans, Green and Co., 1925. \$1.50.

The increasing interest in medieval Latin studies and in the use of earlier Latin literature by medieval students makes this volume particularly timely. Published as an adjunct to the forthcoming edition of the *Liber Glossarum* (to be issued under the auspices of the British Academy) it contains an interesting collection of citations from classical authors preserved in medieval Latin glossaries, as well as illustrations of the relations between the manuscripts of the *Liber Glossarum*.

In Part I Professor Mountford discusses the value and sources of those quotation items which cannot be traced to a definite and still extant source of the *Liber Glossarum* (in which almost all of the quotation items are found). Two hundred and fifty-eight of these items are printed in Part II, grouped according to the authors cited. In an argument convincingly based on the evidence of these, he rejects Goetz's view that the quotation glosses came from a *citaten-glossar* and Wessner's theory of the descent of the *Liber Glossarum* and the PP glossary from a common parent compiled from scholia and glosses on various different authors, in favor of the theory that the large majority of these items came from Virgil scholia by way of the *Abstrusa* glossary in its earlier and fuller form. This theory he had proposed earlier, in the present work it appears to be clearly established.

For those to whom glossography is comparatively a dark continent, there is much of interest in the reconstruction of the general character of the Virgil

¹ *Republic* 425 B-D.

scholia from which these quotation glosses would then have been drawn; a variorum collection made by a Christian scholiast who used citations drawn from the works of Plautus, Lucilius, Lucretius, Catullus, and others, including the lost works of Sallust, who occasionally gives fuller discussions than those of Servius or of Servius Danielis on the same items, using more than once a citation to illustrate a different line of Virgil from that to which Servius applied it, and once at least, in quotation gloss No. 4 on the distinction between *fruges* and *Frumenta*, provoking Servius to direct contradiction. The "tracking down of lost fragments of predecessors of Servius" here suggested is a fascinating possibility.

The large number of citations from Lucan (over fifty), is particularly striking in view of the dependence of Lucan scholia on earlier Virgil scholia. Here, as elsewhere, Professor Mountford is careful not to claim a Virgil scholium as the source for an item unless the evidence is conclusive. Yet for more than half, such a source is the most likely, for the rest it is at least probable.

A survey of the whole list of quotation glosses leaves a very strong presumption in favor of the theory put forth. Among the interesting by-products of the study is the occasional reconstruction on the evidence of items representing the scattered fragments of a long scholium, together with the commentary of Servius, of the original full set of scholia on a given word. The most fertile example is No. 205, on the lemma *lactentia*, on which Ovid, Terence, Ennius, Lucilius, and Horace are cited.

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The Form of the Ancient Greek Letter. A study in Greek Epistolography. Dissertation by the REV. FRANCIS XAVIER J. EXLER, M.A. Washington: Catholic University of America, 1923. Pp. 141.

The ready writer is readiest when at the beginning or end of his missive he uses conventional forms of expression and does not have to trouble himself to think what to write. Exler's dissertation is a study of these ready-made phrases of the Greek letter and, like so many others of the recent contributions to our knowledge of ancient life, it is based on an examination of the papyri. It gives a survey of the use of the formulas for opening, closing, and dating and of other conventional phrases in the Greek letter of the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, specifically from the third century B.C. to the third century A.D., inclusive. It is concerned, not so much with the content of the letters, as with the phrases which had become conventional during the development of letter-writing from the *σύμμα* of *Iliad* vi. 168, to the everyday correspondence of the Hellenistic world. This traditional language, long established, appears in the greetings found in the letters of St. Paul and the Church

Fathers, and our author's material clearly shows that the well-known salutatory and valedictory phrases of Cicero's letters are but renderings of expressions in vogue among the Greeks. Thus, the basic type of opening formula found in familiar letters of the Greeks, A- to B- *χαιρειν*, appears in the Latin A- to B- *salutem*. The closing formula, *ἔρρωσο* (Latin *vale*), is the basic form of the conventional "health wish," which appears further developed in the stereotyped opening formula, *εἰ ἔρρωσαι, εὐ ἀντίχαιροι*. *ἔρρωμεθα καὶ ἡμεῖς* (Cf. Cicero's *si tu vales, bene est. ego valeo.*), and in the common closing phrase *ἐπιμέλον δὲ σεαντοῦ ἵνα ὑγιαίνης* (= *cura ut valeas*).

Like the dating formula, so the greeting with some form of *ἀσπάζομαι* is mainly employed at the close of letters, though occasionally at the beginning. The writer uses this verb when he expresses his own greeting to the recipient, or when he transmits the greetings of a third person, or when he commissions the recipient to convey his greetings to others. The "illiteracy formula" is common; e.g., *ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι αὐτὸν γράμματα*. This would make it seem likely that the general correctness of expression and spelling in the letters is due to the employment of professional scribes. The "oath formula" appears in many of the official letters, the oath being sworn by the name of the emperor or by his *τύχην*.

The formulas are subject to much greater variation in wording according to the fancy of the writer than are their Latin adaptations; e.g., in petitions addressed to the higher Egyptian officials the common opening formula reverses the order of names, as To B- *χαιρειν* A-; the regular closing formula of the familiar letters, *ἔρρωσο*, becomes in documents addressed to officials *εὐτύχα*; in the "health wish" *ἔρρωσαι* is often replaced by *ὑγιαίνειν*. During the Roman period there is a tendency toward expansion and greater elaborateness. So the dating formulas and the oaths become weighted with the titles of the reigning emperors. Of the "health wish" the variations and expansions are many; to take a single example, *εὐχαίραι ὑμᾶς ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν*.

The range of material is covered by citations of examples in chronological order and filling more than half of the pages. The dissertation is provided with a table of contents, an excellent bibliography, a brief introduction on the development of letter-writing from a social business convenience into the literary epistle, and finally, with an index.

H. A. HAMILTON

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Histoire de la Littérature latine chrétienne. By PIERRE DE LABRIOLLE.

Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1920. Pp. viii+741.

Early in the present year (1925) Alfred A. Knopf, New York, brought out under the title *History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius* a translation of this book by Herbert Wilson, with an Introductory Foreword by Cardinal Gasquet.

In the Author's Preface, M. de Labriolle writes:

It seemed to me that I might be performing a useful service in providing for the first time [in France] an ample survey wherein I might endeavour to bring again to life the leading figures in Western Christianity, and to define the present stage of matters still in dispute.

The author has succeeded admirably, and it is hardly necessary to add that, in default of a similar work by an English or an American scholar, the translation should prove of great value in illuminating and revivifying an interesting and vital, but much neglected, chapter in the history of Christianity and of Western civilization.

In an Introduction of fifty pages the author discusses Latin Christian literature and modern criticism, the aesthetic interest of this literature, the intellectual formation of the Christian writers, and their contributions to Roman literature. He then deals, in some detail, with the doubts and problems which confronted the Christians with regard to their relations to pagan learning and the middle position which they finally took. He touches briefly on the rôle played by Christianity in the preservation and transmission of pagan culture and the extent to which this culture influenced Christianity, and concludes with some bibliographical notes. This Introduction is excellent and, in spite of occasional infelicities of style, deserves, and will repay, careful reading.

M. de Labriolle has treated his material in five books as follows: *I. The Beginnings; II. The Third Century to the Peace of the Church; III. The Golden Age of Latin Christian Literature; IV. The Dissolution of the Empire; V. On the Threshold of the Middle Ages.*

He deals interestingly and concisely with men and movements in this literature. At the beginning of each chapter is a condensed but useful special bibliography. At the end of the book are excellent tables: the first of these gives a general view of the literature of the period, the others are devoted to the more important individual authors.

The general plan of the book is good, but it would have been more natural and more logical to have put the first chapter of the second book ("Minucius Felix") in the first book; also to have included the chapter on "St. Augustine and Augustinianism" in the book dealing with the Golden Age. The remaining chapters could then have been brought together in one book.

A word as to the English translation. The typography is excellent, the paper and the binding are good; the translation itself is in numerous places inaccurate and unidiomatic; the editing is slovenly. For example: On page 2, "it is also almost Roman and much more modern" is a mistranslation of "elle est presque aussi romaine et beaucoup plus moderne"; on the same page, "to other distinguishing features" is an incorrect rendering of "a d'autres spécialités." On page 8, "Fronto" appears as "Frontonius"—also on pages 110, 111, 124, and 338, and in the Index; the correct form also appears on page 111—apparently only because the passage is in Latin. On pages 33 ff., *Patrologie Latine* occurs; this form should either have been Englished or put

back into the Latin. Such and similar errors are frequent and annoying. Mr. Wilson has doubtless performed a service by translating this book, but he has not made the original work unnecessary for the reader who would know exactly what M. de Labriolle wrote.

HOLMES V. M. DENNIS 3d

PRINCETON, N. J.

Theophrast bei Epikur und Lucrez. Von ERICH REITZENSTEIN. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1924. Pp. 108.

This study, dedicated to Franz Boll, whose untimely death all serious students of the classics mourn, is number 2 of the series *Orient und Antike*, edited by that scholar and Gotthelf Bergsträsser. In 1918 Dr. Bergsträsser, to whom we owe the commentary of Pseudo-Galen on the "Hippocratic" treatise *Περὶ ἐβδομάδων*, published an Arabic text under the title *Neue meteorologische Fragmente des Theophrast*. The Arabic version was made from the Syriac, and is thus two removes from the original Greek; but, like others of the sort, it labors under the additional handicap of being itself faulty as the work of one who did not fully comprehend the subjects discussed. It is this text which Dr. Reitzenstein takes as his point of departure in the study we are here considering.

It may as well be said at once that this little book is one of the best of its kind that has appeared in a long time. It is a pleasure to read the introductory chapter, in which the claims of the text to be regarded as derived from Theophrastus are vindicated, because Dr. Reitzenstein gives evidence of recognizing to the full the difficulties arising from the complicated course of transmission of the thought. There is in fact no reason to question that we have, albeit in derivative form, a genuine fragment of the first comprehensive history of philosophy, the *Φυσικῶν δόξα* of Theophrastus, whom the text names as the source. Whether, however, even the Syriac version was made from the unabridged original, cannot be determined.

Dr. Bergsträsser had noted many parallels, chiefly from the digest of Theophrastus by Aëtius and from the epistle of Epicurus to Pythocles. In an appendix (pp. 86-108) Reitzenstein prints entire Bergsträsser's German translation of the Arabic text and the parallels that he has noted, duly marking those which the first editor had adduced. This part of the study is of great practical value as giving a conspectus of at least the most important texts dealing with the subjects mentioned in the fragment.

In order to realize the actual and potential significance of the new text one needs, however, to be reminded that we have here another witness to the doxographic tradition which goes back directly to Theophrastus and through him, in great part, to Aristotle. The documents previously known had been sifted and assigned to their respective places in the tradition by Diels in his *Doxographi Graeci*, a work of capital importance. One of the principal stages between Theophrastus and Aëtius Diels there called the "Vetusta Placita,"

which he afterward identified as the work of Posidonius. Posidonius had in fact come to be a sort of *ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ* from which it was long the fashion to derive pretty much everything after 100 B.C. This was particularly true in regard to Lucretius, who was supposed to have got his doxographic lore not from Epicurus but from Posidonius. This tendency, fostered by Diels, has lately been in part checked by Reinhardt's *Poseidonios* (1921). It is the chief merit of Reitzenstein's study that he has practically eliminated Posidonius as a source of Lucretius and shown that the evidence rather indicated that the Roman poet drew directly from Epicurus who in turn used Theophrastus. I believe that he is right also in regarding the *Περὶ φύσεως* of Epicurus rather than the epitome of his opinions in the *Epistle to Pythocles* as the primary source of Lucretius, though I incline to think the latter was also well known to him. Reitzenstein follows Usener and Diels in holding this epitome spurious. In this I cannot agree with him, but with Von der Mühl accept it as genuine despite the doubts of certain ancients indicated by Philodemus. These epitomes formed the *Shorter Catechism* of the Epicurean brotherhood; and if the *Epistle to Pythocles* were not extant we should have to postulate one of like contents. That it has greatly suffered in transmission is evident; but there is no good reason for rejecting it.

Dr Reitzenstein is to be congratulated on his book, which is well written and shows few misprints, which are, moreover, easily corrected.

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BREVIORA

[The managing editor establishes this subdepartment because of the difficulty of procuring substantial critical reviews of all books, and the impossibility if they were found of printing them in our limited space. It is believed that brief but fair *comptes rendus* will prove more useful than a mere bibliographical notice. Contributions to this department should never exceed a page, and a paragraph is preferable.]

Cicero: Select Letters. A new edition based upon that of Watson, revised and annotated by W. W. How. Volume I: Text. Oxford: Clarendon Press (Oxford Univ. Press, American Branch), 1925. Crown 8vo, unpage. \$2.00.

Mr. Watson's portly book of selections from Cicero's letters, first published half a century ago and now long out of print, was by far the best introduction to its subject and to the Roman history of Cicero's time to be found anywhere. But it was a large book, and its price too high to make it popular for class use as a textbook. The new edition is to appear in two volumes, of which the first, containing the text only, is now placed before us. The promised Critical Introduction by Professor A. C. Clark, which, one might think, would properly accompany the text, is apparently relegated to the second volume.

The text of this volume is not a revision of Mr. Watson's text. It is made from the actual plates of Mr. Purser's edition in the Oxford text series. These have been cut, but not so as to fit neatly together in a connected whole. Letters have been permitted to begin or end on the pages just where they did in the Oxford original. Thus there are frequent yawning gaps between consecutive letters, and the page headings are in a sad jumble. Incidentally it may be remarked that the atrocious Oxford text system of omitting page-numbers is perpetuated here also. The book is thus a certainly unique typographic crazy-quilt. The Preface (not signed by Mr. How) apologizes for its aspect on the ground that "the publication is designed rather *urbi* than *orbi*," and that "the economy so achieved is reflected in the price." As to the former point, the book is certainly offered *orbi*; as to the latter, the reflection appears somewhat blurred.

Mr. Watson's selection comprised 148 letters: the present one has only 101 (a reminiscence of Tom?), of which 14 did not appear in its predecessor. The order of the selections in Mr. Watson's book has also been departed from in a few instances, doubtless to accord with more recent judgments of chronology.

The appearance of the volume of notes will be awaited with much interest. Let us hope that it will contain an index of proper names occurring in the text. That was to be found in the text edition of Mr. Watson, but has been omitted from this. Yet how can such an index be conveniently framed for such a book in the absence of page numbers?

E. T. M.

The Spirit of the Classics. Greek Literature in Translation. Selected and edited by GEORGE HOWE and GUSTAVE ADOLPHUS HARRER. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1924. Pp. xiv + 642. \$4.00.

At least one reason for the new renascence characterized by interest in the publication and reading of the classics in translation is to be found in the popularizing of a liberal education. Many colleges are no longer refusing to offer courses in classical literature studied through the English translation. The material for such a course is presented in the two volumes of *The Spirit of the Classics*; the companion volume on Roman literature by the same editors has already appeared. The volume under review contains nearly two hundred fairly representative selections covering the range of Greek literature from Homer to Lucian and varying in length from the five complete plays to the fragment of Sappho on "The Sweet Apple." The table of contents is, as the editors say, a sort of syllabus and it stimulates the interest of the reader by such headings as, "The Epic of Romantic Adventure" (*Odyssey*), "Tales of a Traveler" (*Herodotus*), and "Satire by a Conservative" (*Aristophanes*). The short essays and paragraphs of explanation prefixed to each of the main

divisions and to most of the selections are enlightening with reference to the social background and significance of the different periods, authors, and selections. Taken together they would not fall far short of making a satisfactory primer of Greek literature.

The reviewer finds little to criticize. The editors follow a bad English tradition in alluding to Xenophon's "Oeconomus" as "the Economics"; in this country this usage seems mostly limited to teachers of home economics, who are wont to refer their students to this essay. Most scholars surely have felt that the lines of the Sappho fragment mentioned above are poorly reproduced by the cacophony of Rossetti's

A-top on the topmost twig,—which the pluckers forgot, somehow,
Forgot it not, nay, but got it not, for none could get it till now.

But the choice of translators is a ready theme for the critic, and criticism brings us to the general inadequacy of all translation. Yet apparently the larger reading public is to get its foreign classics, as it has long gotten its Bible, through the medium of translation, and many college teachers and classes, and doubtless many general readers as well, will be ready to welcome this very useful book.

H. A. HAMILTON

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Die indogermanische Sprachwissenschaft. Eine Einführung für die Schule. By PAUL KRETSCHMER. Göttingen, 1925. Pp. 61.

This is the German original, with some modifications, of a sketch prepared for a series of popularizing scientific monographs fostered by the Albanian ministry of education, and first printed in an Albanian translation. It gives a readable and competent survey of the IE languages, history and method of the science, and a few pages on the question of the original home and civilization of the Indo-Europeans.

C. D. B.

Die Rechtstitel und Regierungsprogramme auf römischen Kaiser-münzen. (Von Cäsar bis Severus.) By OTTO TH. SCHULZ. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1925. Pp. x+124, 8vo. M. 6.

This treatise appears as the fourth part of the thirteenth volume of the *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* edited by Drerup-Grimme-Kirsch. Its author is professor *extra-ordinarius* in the University of Leipzig, and is already well known through a number of his contributions to our knowledge of the constitutional history of the Roman principate. In the present volume he essays a detailed examination of the types and legends on the imperial (and in some measure those on the senatorial) coinage of the first two centuries to determine therefrom what we may validly infer concerning the bases on which the successive rulers relied for support of their professed title

to authority, and concerning the character of their administrative "platforms." His conclusions are not infrequently in disagreement with what have been commonly accepted theories on the points concerned. He does not hesitate, for example, to oppose to Mommsen's dogmatic intuitions the testimony of these original documents. I fear, however, that mere convention played a larger part in the selection of types and legends in the case of the post-Julians than Professor Schulz appears willing to concede. If for no other reason, the book would be valuable as an example of the appeal to coinage even in the investigation of constitutional matters. Our American students especially have not appeared to be awake to the necessity of a knowledge of numismatics for the study and appreciation of ancient history, even though they have in the last generation learned something about the importance of inscriptions and of archaeology in general. But we are still too much under the sway of the mere written word.

Professor Schulz's book would be more attractive to read if he could have expressed his ideas in a more fluent style, and have relieved his pages of some of their copious and disconcerting abbreviations. Conviction sometimes depends on manner of presentation. This volume, for example, compared very unfavorably in that regard with another recent German book on a much more abstruse antiquarian topic that I am reading on the same day. Let us have, if possible, some of the curving graces of living form, and not merely its angular and stark framework.

E. T. M.

Studies in the Athenian Tribute Lists. By BENJAMIN DEAN MERITT.
Princeton, New Jersey, 1926.

This is a Princeton doctoral dissertation, reprinted from the *American Journal of Archaeology* (1925). The first study is a restoration in *IG*, I², 63 on the basis of *IG*, I², 64. According to Dr. Meritt's restoration, Mecyberna, Singus, and Gale were each assessed at only ten drachmae in 425-424 B.C. This low amount is explained on the ground that at this time many anti-Athenians had abandoned the coast towns and gone to Olynthus. Among the principal conclusions in the second study are the statements that tribute assessment periods may be determined not only by changes in the amounts of recorded tithe, but also by changes in the spelling of the names of cities, and by the introduction of a new geographical grouping of the cities on the quota lists. The author concludes on well-established grounds that there were tribute reassessments in 450-449 B.C., in 446-445 B.C., and in 443-442 B.C. In the third study the author produces ample evidence to show that there was a reassessment of tribute in the Athenian Empire at some time between 439-438 B.C. and 436-435 B.C. The evidence for accepting 438-437 B.C. as the exact year of the reassessment is convincing. The fourth and final article

concerns *IG*, I², 213, and marks a decided advance over the restored transcript in the *Corpus*. This dissertation has prepared the way for further investigations which Dr. Meritt has promised to carry on in collaboration with Dr. Allen West, of Wheaton College.

ALFRED P. DORJAHN

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Die alten Balkanillyrischen geographischen Namen, auf Grund von Autoren und Inschriften. By HANS KRAHE. Heidelberg: Winter, 1925. Pp. 128.

Exhaustive and critical collection of the material in an alphabetical list, followed by a study of the suffixes and a grouping by radical elements. The names of non-Illyrian origin, Greek, Roman, etc., are discussed separately. Important for the student of Balkan geography and history, as well as for the linguist.

C. D. B.

Studien der Bibliothek Warburg. Sprache und Mythos. By ERNST CASSIRER. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1925.

This is a thoughtful and well-written philosophical essay in the twilight zone of psychology, linguistic, comparative mythology and ethnology. Assuming the Kantian standpoint about ultimates the author starts with the *Götternamen* of Usener whose *Augenblicksgötter* he defends against Wundt's objection that they are only a postulate of theory by concrete examples from Spieth's *Die Religion der Eweer in Süd-Togo*. He is especially interested in the psychological and logical interrelations between myth, meaning, symbolism, *Begriffsbildung*, metaphor, and the primitive conception of the reality and magic powers of the "Word." I regret lack of space to discuss further his keen analysis of these relations.

PAUL SHOREY

Heiliges Geld, eine historische Untersuchung über den sakralen Ursprung des Geldes. Von BERNHARD LAUM. Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1924. Pp. xii+164. M. 540.

The conclusion at which the author of this interesting and valuable study arrives is that the use of money as a means of payment and medium of exchange had its origin in magic and religion. The *homo economicus* of dogmatic economists is a fiction, or at any rate not the relatively primitive being to whom we owe social conventions. The conclusion itself will no doubt ap-

pear to the historical student far from startling, however professed economists may regard it; for it is hardly to be considered news that wherever one follows an institution back far enough he arrives at a stage of society dominated by the conceptions which are well called magic. What gives interest and value to the present study is the sane and enlightened survey and evaluation of the evidence. Because of the importance of Greece in relation to coinage this investigation concerns the student of classical antiquity quite as much as the economist. He will be reassured in regard to the author's competence in this field when he learns that Dr. Laum studied under Bruno Keil.

So far as the main thesis of the book is concerned I am persuaded that Dr. Laum is in the right. There are, moreover, many suggestions offered in the course of his argument which seem to me important for the general study of classical antiquity; but there are likewise observations, but relatively indifferent for his thesis, which seem to me certainly wrong. These latter are, however, such as one would not naturally seek in this context and when found would regard in the light of *obiter dicta*; hence it would serve no useful purpose to single them out and criticize them here. It is perhaps more important to point out that this book well illustrates the sort of service a careful study of ancient institutions may render scholars in fields somewhat remote from our own.

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